Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant John Lewis sought post-conviction relief under Proposition 47 to recharacterize his grand theft felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Lewis argued on appeal that the standards outlined in subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1170.18 applied, and that the trial court erred when it denied his section petition for relief because it erroneously employed the standards for petitioners who were still "serving" their sentences. The different procedures and standards for obtaining the relief made available by section 1170.18 depended on whether the petitioner has "completed his or her sentence" (subdivision (f)), or is "currently serving a sentence" (subdivision (a)), for a felony that has been recharacterized as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The issue here was a matter of first impression and turned on statutory interpretation: which set of procedures and standards applied to a petitioner who is not currently incarcerated but was out on parole or postrelease community supervision. The Court of Appeals concluded that the standards and procedures specified in section 1170.18, subdivision (f), had limited applicability: it was only available to those persons who have completed their entire sentence, including any period of postrelease supervision, whether through parole or through PRCS. For those still serving "[a] sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison . . . [which] shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community supervision," the standards and procedures specified in section 1170.18, subdivision (a) applied, including the requirement (imposed under section 1170.18, subdivision (d)) that a successful petitioner serve a one-year period of parole unreduced by any "Sosa" credits. Because the trial court correctly selected the standards applicable to Lewis' petition, and he raised no separate claim that the court's rejection of his second application was an abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed the order. View "California v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Using software tools known as RoundUp, police learned that an IP address, later determined to be assigned to Evensen’s mother, had downloaded child pornography, using peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. Evensen pleaded guilty to various sex crimes after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Evensen’s argument that, the use of the Roundup software violated his Fourth Amendment rights by infringing on his reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer. View "People v. Evensen" on Justia Law

The trial court refused to reduce defendant Jillian Rendon’s felony conviction for forgery to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 because the court concluded that while the counterfeit bills she possessed had a face value of only $260, other material she also had in her possession (security strips, Benjamin Franklin faces, and blank pre-cut paper money) could have been used to make “tens of thousands of dollars” of counterfeit bills. After review of this matter, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred because the statute that dictated the punishment for forgery specified that where the offense related to a bank bill or note, the offense was punishable as a misdemeanor “where the value of the . . . bank bill[ or] note . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” Material that could be used to make counterfeit bills has no bearing on the application of the statute, and blank pre-cut paper money has no face value. "In applying section 473, only counterfeit bills that have a discernible face value are relevant to the valuation process. Here, defendant possessed counterfeit bills with only $260 in discernible value." In addition, the Court concluded the State was not entitled on remand to withdraw from the plea agreement that resulted in defendant’s forgery conviction just because that conviction could be reduced to a misdemeanor. "Even assuming the right to withdraw from a plea agreement may be available when the reduction of a conviction under Proposition 47 deprives the People of the benefit of the agreement, the People here have not shown that the reduction of defendant’s forgery conviction will result in such a deprivation. Accordingly, unless the trial court makes a discretionary determination that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the court must reduce her forgery conviction to a misdemeanor." View "California v. Rendon" on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Buford was serving a term of 25 years to life in prison for his conviction of a felony that was not violent (as defined by Pen. Code, sec. 667.5 (c)) or serious (as defined by Pen. Code, sec. 1192.7 (c)). Defendant filed a petition pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (hereafter Proposition 36 or the Act) to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced. The trial court concluded resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and denied the petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the State had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts on which a finding that resentencing a petitioner would have posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety reasonably can be based. Those facts would be reviewed for substantial evidence. The Court held further that the preponderance of the evidence standard did not apply to the trial court’s determination regarding dangerousness, nor did section 1170.126, subdivision (f), create a presumption in favor of resentencing. The ultimate decision of whether resentencing an inmate would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was within the sound discretion of the trial court. In the unpublished portion of the Court's opinion, it found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "California v. Buford" on Justia Law

In 1997, Cleamon Johnson was convicted for the first-degree murders of Peyton Beroit and Donald Loggins, with multiple-murder special-circumstances findings as to both. For these murders, Johnson was sentenced to death. In 2011, the California Supreme Court reversed Johnson's convictions and remanded for retrial. Before the second trial, the State investigated other murder and attempted murder cases from the early 1990s in which Johnson had been suspect. Ultimately, the State added new charges to the pending case against Johnson. In all, Johnson faced five capital murder charges and one attempted murder charge. The State also added gang enhancements. Johnson challenged the filing of the new charges in a motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss three of the new charges, but affirmed as to the others. As for gang enhancements added to the Beroit and Loggins counts, the Court remanded the case for an evidentary hearing to allow the State to present evidence to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness. View "Johnson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court's suppression order and subsequent dismissal of its prosecution of defendant Maria Elena Lopez on drug possession charges. Defendant was outside her car when a police officer, who watched her park the car, asked whether she had a driver’s license; when defendant said she did not, the officer asked whether she had any identification and defendant said she thought it was in the car; the officer then placed her in handcuffs and another officer retrieved a purse from the car; the subsequent search of the purse for identification uncovered a small amount of methamphetamine. The Attorney General argued the methamphetamine was found during a lawful search for identification and the trial court erroneously ruled the United States Supreme Court’s decision in "Arizona v. Gant," 556 U.S. 332 (2009) compelled suppression of the evidence. Defendant argued the officer unlawfully detained her and the subsequent search of her purse for identification was nevertheless unlawful on these facts. After review, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Attorney General’s assessment of the issue and reversed the trial court’s orders granting the suppression motion and dismissing the case against defendant. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) imposed a $179,329.60 penalty, pursuant to Labor Code section 3722(b) against Taylor for failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance as required by section 3700. Taylor requested an administrative hearing and then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus under section 3725. The petition was dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s statutory construction and equal protection challenges to the penalty and section 3722(b). The court held that “calendar year,” as used in section 3722(b), means the 12-month period immediately preceding a determination that an employer has been uninsured for the requisite period. View "Taylor v. Department of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

In 1996, Leonard Joseph Rangel was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of two misdemeanors. As a “third striker,” he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison. In 2012, the electorate adopted Proposition 36, known as the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Rangel filed a request under Proposition 36 which the superior court granted in 2014. Rangel was resentenced to a total of nine years in state prison. The State did not challenge the order granting Rangel’s petition. Due to the nature of his conviction, Rangel would normally have been subject upon release from prison to a period of community supervision under part of the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011 (PCSA). The superior court in this case offered Rangel the choice to participate in the community supervision program. Rangel declined the offer, and the superior court did not order him to participate in community supervision. The State petitioned the Court of Appeals for extraordinary relief, challenging the Superior Court's order declining to place Rangel on community supervision following his release from prison. In the Court of Appeals' original published opinion (filed January 12, 2016 and modified on Feb. 2 and 4, 2016), the Court agreed with the superior court’s decision and denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and subsequently transferred the matter to back to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the prior opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of "California v. Morales," (63 Cal.4th 399 (2016)). Having considered "Morales" and the supplemental briefs filed by the parties, the Court of Appeals granted the State's petition. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant William Johnson of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and hit and run with injury. The jury also found true two enhancement allegations; defendant fled the scene, and the collision resulted in a fatality. The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict on the other charged count, second degree murder, and the trial court granted a mistrial with respect to that count. On retrial, a new jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder. In this appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred during his retrial by not informing the jury that he had been convicted in the first trial of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and that the error required reversal of his second degree murder conviction. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s instructions to the jury for defendant’s retrial were erroneous in several respects, and the second degree murder conviction had to be reversed. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

William Cady drove his vehicle at an excessive and unsafe speed while intoxicated, resulting in an accident that killed three of his passengers and injured two others. A jury found Cady guilty of: (1) three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (with the further finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury); (2) one count of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury; (3) one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more causing injury; and (4) one count of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury. The trial court sentenced Cady to 18 years in prison. Cady raised two issues on appeal: (1) that the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was a lesser included offense of the crime of driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury, so that he should not have been convicted on the former count; (2) with regard to the charge of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the trial court prejudicially erred in not sua sponte giving the jury the option of convicting him of the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated for those counts. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury was indeed a lesser included offense of the driving under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug causing injury, for which Cady was convicted in another count. However, there was no merit to Cady's contention that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated as a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The Court reversed the conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury, and affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Cady" on Justia Law