Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a crime that started as an attempted robbery, and ended in the death of three individuals: the victim of the attempted robbery and two of the defendants' cohorts involved in that crime. A jury convicted defendant Steven Carter of one count of first degree murder and one count of attempted robbery. Defendant Michael Hall pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter, robbery, and an enhancement. The defendants raised separate sentencing challenges on appeal: (1) Carter argued the court violated Penal Code section 654 when it sentenced him to consecutive terms for attempted robbery and first degree murder of the robbery victim; (2) Hall contended the court abused its discretion in imposing a 12-year sentence under the terms of his plea agreement. Hall also challenged alleged errors made during his subsequent resentencing. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in Hall's subsequent resentencing, but disagreed with Carter's and Hall's remaining sentencing challenges. The judgment as to Carter was affirmed; judgment as to Hall was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial court granted petitioner Jason Berg's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeal issued an opinion in a prior appeal that constituted an "unqualified affirmance" of the order granting the petition. "An unqualified affirmance 'ordinarily sustains the judgment and ends the litigation.'" After the issuance of the remittitur in Berg I, the State filed a pleading in the trial court styled as a "Request to Reconsider and Vacate Previous Order." In its request, the State asked the court to vacate its prior order granting Berg's petition for writ of habeas corpus in light of an anticipated change in the law. In January 2018, after the new law became effective, the trial court granted the State's request, vacated its prior order granting Berg's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and issued a new order denying the petition. In his opening brief, Berg claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its prior order granting his petition for writ of habeas corpus, among other contentions. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's January 2018 order was void for lack of jurisdiction, and was thus reversed. View "California v. Berg" on Justia Law

Defendant Devashish Mazumder was charged with two assaultive felony sex offenses. As part of a negotiated plea, the State dismissed the two felony counts and Mazumder pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor simple battery. After Mazumder successfully completed a period of informal probation, the superior court dismissed the action. Mazumder then filed a petition for a finding of factual innocence and the sealing and destruction of his arrest records. The trial court denied Mazumder’s petition for a finding of factual innocence without conducting an evidentiary hearing because Mazumder pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery. Mazumder appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded a defendant who pleads guilty was statutorily precluded from a finding of factual innocence because a “conviction has occurred” in the defendant’s “case” as a result of the guilty plea. Further, as a matter of first impression, the Court held a dismissal after a defendant successfully completes probation does not expunge the defendant’s conviction with regard to a defendant’s filing a petition for a finding of factual innocence. View "California v. Mazumder" on Justia Law

In March 2003, Raul Novoa pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days in county jail and three years' probation. In 2012, the United States began deportation proceedings against Novoa, which were ongoing at the time of this opinion. In May 2017, Novoa successfully moved to vacate his 2003 conviction per Penal Code section 1473.7. The State appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) holding Novoa's trial counsel to a duty the law did not require; and (2) finding Novoa suffered prejudice. In support of its position, the State contended the superior court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the State argued laches prohibited Novoa's motion. The Court of Appeal found the State’s arguments were without merit and thus affirmed the superior court. View "California v. Novoa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the probate court's order striking her petition to enforce a no contest clause in a trust under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, and denying her motion to recover attorney fees.The Court of Appeal agreed with the probate court, and with a recent decision by Division Five of this district, that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to a petition such as plaintiff's seeking to enforce a no contest clause. However, the court held that plaintiff adequately demonstrated a likelihood of success under the second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure. In this case, defendant's judicial defense of the 2007 Amendment to the Trust that she procured through undue influence met the Trust's definition of a contest that triggered the no contest clause. Furthermore, under sections 21310 and 21311, that clause was enforceable against defendant. The court also held that plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that defendant lacked probable cause to defend the 2007 Amendment. The court held that the findings of the probate court concerning defendant's undue influence, which this court affirmed, provided a sufficient basis to conclude that plaintiff has shown a probability of success on her No Contest Petition. Finally, the court held that plaintiff had the contractual right to seek reimbursement of her attorney fees incurred in resisting defendant's appeal of the probate court's ruling invalidating the 2007 Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 1991, 70-year-old Cary was shot and killed as she made a night deposit of the receipts from the liquor store where she worked. Davis, Taylor, Shackelfoot, and Lawless had planned the robbery. Davis attempted the robbery and shot Cary while the others waited in a car driven by Taylor. A jury convicted Taylor of first-degree felony murder and found that the killing occurred in the commission of an attempted robbery that he aided and abetted “as a major participant” and “with reckless indifference to human life,” a special circumstance requiring a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (Penal Code 190.2(d)). The reckless indifference finding was based on the fact that after the shooting, Taylor simply drove off, later stating, “Fuck that old bitch.”In 2018, Taylor sought habeas corpus relief to have the special circumstance vacated under the California Supreme Court’s “Banks” and “Clark” decisions, which clarified what it means for an aiding and abetting defendant to be a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life when he “knowingly creat[es] a ‘grave risk of death.’” The court of appeal granted his petition. Evidence of a defendant’s actions after a murder betraying an indifference to the loss of life does not, alone, establish that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death. There was no other evidence that Taylor had such intent. . View "In re Taylor" on Justia Law

In the underlying actions, the People asserted claims under Business and Professions Code section 17501 against real parties in interest and alleged that real parties sold products online by means of misleading, deceptive or untrue statements regarding the former prices of those products. The trial court sustained real parties' demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to real parties.The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate seeking relief from the ruling regarding the section 17501 claims, and held that real parties failed to demonstrate any constitutional defect on demurrer. Regarding real parties' challenge to section 17501 as an unconstitutional regulation of free speech, as a preliminary matter, the court rejected petitioner's contention that the statute targets only false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech; the plain language of the statute restricts protected commercial speech and thus, the statute was subject to the test for constitutional validity set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (1980) 447 U.S. 557, 566; and, because the undeveloped record was inadequate to apply the test, real parties' "free speech" challenge necessarily failed on demurrer. The court also rejected real parties' contention that section 17501 was void for vagueness, and rejected the facial and as-applied challenges. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

An onlooker called 911 to report that defendant Marcus Washington was walking around flashing a gun. Defendant fled on foot from responding police; officers eventually arrested defendant and recovered a loaded magazine and a firearm in his path of flight. A jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and obstructing a peace officer during the lawful performance of his duties. Defendant admitted a strike prior and a prior prison term, and was sentenced to seven years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) because he was indigent, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for payment of costs for copying discovery, even though his retained counsel had access to the materials at the district attorney’s office and the written retainer agreement between his mother and counsel provided for payment of routine costs and expenses; (2) the court violated his due process rights by denying him all relevant discovery before trial; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her opening statement and closing remarks by referring to facts not supported by the evidence, and by misstating the law regarding possession of firearms by a felon; (4) insufficient evidence supports his possession convictions; and (5) the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for discovery of the personnel records of a police officer who was not present when defendant was apprehended and who did not testify at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s judgment of conviction. View "California v. Washington" on Justia Law

During his trial for the attempted murder of a police officer, defendant Roberto Flores repeatedly objected to his counsel's decision to admit Flores was driving the car that seriously injured the officer. In his professional judgment, counsel elected to concede the act of driving and instead assert that Flores never formed the premeditated intent to kill necessary for first degree murder. Similarly at a subsequent trial on weapons possession charges, Flores objected when his counsel decided to concede that Flores possessed certain firearms, instead arguing that the possession was not "knowing" because Flores did not understand the prohibited nature of the weapons. On appeal, Flores asked the Court of Appeal to reverse his two convictions, asserting that under McCoy v. Louisiana 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018), it was structural error for counsel to take a factual position at odds with Flores's insistence that he did not commit the criminal acts alleged by the prosecution. Among other arguments, the State contended the disagreement between Flores and his lawyer amounted to a strategic dispute about how to best achieve an acquittal - traditionally the province of counsel - rather than an intractable conflict about Flores's goal of maintaining his factual innocence of the charged crimes. Based on its reading of McCoy, the Court of Appeal was unable to characterize Flores' statements as presenting a "mere dispute" over trial strategy where counsel's judgment trumped that of the client's. "The record before us demonstrates that counsel overrode Flores's stated goal of maintaining his innocence of the alleged acts. Instead, in pursuit of the understandable objective of achieving an acquittal, he conceded the actus reus of the charged crimes at both trials. Although any reasonable lawyer might agree with counsel's judgment, McCoy instructs that this is a decision for the client to make. Accordingly, we reverse." View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Beau Dearborne of: human trafficking, kidnapping to commit a sex offense, two counts of forcible rape in concert, two counts of forcible oral copulation in concert, second degree robbery, two counts of pimping, and two counts of pandering. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for and aggregate 205 years to life plus 28 years. On appeal, defendant: (1) challenged the evidence presented at trial as insufficient to support his convictions; (2) argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury on "forcible rape;" and (3) the calculation of his sentences. The Court of Appeal concurred with defendant that the trial court had discretion with regard to sentences on several of the charges, and that defendant was entitled to a stay of sentence on the pimping charge. With that, the Court affirmed the convictions and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Dearborne" on Justia Law