Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a magistrate denied his motion to suppress, and the trial court denied his renewed motion to suppress, Oscar Millan pled guilty to one count of transporting methamphetamine, admitted having suffered four prior drug-related convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2(c), and admitted having suffered four prison priors. On appeal, Millan's primary contention was that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Millan argued the trial court should have granted the motion because law enforcement agents conducted a warrantless search of his rental car without probable cause and the State failed to prove that an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied. Millan also argued the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments on a drug program charge, and a lab analysis charge, and that the Court of Appeal should reduce the trial court's imposition of a $3,000 restitution fine and a $3,000 parole revocation restitution fine to $300 each in accordance with the trial court's purported intention to impose the minimum possible fines that the court could legally impose. In its initial opinion in this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because there was substantial evidence in the record that Millan implicitly consented to the search at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in imposing penalty assessments on the drug program charge and the lab analysis charge and that there was no basis for reducing the restitution or parole revocation restitution fines. In the unpublished portions of its opinion, the Court of Appeal restated those conclusions. View "California v. Millan" on Justia Law

After a magistrate denied his motion to suppress, and the trial court denied his renewed motion to suppress, Oscar Millan pled guilty to one count of transporting methamphetamine, admitted having suffered four prior drug-related convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2(c), and admitted having suffered four prison priors. On appeal, Millan's primary contention was that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Millan argued the trial court should have granted the motion because law enforcement agents conducted a warrantless search of his rental car without probable cause and the State failed to prove that an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied. Millan also argued the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments on a drug program charge, and a lab analysis charge, and that the Court of Appeal should reduce the trial court's imposition of a $3,000 restitution fine and a $3,000 parole revocation restitution fine to $300 each in accordance with the trial court's purported intention to impose the minimum possible fines that the court could legally impose. In its initial opinion in this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because there was substantial evidence in the record that Millan implicitly consented to the search at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in imposing penalty assessments on the drug program charge and the lab analysis charge and that there was no basis for reducing the restitution or parole revocation restitution fines. In the unpublished portions of its opinion, the Court of Appeal restated those conclusions. View "California v. Millan" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Jimmy and Uma Naidu, challenged a trial court order preventing them from using their licenses from the Contractors’ State Licensing Board (CSLB) as a condition of bail. Petitioners allegedly sold at least one of their business licenses to Raj Suri, whose own CSLB license was suspended, and then failed to supervise Suri despite retaining the status of “Responsible Managing Employee” in CSLB’s records. CSLB initiated an administrative proceeding to suspend or revoke petitioners’ business licenses. Petitioners were also defendants in a prosecution charging them with fraudulent use of a contractor’s license, and conspiracy, one of which is a felony. Prior to petitioners’ arraignment, the CSLB filed a request that the trial court suspend petitioners’ business licenses from the CSLB as a condition of bail. Petitioners filed written opposition to CSLB’s request and argued against the license suspension at the bail hearing. Nevertheless, the trial court released petitioners on their own recognizance (O.R.) but ordered their CSLB licenses suspended. Petitioners argue to the Court of Appeal that the trial court had no authority to suspend their CSLB licenses as a condition of O.R. release because this order infringed on their due process rights. They also contended the scope of the order containing the probation conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the license suspension could last beyond the conclusion of any criminal proceedings, even if petitioners are acquitted. Because the Court of Appeal agreed with the first premise, it did not reach the second. View "Naidu v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Acosta pleaded guilty to two counts of felony vandalism and admitted the gang enhancement attached to each count. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Acosta was placed on formal probation for three years on the condition he serve 365 days in custody with the possibility of work furlough, if eligible, after serving 90 days. Relevant here, the court also imposed terms and conditions of probation, four of which Acosta challenged on appeal: the search of his electronic devices (electronic search condition) (no. 6n); the requirement he stay away from the private residences he had vandalized with graffiti (stay-away condition) (no. 14); the treatment, therapy, and counseling condition (no. 7); and the alcohol (no. 8) and drug (no. 9) conditions. The State conceded the treatment, therapy, and counseling condition should be struck, but otherwise contended the remaining terms and conditions were properly imposed. The Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence in this record to support the imposition of the drug condition, but otherwise affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "California v. Acosta" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Acosta pleaded guilty to two counts of felony vandalism and admitted the gang enhancement attached to each count. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Acosta was placed on formal probation for three years on the condition he serve 365 days in custody with the possibility of work furlough, if eligible, after serving 90 days. Relevant here, the court also imposed terms and conditions of probation, four of which Acosta challenged on appeal: the search of his electronic devices (electronic search condition) (no. 6n); the requirement he stay away from the private residences he had vandalized with graffiti (stay-away condition) (no. 14); the treatment, therapy, and counseling condition (no. 7); and the alcohol (no. 8) and drug (no. 9) conditions. The State conceded the treatment, therapy, and counseling condition should be struck, but otherwise contended the remaining terms and conditions were properly imposed. The Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence in this record to support the imposition of the drug condition, but otherwise affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "California v. Acosta" on Justia Law

In 2014, W.S. filed a petition to establish a parental relationship, claiming to be daughter’s biological father. He stated he had a relationship with S.T., daughter’s mother, while she was married to, but separated from, her husband with whom she later reconciled. W.S. requested joint legal and physical custody, equal time visitation, and mediation to work out a parenting plan. He also requested daughter’s last name be changed. The trial court denied W.S.’s requests, finding he was not a presumed parent within the meaning of Family Code section 7611(d). The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the lower court’s determination that “receiving daughter into his home” under the statute required more than physically taking daughter into his home and required regular visitation and the assumption of parent-type obligations. The court also rejected W.S.’s argument that as daughter’s biological father, he had a right to visitation under section 3100 notwithstanding his failure to achieve status as a presumed parent. Equal protection challenges to the statute were “conclusory” and unsupported. View "W.S. v. S.T." on Justia Law

While driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, defendant-appellant David Doyle swerved into oncoming traffic and hit Mark Norton (the victim) who was riding a motor scooter. The victim died immediately. Defendant drove away from the scene with the scooter lodged under his vehicle. He was apprehended one mile from the scene of the accident. Defendant was found guilty after a court trial of vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs causing great bodily injury, and fleeing the scene of an accident involving great bodily injury or death. Defendant argued on appeal that he was not fully advised of his constitutional rights to a trial by 12 jurors prior to waiving his right to a jury trial and proceeding to a court trial. Finding that defendant’s waiver of a jury trial in this case was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Bettie Webb was arrested and eventually charged in a felony complaint with knowingly bringing controlled substances into a state prison, and unauthorized possession of a controlled substance in a prison. She posted a $50,000 bond in accordance with the bail schedule and was released. At her arraignment, Webb pleaded not guilty to the charges, but over her objection the magistrate imposed a condition that she would be subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver, finding it had inherent authority to do so. She petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the search condition. Pointing out the magistrate had not made a verified showing of facts, the superior court denied the petition, citing facts developed at Webb's preliminary hearing. Webb petitioned the Court of Appeal for habeas relief, contending the magistrate lacked statutory or inherent authority to impose the bail search condition, and imposition of the condition constituted a pretrial restraint without due process protections such as notice and a hearing or any showing that she poses a heightened risk of misbehaving while on bail. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court had no authority to condition Webb's bail on a waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we grant Webb's petition and order the search condition stricken from her bail order. View "In re Webb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit one behalf of himself and a putative class of California consumers who were over 30 years old when they subscribed to Tinder Plus, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the higher price Tinder charged its customers who were over 30 years old for the Tinder Plus service was discriminatory. The Court of Appeal held that the discriminatory pricing model, as alleged, violated the Unruh Act and the UCL to the extent it employed an arbitrary, class-based, generalization about older users' incomes as a basis for charging them more than younger users. The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer where nothing in the complaint suggested that there was a strong public policy that justified the alleged discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Candelore v. Tinder, Inc." on Justia Law

At age of 19, defendant Montrell Woods shot Kenny Hernandez to death during a confrontation between the two men at an apartment complex. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and also found he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the murder and to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the enhancement statute provided that “[n]otwithstanding [Penal Code s]ection 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the possession of a firearm charge from the murder charge, the court erroneously excluded evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the prosecutor committed two acts of misconduct, the court committed multiple instances of instructional error, and cumulative error resulted. Defendant also argued should have been remanded to the trial court so that he can make an adequate record for a future youth offender parole hearing and so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement based on a recent change to Penal Code section 12022.53 that took effect on January 1, 2018. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit to defendant’s claims of trial court error and prosecutorial misconduct. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant already had sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, but agree that remand was necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law