Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dinh Van Nguyen had a prior first degree burglary conviction which qualified as: (1) a “strike” prior; (2) a one-year prior prison term enhancement; and (3) a five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The information in this case contained one paragraph alleging the fact of the prior and citing the statute that defined a strike. It also contained a second paragraph realleging the fact of the prior and citing the statute that defines a prior prison term enhancement. However, it never specifically alleged a prior serious felony conviction enhancement. Defendant admitted the fact of the prior; he did not expressly admit its legal effect. Then, at sentencing, the trial court used the prior as a strike and as a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and defense counsel did not object. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by imposing the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. View "California v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court declared defendant-appellant, R.G. (Minor, born in April 2000), a dependent of the court. In 2016, while Minor remained a dependent of the juvenile court, the State filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had committed misdemeanor battery. After denying Minor’s request to refer the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.12 assessment and report, Minor admitted the allegation that she had committed misdemeanor battery. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed her on formal probation, placed her in the custody of Children and Family Services (CFS), and scheduled the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 241.1. After subsequently receiving a section 241.1 report, the court again declared Minor a ward of the court with “CFS lead jurisdiction.” On appeal, Minor contended the juvenile court prejudicially erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 assessment, report, and hearing prior to taking jurisdiction, resulting in violations of Minor’s statutory and due process rights. Moreover, Minor argued the subsequent section 241.1 report and hearing were statutorily inadequate. CFS countered Minor forfeited any contention the section 241.1 report was untimely or inadequate and that any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the court erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 report prior to making a determination of Minor’s status and holding the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the subsequent section 241.1 report was inadequate to overcome the court’s initial error, and this error was not harmless. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

Optional filed suit against DAS and its counsel, Akin and Parker, for conversion and fraudulent transfer. Akin and Parker filed special anti-SLAPP motions to strike all claims asserted against them. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motions, holding that Optional v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, was not the "law of the case" for purposes of this appeal; defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's claims arose from defendants' constitutionally protected petition rights where the gravamen of plaintiff's claims was protected activity, namely defendants' representation of DAS in litigation; and plaintiff did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims where the litigation privilege defeated plaintiff's claims. View "Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP" on Justia Law

An information charged defendant Marco Sandoval with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition (count 1) and making a criminal threat (count 2); defendant had suffered two prison and two strike priors. The charges arose out of a 2016 incident in which defendant punched his wife, A.H., choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and threatened to kill her if she left him. He pleaded no contest to count 1 and admitted one prison prior. The plea included a stipulated five-year upper term, suspended; three-years felony probation; and a dismissal of count 2 and all additional allegations in the information. At sentencing, over the objections of defendant and A.H., the court reissued a criminal protective order (CPO) using Judicial Council form CR-160 preventing defendant from initiating any contact whatsoever with A.H. for three years. Defendant's sole contention on appeal was that the court erred in refusing to terminate the CPO or otherwise modify it to allow some contact between him and A.H. Respondent the State agreed with defendant and requested that this case be remanded to allow the trial court to consider a more narrowly tailored protective order. The Court of Appeal affirmed the CPO with a minor modification: to allow A.H. to initiate contact, if any, with defendant that was acceptable and welcomed by her. View "California v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the divisions' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition and complaint. The court held that the division made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of its right of free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, plaintiff claimed that the division's decision and notice that Petromax was hazardous waste, by themselves, were causing plaintiff harm even without an enforcement action. The court also held that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division" on Justia Law

The same standard applies to an individual defendant's request for attorney fees under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) as applies to an employer defendant, and thus a fee award is only available in the discretion of a trial court when the court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for attorney fees because plaintiff's FEHA claim was not frivolous. The court noted that individual employee defendants who prevailed on a FEHA harassment suit were not left without a means of recovering attorney fees and costs they may have incurred to defend themselves. The court also denied defendant's request for judicial notice. View "Lopez v. Routt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City violated certain ordinances and selectively applied others in issuing the permit for a fence separating two neighbors while denying plaintiffs' permit for a deck they had built. The City filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), because plaintiffs' complaint targeted "protected speech" where the City's decisions followed official government proceedings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the special motion, holding that section 425.16 does not protect a governmental entity's decisions to issue or deny permits. The court agreed with the trial court that granting a special motion to strike in these circumstances would chill citizens' attempts to challenge government action. View "Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Janice Dickinson filed suit against William H. Cosby, Jr. and his attorney, Martin Singer, for defamation and related causes of action after Singer issued a letter demanding media outlets not to repeat Dickinson's allegedly false accusations of rape against Cosby, and a press release characterizing Dickinson's rape accusations as a lie. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in striking Dickinson's first amended complaint, as it pertained only to a party, Singer, who had not filed an anti-SLAPP motion; the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the demand letter; and the court correctly denied the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the press release. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Dickinson v. Cosby" on Justia Law

Petitioner Phyllis Morris’ office, the Public Defender for San Bernadino County, represented Ruth Zapata Lopez, a nonparty to this petition, in a case alleging she committed two misdemeanors by driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. Acting on Lopez’s behalf, petitioner’s office successfully moved to suppress evidence supporting the State’s case. Both counts were eventually dismissed in the interest of justice. The State appealed the suppression motion on the same day. A deputy public defender filed a request with the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to appoint counsel for Lopez on appeal. Court clerks informed counsel that Lopez was not eligible for appointment of counsel on appeal. According to the deputy public defender, the reason provided was that Lopez “was the respondent, and the respondent on a misdemeanor appeal is not entitled to appointed counsel.” In an e-mail attached to the petition, the same deputy public defender asserts a court clerk told him the appellate division’s position was that petitioner’s office still represented Lopez. Petitioner filed an earlier petition (case No. E066181) challenging this policy. Petitioner argued the United States Constitution obligated the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to appoint counsel for all indigent defendants in the appellate division. While the Court of Appeal agreed that a defendant acting as respondent in the appellate division would likely fare better with an attorney than without one, “showing that something might be procedurally better is not the same as showing that the state is obligated to provide it.” The Court concluded petitioner failed to show why appointment of counsel for respondents in the appellate division, as much as it might conceivably benefit those respondents, was constitutionally mandated. View "Morris v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Robert Klem sued Access Insurance Company and Access General Insurance Adjusters, LLC (collectively, "Access") after he was in a car accident and Access administered his claim. Klem alleged Access falsely notified the California Department of Motor Vehicles that his care was a total loss salvage, thereby reducing its value and resulting in a loss of use. Access filed a special motion pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The trial court found Access' notice to the DMV was a protected communication, but that Klem met his initial burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits. The trial court denied Access' motion, and Access appealed. Finding the trial court erred with respect to certain evidentiary rulings and by denying the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new order granting Access' motion. View "Klem v. Access Insurance Co." on Justia Law