Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Shawn Young was convicted by jury of sexually abusing his two daughters, A. and H., as well as their friend, M., who lived next door. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate determinate prison term of 18 years, plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 85 years to life. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the Court of Appeal had to reverse the judgment because the trial court lacked good cause to excuse one of the sitting jurors (Juror No. 4) and doing so in the absence of both defendant and his assigned trial counsel violated defendant’s constitutional rights; (2) defendant’s convictions for Counts 3 and 6 had to be reversed for insufficient evidence; (3) defendant’s Count 6 conviction had to be vacated because Penal Code section 288.5 (c), mandated charges of continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual offenses, pertaining to the same victim over the same period of time, be charged in the alternative; (4) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated defendant’s constitutional rights by allowing two prosecution witnesses to testify to their opinion that the complaining witnesses were credible; (5) defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to object to certain assertions of prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on attempted sexual penetration as a lesser included offense to Count 7. The Court concluded the trial court did not have good cause to excuse Juror No. 4. Furthermore, the Court concluded doing so outside defendant’s presence and while he was represented by an attorney who was standing in for defendant’s temporarily ill trial counsel, and who was told she was appearing to agree to a continuance on defendant’s behalf, violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights. Because the Court could not conclude this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it reversed the judgment. This conclusion made it unnecessary to address defendant’s remaining claims except those challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. As to those, we conclude sufficient substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction in Count 3, not so with respect to Count 6. The Court reversed the judgment on that count for insufficient evidence. View "California v. Young" on Justia Law

Police officer trainee Cornell, off-duty and in street clothes, was running in Golden Gate Park. Uniformed patrol officers spotted him and grew suspicious because the area is known for illicit drug activity. Cornell claims he was unaware of the officers when he heard, “I will shoot you,” and looked behind him to see a dark figure pointing a gun. He darted away, ultimately finding a police officer, who ordered him to the ground. He was arrested at gunpoint and searched, taken in handcuffs to a station, and eventually to a hospital for a drug test, which was negative. Officers searched the areas where he was known to have been, and his truck. After nearly six hours in custody, Cornell was released with a citation for evading arrest. Cornell was never prosecuted but lost his job. Cornell sued. The court determined that Cornell was arrested without probable cause. A jury awarded Cornell $575,242 for tortious interference with economic advantage, and violation of Civil Code section 52.1; the court added $2,027,612.75 in attorney’s fees and costs on the Section 52.1 claim. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s findings did not support the probable cause determination; the court should have declared a mistrial when the jury deadlocked on one question on the special verdict form; the court failed to address an argument that, under Penal Code 847(b), the defendants were immune from false arrest claims; and even if the tort verdict is upheld, the Section 52.1 verdict and awards were based on insufficient evidence. View "Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Francisco Javier Solorio of the first degree premeditated murder of his neighbor, Albert Ramos. The prosecution presented evidence that Solorio, motivated by revenge, killed Ramos four months after Ramos stabbed Solorio's brother, Rudy. Solorio appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on grounds of jury misconduct. Although it denied his motion, the court made a factual finding that the jury discussed Solorio's decision not to testify "several times" despite repeated admonitions not to consider that topic. Prejudice from this type of misconduct was presumed, and on this record the Court of Appeal could not conclude the presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "California v. Solorio" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jack Kaufman of grand theft of personal property belonging to his longtime friend Dr. Steven Emmet. At trial, the prosecution's theory was that Kaufman: (1) sold Emmet a promissory note on property owned by Aaron Reinicke; (2) renegotiated the note with Reinicke and reconveyed the property to him free and clear without telling him that Emmet owned the note or informing Emmet of the transaction; and (3) deprived Emmet of Reinicke's final payment of around $36,000 on the note. The prosecution claimed the evidence supported conviction for grand theft by larceny, and the jury was instructed on only that theory of theft. On appeal Kaufman claimed that to the extent any crime occurred, it was theft by false pretenses as to Reinicke, not larceny as to Emmet. Accordingly, he argued the trial court instructed the jury on the wrong offense allegedly committed against the wrong victim. He also argued there was no theft because Emmet exercised his right of recourse, allowing Kaufman to renegotiate the note with Reinicke. Kaufman contended Emmet's alleged attempt to extort repayment from Kaufman was a defense to the crime of larceny, and he asserted the trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to admit relevant evidence or instruct the jury on that defense. The State opposed each of Kaufman's contentions, and argued the court committed sentencing error in ordering summary probation. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported Kaufman's conviction for grand theft by larceny, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on that offense. View "California v. Kaufman" on Justia Law

Defendant, driving with a suspended license, was stopped by a Santa Clara County Sheriff’s deputy for a traffic infraction. The vehicle was searched following the deputy’s decision to impound it. The deputy found baggies filled with a white substance in a paper bag under the driver’s seat. She showed those baggies to Deputy Dorsey, who thought the substance might be cocaine. After field testing produced negative results, he concluded it was a cutting agent to be mixed with a controlled substance. Dorsey then noticed that the radio console “looked loose, like it had been manipulated.” Using his pocket knife, Dorsey removed the console, which was loose, and between air conditioning ducts behind the stereo he found several bags of a white crystalline substance that he recognized as methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with possession for sale of methamphetamine, transportation of methamphetamine, and driving with a suspended license. The information alleged four prior narcotics convictions. The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine as the fruit of an unlawful inventory search. The court of appeal affirmed. Removal of the console exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search but the search was supported by probable cause and was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "People v. Zabala" on Justia Law

Yelp Inc., operator of a website for consumer reviews, petitioned for a writ of mandate to overturn an order compelling its production of documents that may reveal the identity of an anonymous reviewer on its site. Yelp also appealed from a separate order imposing $4,962.59 in monetary sanctions against it for failing to comply with the subpoena requiring production of the documents. Gregory Montagna filed a lawsuit against Sandra Jo Nunis and several Doe defendants alleging a single cause of action for trade libel. Montagna, an accountant, prepared a tax return for Nunis in 2015, initially quoting Nunis a “minimum” fee of $200 for the preparation of her return, based on her representation that her income was comprised exclusively of wages reported on a W-2 form, and she would require only a simple return. However, both Nunis’ income and the resulting tax return were allegedly more complicated than she had represented. As a consequence, Montagna charged Nunis $400 for preparation of the return, rather than the $200 fee he initially quoted. Nunis allegedly paid Montagna only $200, and refused to pay him more even after receiving “a collection letter” for the balance. And in November 2015, Nunis allegedly went online to the Yelp website under an alias and posted a negative review of Montagna. Yelp argued the trial court's orders had to be reversed because: (1) the trial court erroneously concluded Yelp lacked standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its anonymous reviewer as grounds for resisting the subpoena; and (2) the court further erred by concluding Montagna made a prima facie showing the posted review contained defamatory statements. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in ruling Yelp lacked standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its anonymous reviewer, but found no error in its determination Montagna made a prima facie showing the challenged review was defamatory. The Court concluded the latter finding was sufficient to support the trial court’s order compelling Yelp to produce the subpoenaed documents in the circumstances of this case. Consequently, the Court denied the petition for writ of mandate. "However, given the dynamic nature of this area of law - the primary cases we rely upon were decided after the trial court issued its ruling - we also conclude Yelp’s opposition to Montagna’s motion to compel was substantially justified." Thus the Court reversed the order imposing sanctions against Yelp. View "Yelp Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Susan and William Avignone defrauded five investors out of more than $700,000 in a real estate scheme. In exchange for dismissal of some of the charges, the Avignones pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud in connection with the offer, sale, and purchase of a security and two counts of grand theft of personal property with a value of more than $950. Susan admitted a Penal Code section 186.11 (a)(2) allegation attached to count 10, and a section 12022.6 (a)(1) allegation attached to count 5. William admitted a section 186.11 (a)(2) allegation attached to count 2, a section 12022.6 (a)(2) allegation attached to count 3, and a section 12022.6 (a)(1) allegation attached to count 5. At sentencing, the trial court struck the section 186.11 enhancements and denied probation. It sentenced the Avignones to an aggregate term of five years four months to be served in the custody of the sheriff. The court imposed a split sentence, ordering that one year four months of the imposed sentence would be served in the community under mandatory supervision. The Avignones separately appealed, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation. William also contended: (1) an electronic search condition was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad; and (2) the trial court improperly calculated a restitution order as to one of the victims. The State conceded the trial court improperly calculated the restitution for one of the victims, but asserted the Avignones' sentences were unauthorized because the trial court did not have discretion to sentence them to county jail, rather than prison. The Court of Appeal rejected the Avignones' argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation, and agreed the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence. This conclusion rendered William's argument regarding the electronic search condition moot. The Court reversed and remanded with directions to allow the Avignones an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas. View "California v. Avignone" on Justia Law

In this domestic abuse case, defendant Jose Valdivia challenged a condition of his probation authorizing the warrantless search of electronic storage devices (such as cellular phones and computers) under his control. He argued the condition must be stricken because it: (1) “is unreasonable under [People v.] Lent [(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481], as it bears no relationship to [his] current offense or potential future criminality”; and (2) “is unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution because [his] privacy and privilege against self[-] incrimination far outweigh the State’s purported and unproven rehabilitation and societal protection interests.” Additionally, Valdivia argued the condition infringed on the privacy interests of third parties. The Court of Appeal found no merit in defendant’s arguments that the electronic storage device search condition was unreasonable under Lent, nor under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, defendant’s attempt to raise the privacy interests of third parties was barred by forfeiture. The Court of Appeal agreed, however, that on the facts of this case, the electronic storage device search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because its potential impact on his Fourth Amendment rights exceeded what was reasonably necessary to serve the government’s legitimate interest in ensuring that he complied with the terms of his probation. The case was remanded to the trial court to consider in the first instance whether the condition can be narrowed in a manner that will allow it to pass constitutional muster. View "California v. Valdivia" on Justia Law

In May 2011, defendant Sim Hoffman was indicted on 884 felony counts alleging healthcare insurance fraud. That indictment was ultimately dismissed in 2013 on the ground that the prosecution had failed to provide exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Rather than proceed by indictment, in January 2014, the State filed a felony complaint. The complaint alleged 159 counts of insurance fraud. The issue in this writ proceeding was whether an information could allege a single offense in a single count, but describe within that count multiple discrete acts, each of which constitute the charged offense. Each count in the State’s complaint identified multiple patient files and a timeframe that spannedyears. Defendant demurred to the information. The court overruled the demurrer and defendant then filed this writ petition. The Court of Appeal concluded the information was proper, and denied the writ petition. “Each count alleges a single offense. Any complications, or undue prejudice to defendant, arising from the fact that multiple discrete acts may constitute the charged offense in each count are adequately dealt with by a unanimity instruction at trial, or by other tools at the court’s disposal, such as a severance of counts, or trial continuances where appropriate. A demurrer on these grounds is not the proper vehicle to address defendant’s concerns.” View "Hoffman v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction, having a large-capacity magazine, and carrying a loaded firearm. Detective Calderan testified that he was on patrol near Richmond's Crescent Park apartment complex, a high-crime area claimed by a street gang. Defendant was sitting in the back of a van. Others were in the front passenger and driver’s seats. Calderan and others officers approached. Defendant “ducked down." Calderan testified: “We told him to get up and put his hands up. ... After several orders" he did so. The officers had their guns drawn. Calderan approached and located marijuana in the possession of the front-seat passenger. Officers searched the vehicle. Calderan found a gun loaded with a 15-round magazine underneath the rear of the driver’s seat, in front of where Defendant had been seated. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress. The trial court stated it was “clear” that the officers detained Defendant without reasonable suspicion but that Defendant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court of appeal directed the court to vacate its order. The trial court did not do so. The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate. Defendant can challenge the gun evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention, even if he lacked an expectation of privacy in the searched car. View "Brewer v. Superior Court" on Justia Law