Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

The case involves Pacific Bell Telephone Company and other utilities suing the County of Napa and the state Board of Equalization for a refund of property taxes and declaratory relief. The utilities argue that from 2018 to 2023, the tax rates used to compute the debt-service component of their property taxes were higher than those applied to other properties, violating the California Constitution's requirement that public utility property be taxed in the same manner as other property.In the lower court, the trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer to the utilities' complaint without leave to amend, based on the precedent set by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the California Constitution does not mandate that public utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasoning in Santa Clara and another case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced. The court concluded that the constitutional provision does not require the same or comparable debt-service tax rates for public utility and nonutility property. The court also rejected the utilities' claim that the tax rates violated the principle of taxation uniformity embodied in the California Constitution. The judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa" on Justia Law

Daniel Bray pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to two years of formal probation with several conditions, including restrictions on Internet use, dating or socializing with individuals who have custody of minors, and prohibitions on possessing or frequenting places with pornography. Bray challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.The Santa Clara County Superior Court imposed these conditions, and Bray objected to the conditions regarding Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography. The trial court overruled his objections, finding the conditions reasonable and related to the offense. Bray then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the Internet use restriction was overbroad, as it unduly burdened Bray's ability to perform daily tasks and maintain employment. The court also found the condition on dating and socializing overbroad, as it infringed on Bray's right to freedom of association without being closely tailored to the goal of protecting minors. Additionally, the court agreed with the Attorney General's concession that the conditions regarding pornography were unconstitutionally vague and needed modification.The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to strike or modify the conditions on Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography to ensure they are narrowly tailored and specific. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Bray" on Justia Law

Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of an annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax that required voter approval, which had not been obtained. The trial court rejected the owners' argument and ruled in favor of the County.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered judgment for the County, finding that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the separate assessment. The court considered various costs, including those related to a new computer system and assessment appeals, even though these costs were not included in the original budget used to set the fee.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the $23 fee was not a tax requiring voter approval under Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed, as it included costs unrelated to the specific service of providing separate timeshare assessments and did not accurately reflect the actual cost of the service. The court also ruled that the trial court erred in considering costs incurred after the fiscal year used to set the fee.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to decide on the declaratory, injunctive, and/or writ relief sought by the owners. The County must prove the reasonable and necessary costs of providing the separate assessment service, excluding costs for valuing the timeshare project as a whole. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

In 1996, Daniel Whalen was convicted of first-degree murder during a robbery and received a death sentence. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme Court in 2013, and his first state habeas corpus petition was denied in 2014. Whalen filed a second habeas corpus petition in 2016, raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and constitutional challenges to the death penalty. This petition was transferred to the Stanislaus Superior Court, which denied it in 2022, finding the claims were successive and could have been raised earlier.Whalen appealed the denial and requested a certificate of appealability from the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appellate court initially denied the request, but the California Supreme Court directed it to reconsider whether the superior court had properly ruled the petition as successive under Proposition 66 and its implementing statutes. Upon remand, the superior court reaffirmed its decision that the claims were successive and granted a certificate of appealability without specifying the claims.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found the certificate of appealability fatally defective because it did not indicate which claims were substantial, as required by law. The court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the superior court to either deny the certificate of appealability or issue a new one that complies with the statutory requirements. The appellate court also upheld the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d), which limits successive habeas corpus petitions to claims of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence. View "In re Whalen" on Justia Law

In 1996, Jesse Banda Ortega, then 17 years old, was involved in a gang-related shooting in Santa Ana, California, resulting in one death and one injury. Ortega was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of attempted murder, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 17 years, making him eligible for parole after 42 years.Ortega filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) in 2023, arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that he should be eligible for relief under equal protection principles. The Superior Court of Orange County denied his petition, stating that Ortega's sentence included a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration, thus it was neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Ortega's sentence, modified by legislative changes requiring youth offender parole hearings, provided a meaningful opportunity for release after 25 years. Therefore, Ortega was not serving a sentence equivalent to LWOP. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Ortega's petition, concluding that his constitutional claim was moot due to the legislative changes ensuring parole eligibility. The court also found that Ortega's equal protection argument was moot, as his current sentence did not violate constitutional principles. View "P. v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Deshunn Lewis was charged with two counts of assault and alleged probation violations. He was found mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (Department), which was authorized to administer antipsychotic medication involuntarily. Lewis appealed, arguing that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because the trial court issued the involuntary medication order without an evidentiary hearing.The Contra Costa County District Attorney initially charged Lewis with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings due to doubts about his mental competence and appointed psychologists to evaluate him. Based on their reports, the court found him incompetent and committed him to the Department. After a month, the Department certified that Lewis had regained competence, and he pled no contest to the assault charge, receiving probation. However, a subsequent probation violation led to new charges and another suspension of proceedings due to doubts about his competence. A psychologist's report again found him incompetent, and the court committed him to the Department, authorizing involuntary medication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370(a)(2)(B) of the Penal Code does not require an evidentiary hearing before authorizing involuntary medication. The court found that the trial court's procedures, which included considering written reports from mental health experts and allowing for argument by counsel, provided sufficient due process. The court also held that the different procedural requirements for inmates and other civil committees did not violate equal protection, as there were rational bases for the distinctions. The court affirmed the trial court's order authorizing involuntary medication. View "P. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of threatening a police officer via social media while on mandatory supervision. As a condition of his postrelease community supervision, the trial court prohibited him from creating or using social media accounts and from accessing social media websites. The defendant challenged this condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially sentenced the defendant to a split sentence for various offenses, including carrying a concealed weapon and perjury. While on mandatory supervision, the defendant was convicted of making a criminal threat using his Facebook account. The trial court executed the previously imposed sentence and added a consecutive sentence for the new conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The trial court then imposed a revised sentence, and the defendant was released on postrelease supervision with the challenged social media condition.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the social media prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly defined the prohibited conduct. The court also found that the condition was not overbroad, as it was closely related to the defendant's use of social media to commit the crime. The court concluded that the prohibition was a reasonable measure to protect the state's interest in the defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "People v. Nixon" on Justia Law

San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement.The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Utility companies operating in Placer County, California, filed a complaint against the County and the Board of Equalization, seeking a refund of taxes. They alleged that the tax rate imposed on their state-assessed property was unconstitutionally higher than the rate imposed on locally-assessed property. The tax rate for state-assessed property is calculated under Revenue and Taxation Code section 100, while locally-assessed property is taxed under a different formula. The utility companies argued that this discrepancy violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates that utility property be taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.The Superior Court of Placer County sustained the County's demurrer, effectively dismissing the complaint. The trial court relied on the precedent set by the appellate court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the tax rates imposed on utility property were constitutional. The utility companies acknowledged that the Santa Clara decision was binding on the trial court but maintained that they had a good faith basis for their claims on appeal.The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the utility companies had not established that the trial court erred. The appellate court found that the utility companies did not present a valid basis for defining comparability to state a valid claim. The court noted that while the utility companies argued for comparable tax rates, they failed to provide a clear standard or formula to determine what constitutes comparability. Consequently, the court held that the utility companies did not meet their burden of proving that the County's tax rates were unconstitutional. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law