Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs and bribing an executive officer. During the arrest, the officer observed signs of intoxication and conducted field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed. A preliminary alcohol screening test showed no alcohol, leading the officer to suspect drug use. The defendant admitted to using cannabis and Alprazolam. At the police station, the defendant initially agreed to a blood test but later refused without a warrant. The officer obtained a warrant, and the blood test confirmed the presence of drugs. The defendant was charged and convicted of DUI and bribery.The Superior Court of California, County of Marin, handled the initial trial. The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, allowing them to infer consciousness of guilt from the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test. The defendant was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to three years of probation and 180 days in jail. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instruction was improper because he had a constitutional right to refuse the blood test without a warrant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the instruction was proper, stating that while the Fourth Amendment prohibits criminal penalties for refusing a blood test without a warrant, it does not prohibit all consequences. The court emphasized that implied consent laws can impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences for refusal. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that the instruction did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

Jose Oliveras, serving a life sentence without parole, was found with over 600 pornographic images on a tablet assigned to him. The images were stored on a removable SIM card. Oliveras was charged with possession of contraband under California Code of Regulations (CCR), title 15, section 3006(c). He pled guilty to the administrative violation and received counseling without reprimand. However, at a subsequent classification review, his computer clearance was rescinded due to the violation, which was interpreted as computer fraud or abuse under CCR sections 3040(h) and 3041.3(j).Oliveras filed a grievance with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), arguing that his violation did not constitute computer fraud or abuse. The CDCR denied his grievance and subsequent appeal. He then petitioned the superior court, which upheld the decision, stating it was supported by "some evidence." Oliveras filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District. While the petition was pending, his computer clearance was reauthorized at an annual review.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the issue was not moot despite the reauthorization of Oliveras's computer clearance. The court found that the classification of his violation as computer fraud or abuse could still affect future decisions. The court held that Oliveras's conduct did not constitute computer fraud or abuse under Penal Code section 502, as there was no evidence he used the tablet's functions to obtain or distribute the images, nor did his actions align with the legislative intent behind section 502. The court reversed the October 2022 revocation of Oliveras's computer clearance and ordered the removal of any reference to this revocation from his file. View "In re Oliveras" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Haadi Bolourchi, who was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The defendant was pulled over by Officer Kevin Finerty for vehicle code violations. The officer noticed signs of intoxication and conducted several field sobriety tests, which Bolourchi failed. Bolourchi admitted to smoking cannabis the day before and was arrested. Officer Finerty requested Bolourchi to submit to a blood test, but Bolourchi insisted that a warrant be obtained first. Bolourchi also offered Officer Finerty $1,000 to let him go, which was interpreted as a bribe.In the trial court, Bolourchi was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Bolourchi on three years’ probation, and ordered a jail term of 180 days. Bolourchi appealed, arguing that the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, an instruction that states a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by California’s implied consent statute may show consciousness of guilt.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a motorist's refusal to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained can be used as an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt in a DUI trial. The court found no instructional error in the use of CALCRIM No. 2130 and rejected Bolourchi's argument that he had a constitutional right to demand a warrant before submitting to a blood draw. The court concluded that while the Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant to conduct a blood draw, Bolourchi could still face an adverse inference at his trial on a DUI charge as a cost of refusing a blood test. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

In 1999, Sylvester Williams was convicted of indecent exposure with a prior conviction and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional two years for two prior prison term enhancements. In 2012, Williams filed a petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied Williams’ petition after finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In 2023, Williams sought relief for his newly invalid prior prison term enhancements, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced to a maximum sentence of six years as a “two-striker” under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The trial court agreed and resentenced Williams to six years, struck the two prior prison term enhancements, and deemed the sentence satisfied.The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act when resentencing Williams under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. They contended that by doing so, the court bypassed the public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 of the Three Strikes Reform Act, and that section 1172.75 thereby constitutes an improper amendment of the Three Strikes Reform Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the People. It held that applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the voter-approved Three Strikes Reform Act. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order resentencing Williams to a six-year term and to hold a new resentencing hearing at which Williams’s sentence of 25 years to life is reinstated. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom and the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) introduced the Blueprint for a Safer Economy, a color-coded, risk-based framework for managing restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Blueprint included restrictions on business activities, including customer capacity limitations. Plaintiffs, Central California businesses and their owners, filed suit against the Governor and others responsible for creating and enforcing the Blueprint, alleging that its creation and enforcement were unlawful. They claimed that the Governor and CDPH lacked statutory authority to implement the Blueprint, and that broadly interpreting the Emergency Services Act (ESA) and Health and Safety Code section 120140 conferred unfettered discretion on defendants to impose restrictions on businesses, violating the California Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine.The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Blueprint. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal as moot because the Governor had rescinded the Blueprint. After this, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and denied plaintiffs’ motion, holding that the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Newsom v. Superior Court (Gallagher) had rejected the same challenges to the Governor’s emergency powers that plaintiffs assert. The court entered judgment in defendants’ favor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court followed Gallagher and concluded it governs the outcome of this appeal. The court held that the ESA permitted the Governor to amend or make new laws and did not violate the constitutional separation of powers by delegating quasi-legislative power to the Governor in an emergency. The court also found that the ESA contained several safeguards on the exercise of the power, including that the Governor must terminate the state of emergency as soon as possible and that the Legislature may terminate the emergency by passing a concurrent resolution. View "Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of San José and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA). The city had a significant unfunded liability in its pension plans for city employees. To address this shortfall, the city council adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds, provided they result in savings for the city. The HJTA argued that this action violated the constitutional debt limitation, which prohibits cities from incurring any indebtedness or liability exceeding the income and revenue provided for a given year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters.The trial court upheld the city's actions, ruling that the bond issuance falls under the obligation imposed by law exception to the debt limitation. The HJTA appealed this decision, arguing that the city's actions violate the constitutional debt limitation and lack statutory authority.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment, but for different reasons than the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the city has not incurred any indebtedness or liability exceeding its annual income and revenue because the city's actions do not trigger the constitutional debt limitation. The court also found that the city has the authority under state law to issue the bonds. View "City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn." on Justia Law

The case involves Jameal M. Mosley, who was charged with unauthorized possession and transportation of a machine gun, being a felon in possession of a firearm for the benefit of a street gang, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. These charges stemmed from warrantless searches of Mosley's car and person, which yielded a loaded magazine and a Glock handgun with an automatic switch. Mosley filed a motion to suppress the magazine and handgun, arguing that the searches were unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.The trial court held a suppression hearing. The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department had received a call about a group of men creating a music video in a parking lot, with one of them holding a handgun. The officers arrived at the scene and detained all members of the group, including Mosley. They found a firearm on one of the men, D.M., and another firearm in D.M.'s car. Mosley was detained for approximately 41 minutes before his car was searched, revealing a loaded magazine. A subsequent search of Mosley's person revealed a Glock handgun with a switch. The trial court denied Mosley's motion to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was not prolonged.Mosley filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District. The appellate court agreed with Mosley's argument that the trial court erred in finding the warrantless searches were supported by probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to search Mosley's car and that the detention was unlawfully prolonged. The court granted Mosley's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Mosley's motion to suppress and enter a new order granting the motion. View "Mosley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Clifford Alan Dilbert, who filed petitions for clemency and/or commutation of his prison sentence with the Governor's office in 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2021. Dilbert claimed that he had not received any communication from the Governor's office regarding the processing of his clemency petition. He sought a writ of mandate to compel Governor Gavin Newsom to process his applications and reapplications for clemency/commutation, render a decision on those applications, and notify him of the decision in a timely manner.The Superior Court of Sacramento County sustained the Governor’s demurrer to the petition without leave to amend. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right to have his applications processed within a particular time frame and the law imposes no duty to process clemency applications within a particular time frame. Dilbert appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court found that neither the California Constitution nor any provision of Penal Code sections 4800 to 4813 contains an express requirement that the Governor process clemency applications within a specified time frame. The court also rejected Dilbert's argument that the application instructions created an obligation for the Governor to grant discretionary clemency within a certain amount of time. The court concluded that Dilbert does not have a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution to have his application processed within a certain time frame. View "Dilbert v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case involves Eric Bean Knudsen, who had his driver's license suspended following an administrative per se (APS) hearing. The hearing officer from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded that Knudsen had driven his car with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Knudsen challenged this decision through a writ of mandate in the Kern County Superior Court, which was denied, and the suspension was upheld.Knudsen appealed the decision, arguing that his state and federal due process rights were violated because the hearing officer who conducted the APS hearing was not constitutionally impartial. He cited a previous case, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. DMV, which held that a public hearing officer who acts as both an advocate and adjudicator violates a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reviewed the case. The court agreed with Knudsen, concluding that the public hearing officer acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, which violated Knudsen's due process right to an impartial adjudicator. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new APS hearing. View "Knudsen v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law