Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This lawsuit alleged a Trinity County deputy sheriff phoned citizens James and Norma Gund (who did not work for the County) and asked them to go check on a neighbor who had called 911 for help likely related to inclement weather. The Gunds unwittingly walked into a murder scene and were savagely attacked by the man who apparently had just murdered the neighbor and her boyfriend. The Gunds sued the County of Trinity and Corporal Ron Whitman for negligence and misrepresentation, alleging defendants created a special relationship with the Gunds and owed them a duty of care, which defendants breached by representing that the 911 call was likely weather-related and “probably no big deal” and by withholding information known to defendants suggesting a crime in progress. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation, because Labor Code section 3366 provides that any person “engaged in the performance of active law enforcement service as part of the posse comitatus or power of the county, and each person . . . engaged in assisting any peace officer in active law enforcement service at the request of such peace officer, is deemed to be an employee of the public entity that he or she is serving or assisting in the enforcement of the law, and is entitled to receive compensation from the public entity in accordance with the provisions of this division [workers’ compensation]. . . .” Defendants’ motion did not acknowledge or address plaintiffs’ factual allegations that the deputy misled them about the nature of the activity, minimized the risk, lulled them into a false sense of security, and that plaintiffs relied on the deputy’s misrepresentations. Absent section 3366, these allegations potentially supported imposing tort liability against defendants. The Court of Appeal concluded section 3366 applied to this case, because responding to a 911 call for help of an uncertain nature is active law enforcement, regardless of the deputy’s misrepresentations. Since the Court concluded section 3366 barred plaintiffs’ lawsuit on the ground they were assisting in active law enforcement, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gund v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

On the evening of January 12, 2017, Deputy Slawson was on duty at the Barstow Sheriff’s Department. At about 7:30 p.m., she was asked by a fellow deputy to watch a juvenile he had detained (minor R.W.) during a stolen vehicle investigation until her mother arrived to pick her up. The department had a policy which required minors in sheriff’s custody to be kept at the station for their safety until they could be released to their parent or another authorized adult. At the time she was turned over to Deputy Slawson’s custody, minor was no longer under investigation and no charges were being filed against her. Deputy Slawson escorted minor into the report-writing room and told her to have a seat until her mother arrived. As Deputy Slawson was doing paperwork on an unrelated matter, R.W. began speaking to her about the vehicle theft. R.W. said she stole the car, and she wanted to speak with the deputy who made the initial traffic stop and arrested the driver. R.W. asked to use Deputy Slawson’s personal cell phone to call the deputy, but Deputy Slawson refused. Minor became frustrated and increasingly impatient. Deputy Slawson then asked R.W. some basic questions about the case. When it became clear from R.W.'s responses that she had no involvement in the car theft, Deputy Slawson told minor that she did not need to lie to make herself a suspect in that case. R.W. got upset, grabbed her bags, and walked out of the room; she refused to comply with the deputy's commands to return. Another female deputy helped Deputy Slawson stop R.W. from leaving, and a third deputy eventually came to assist as well. R.W. resisted the deputies’ efforts, and she was handcuffed. R.W. was seated back in the report-writing room but was not arrested. After about 10 minutes, the handcuffs were removed. R.W.'s mother arrived 15 to 20 minutes later and took custody. Deputy Slawson issued R.W. a citation for resisting a peace officer, and a juvenile court subsequently found true the allegation that minor violated Penal Code section 148(a)(1). R.W. appealed her conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding, because her custody was unlawful at the time Deputy Slawson restrained her from leaving. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. View "In re R.W." on Justia Law

San Jose Police Officer Prim noticed defendant riding a bike “the wrong way into traffic,” while drinking from an open Budweiser beer can. Prim stopped defendant and took the can, smelled it, and looked inside. He determined that the can contained beer. Prim noticed that defendant was sweating heavily and had dried, chapped lips and “fluttering eyelids.” Prim intended to cite defendant, who was wearing a t-shirt, which extended below his waistband so Prim could not see defendant’s waistband area or the pockets of defendant’s shorts. Prim could see “bulges” inside defendant’s shorts pockets. Based on his “training and experience,” concerns for his personal safety and his need to observe defendant’s hands during tests he planned to administer to determine whether defendant was under the influence of a stimulant, Prim conducted a pat search then conducted a Romberg test, observed further indications that defendant was under the influence, and arrested defendant. Prim then reached into defendant’s pocket—where he had observed the bulges—and removed a cell phone, lighter, and a baggie containing methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and using or being under the influence of a controlled substance. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Prim had “specific and articulable facts” that would have led a reasonable officer reasonably to conclude that defendant “may be armed and presently dangerous.” View "People v. Sacrite" on Justia Law

Petitioners were companies or wholly-owned subsidiaries involved in the manufacture, distribution or sale of pharmaceuticals or generic prescription drugs, including the prescription drug Niaspan. In October 2016, the Orange County District Attorney, representing "the People of the State of California" in association with private counsel, filed a complaint for violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging that petitioners either entered into agreements or otherwise engaged in conduct that prevented other generic manufacturers from launching their own Niaspan equivalent, causing purchasers and others in California to overpay for the drug. In this writ proceeding, petitioners asked the Court of Appeal to resolve a single issue: whether section 17204 of the UCL "permit[s] a county district attorney to bring a claim that seeks relief for alleged injuries to residents of California counties whom he or she does not represent, based on conduct occurring outside the county he or she serves . . . ." Petitioners argued district attorneys have no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization, and neither the Government Code, nor Business and Professions Code section 17204, authorized the district attorney of a single county to seek statewide penalties for alleged UCL violations. The Court granted the petition: "[t]hough section 17204 confers standing on district attorneys to sue in the name of the people of the State of California, it cannot constitutionally or reasonably be interpreted to grant the District Attorney power to seek and recover restitution and civil penalty relief for violations occurring outside the jurisdiction of the county in which he was elected. A contrary conclusion would permit the District Attorney to usurp the Attorney General's statewide authority and impermissibly bind his sister district attorneys, precluding them from pursuing their own relief. Thus, in the absence of written consent by the Attorney General and other county district attorneys, the District Attorney must confine such monetary recovery to violations occurring within the county he serves." View "Abbott Laboratories v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Richard Brunton guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon in the commission for the force-likely assault. Brunton was accused of the single act of choking his cellmate with a tightly rolled towel. The trial court sentenced Brunton to six years in prison, consisting of four years on the force-likely assault conviction, one year for the deadly weapon enhancement attached to that conviction, and one year for a prison prior. The court imposed, but stayed under Penal Code section 654, a four-year sentence on the assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction. On appeal, Brunton argued to the Court of Appeal his force-likely assault conviction should have been vacated because it was merely a different statement of the same offense for which he was also convicted (assault with a deadly weapon). Furthermore, Brunton argued that, because the single offense of which he was convicted included the element that he used a deadly weapon, the Court should strike the deadly weapon enhancement attached to the force-likely assault conviction. After review, the Court agreed one of the duplicative convictions had to be vacated. Accordingly, the Court remanded with directions to the trial court to strike one of the duplicative convictions, to strike the deadly weapon enhancement attached to the force-likely assault conviction, and for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Brunton" on Justia Law

The California Court of Appeal consolidated cases to address a novel question regarding jurisdiction under the unique and complex cooperative federalism scheme of the federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.) (Act). The Act authorized the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. States, however, have the “primary responsibility for assuring air quality” and must each devise, adopt, and implement a state implementation plan (SIP) specifying how the state will achieve and maintain the national air quality standards. The SIP is submitted to the Agency’s administrator (Administrator) for approval. The cases here sought the same relief and practical objective: to invalidate and render unenforceable, in whole or in part (albeit on different grounds), a state regulation known as the Truck and Bus Regulation (Regulation), which was approved by the Administrator as part of and incorporated into California’s SIP. Plaintiff Jack Cody argued the Regulation violated the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution because it discriminated against out-of-state truckers by imposing a disproportionate compliance burden on them. Plaintiff Alliance for California Business (Alliance) argued the Regulation was unlawful because part of its mandate conflicted with state and federal safety laws. Defendants, including the California Air Resources Board (Board), raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) of the Act in both cases on appeal. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether section 307(b)(1) vested exclusive and original jurisdiction over these challenges to the Regulation incorporated into and approved as part of California’s SIP in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court concluded it did and affirmed the judgments for lack of jurisdiction. View "Alliance for Calif. Business v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

The juvenile court found minor E.P. committed second degree burglary from the Anaheim ICE public ice hockey facility in 2015. E.P. was also charged with possession of graffiti tools (court 2), receiving stolen property (counts 4-6), and illegal possession of an alcoholic beverage (count 7). E.P. contended his burglary finding (count 1) should have been reversed because the evidence showed he committed the new crime defined by the Legislature as shoplifting, but not burglary. Furthermore, he argued reversal of counts 4-6 because he could not be convicted of both shoplifting and receiving the same property. To E.P.'s argument on counts 4-6, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore reverse the findings on these counts; the Court affirmed count 2. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner Albert Ruedas was charged with various gang-related crimes and enhancements, including the special circumstances allegation he committed murder to further the activities of a criminal street gang. To prove the gang charges, the prosecution called an expert witness who based his opinions on a variety of extrajudicial sources, including testimonial hearsay. When defense counsel objected to the expert’s reliance on this evidence, the trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury not to consider the evidence for its substantive truth, but only as a basis for the expert’s opinions. Ultimately, the jury convicted petitioner as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. The conviction became final in 2015. The following year, the California Supreme Court decided California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016) case. Sanchez held that to properly evaluate an expert witness’ opinions, the jury generally must consider the evidence he relies on for the truth of the matter asserted therein, and therefore that evidence is subject to exclusion under the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, petitioner asked the Court of Appeal to apply Sanchez retroactively to his case and find the gang expert’s reliance on testimonial hearsay violated his confrontation rights. The Court determined Sanchez did not apply retroactively to cases like petitioner’s that were already final by the time Sanchez was decided. Therefore, petitioner could not avail himself of that decision, and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Ruedas" on Justia Law

Israel Soto appealed an order denying his petition to reduce his felony conviction for theft from an elder to a misdemeanor. He sought relief under section 1170.18, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which was enacted by California voters in November 2014 pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court denied Soto's petition on the basis that his conviction was categorically ineligible for relief. Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and California v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979), and Soto filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf. The Court of Appeal asked for supplemental briefing on whether Soto's conviction under section 368(d) was eligible for reclassification under Proposition 47 following California v. Page, 3 Cal.5th 1175 (2017). Having reviewed the submissions, the Court concluded Soto was ineligible for relief and affirmed. View "California v. Soto" on Justia Law

Petitioner, J.N., 17 years old at the time of the alleged offenses, was charged with murder. The evidence presented at the hearing in juvenile court established he did not kill anyone. The murder was committed while J.N. and two other minors, including the killer, were tagging (making graffiti) in a rival gang’s claimed territory. The killing occurred when the three minors were surprised by an adult rival gang member. The rival approached S.C., who pulled out a gun to scare the man. Undeterred, the man grabbed the gun in S.C.’s hand and a struggle ensued. Shots were fired as they wrestled over the gun. J.N. and the other minor stood frozen nearby. After the passage of Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, the superior court suspended criminal proceedings and certified J.N. to the juvenile court to determine whether he should be treated in the juvenile court system or prosecuted as an adult. The juvenile court determined J.N. was not suitable for treatment in the juvenile court. J.N. filed a petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition, arguing the court abused its discretion in applying Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The Court of Appeal determined a trial court must consider five statutory factors in making its decision whether the minor should be tried as an adult. Relevant here were two : (1) the circumstances and gravity of the charged offense; and (2) whether the minor could be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court’s determination J.N. was not suitable for treatment in the juvenile court was not supported by substantial evidence and was, therefore, an abuse of discretion. View "J.N. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law