Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.   The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime View "In re Casey" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, attempted murder of two counts of robbery, and one count of receiving stolen goods and found firearm enhancements true. This is Defendant’s second petition; the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of his first one. Subsequently, the Legislature amended former section 1170.95, expanding it to provide relief to defendants convicted under any theory in which malice was imputed to them based solely on their participation in a crime. The Legislature also amended the statute to encompass defendants convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed his second petition under the amended statute, seeking resentencing for his murder and attempted murder convictions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that although recent case law has held that a conviction for provocative act murder requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, this was not the case when Defendant was convicted in 1994. Under the then-applicable Supreme Court authority, a defendant could be convicted for a killing by a third party provoked by an accomplice’s actions with malice aforethought, regardless of the defendant’s personal mental state. Defendant’s jury was so instructed. The court therefore concluded Defendant may have been convicted under a theory of imputed malice, and thus, he is not barred as a matter of law from relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Defendant’s contention, however, that he is entitled to relief for his attempted murder conviction, which did not implicate the provocative act doctrine nor any theory of imputed malice. View "P. v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence. View "People v. Peterson" on Justia Law

After defendant Christopher Esparza was pulled over for a Vehicle Code violation, a detective who specializes in gang enforcement recognized him and two of his passengers as members of a City Heights gang. The detective thought one of the passengers, Delfino Osnaya, was likely to be armed and told the other officers they needed to search him. After their patdown of Osnaya yielded a loaded gun, the officers searched Esparza as well and found another loaded weapon. Esparza contested the constitutional validity of his detention and search, arguing: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted his patdown; and (2) his detention was unreasonably prolonged because it lasted longer than necessary for the officers to issue him a citation for the Vehicle Code violation. The Court of Appeal found the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety. "The totality of the circumstances known to the initial investigating officer justified those concerns, which were only heightened as additional factors came to light during the course of the traffic stop." View "California v. Esparza" on Justia Law

At age 16, defendant Tory Bratton confessed to robbing a local market, with an accomplice, shooting the clerk dead, and taking $184. At his trial, his counsel argued that defendant’s confession was false and that he did not participate in the robbery at all. However, trial counsel did not argue that, even if defendant did participate, he was not the shooter. Defendant was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a personal firearm use enhancement and felony-murder special circumstances. He appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. When defendant filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, the trial court denied it; it ruled that the Court of Appeal's opinion in defendant’s direct appeal showed that he was the actual killer. The State conceded that this was error, but that the error was harmless because the record of conviction established defendant was the actual killer. Anticipating this response, defendant argued that, under standard principles of issue preclusion (a/k/a collateral estoppel), preclusion did not apply here because: (1) Whether defendant was the shooter was not actually litigated; (2) Trial counsel had an incentive not to contest whether defendant was the shooter; (3) The significance of whether defendant was the shooter was small at trial but, due to the then-unforeseeable enactment of section 1172.6, has since become great; (4) Section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law that warranted reexamination of whether defendant was the shooter. The Court of Appeal agreed that standard principles of issue preclusion applied here. However, the Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the shooter was actually litigated. Moreover, trial counsel did have an incentive to contest this issue; evidently, he simply made a tactical decision not to. Because trial counsel did have an incentive to contest the issue, it did not matter that it was unforeseeable that the issue would have additional future consequences. And finally, while section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law, the Legislature intended that it not constitute an exception ipso facto to issue preclusion. View "California v. Bratton" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Panighetti" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in count 1, second-degree murder in count 2, and attempted murder in count 3. He admitted the truth of the personal firearm use enhancements in each count. Counts 4 and 5 and the special circumstance allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 25 years to life in count 1, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. On February 1, 2021, Defendant executed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied Defendant’s petition in a written memorandum of decision. Defendant appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. However, the court modified the trial court’s memorandum of decision and minute order to reflect that Defendant, and not D.M., is the petitioner in this matter. The court explained that there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that the trial court engaged in premature fact-finding. The trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is part of the record of conviction. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that he only admitted that he was guilty of murder and attempted murder, which did not require that he harbor malice at that time. The court wrote that regardless of whether Defendant was required to admit to being the actual killer/attempted murderer, or could stipulate to particular facts without admitting them, the only reasonable view of the record here is that Defendant did admit that he was the actual killer/attempted murderer. View "P. v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In August 2010, after the California v. Samaniego, 174 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2009) and California v. Nero, 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (2010) were decided, defendant Brandon Burns was convicted on one count of first degree murder arising out of his participation with a codefendant in a gang-related shooting. The jury was instructed using the now-disapproved version of CALCRIM No. 400, but his counsel did not argue he was guilty of a lesser crime than the codefendant. Neither did the attorney argue the instruction was given in error. In 2022 however, Burns petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming he “could not presently be convicted of murder…because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” He argued that based on the error in former CALCRIM No. 400, the jury might have convicted him based on some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” This possibility, he argued, required he be granted an evidentiary hearing. Even accepting Burns’ argument regarding the flaw in the earlier version of CALCRIM No. 400, the Court of Appeal found the alleged error he identified had nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Burns failed to establish a prima facile case for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Burns" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or the District) and its then Superintendent adopted distance-learning policies that discriminated against poor students and students of color in violation of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs rest their challenge on various side letter contract agreements between LAUSD and the teacher’s union, Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA), which Plaintiffs contend implemented the distance-learning framework established by the Legislature in a discriminatory fashion. However, the District has returned to in-person instruction, and both the side letter agreements and the statutory framework that authorized them have expired. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs continue to seek injunctive relief to remedy what they contend are ongoing harms caused by the allegedly unconstitutional policies. The trial court sustained, with leave to amend, LAUSD’s demurrer on mootness grounds and granted, with leave to amend, its motion to strike the prayer for relief, reasoning that the requested remedies would not be manageable on a class-wide basis.   The Second Appellate District reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the trial court prematurely struck the prayer for relief at the pleading stage, notwithstanding the end of distance learning. Because Plaintiffs propose a seemingly viable remedy for the past and continuing harms they allege, their constitutional claims are not moot. The court wrote that the constitutionality of expired policies is measured by reference to the statewide standards that existed when the policies were in effect. Accordingly, the trial court erred by sustaining LAUSD’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action on mootness grounds. View "Shaw v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

While his two teenaged children were across the hall, defendant Anthony Morones, Jr., fired a gun outside a bathroom window. After he was arrested and a complaint was filed against him, he attempted to persuade his children to lie to law enforcement about the incident. A jury found defendant guilty of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, two counts of misdemeanor child endangerment, felon in possession of a weapon, and two counts of dissuading a witness. On appeal, defendant contended his witness dissuasion convictions under Penal Code section 136.11 should have been reversed because the statute only applied to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to charges being filed. He also contended the trial court erred when it failed to properly instruct the jury on elements of the offenses and consider section 654 in sentencing. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed two of defendant’s convictions for witness dissuasion, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Morones" on Justia Law