Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Garcia was dating Delgadillo’s ex-wife when Delgadillo’s daughter suffered bruises and complained that Garcia had hit her. Delgadillo called the police. Three weeks later, as Delgadillo was watching football with Lanford, Lanford questioned Delgadillo about calling the police and invited him out to smoke. Outside, Delgadillo saw Garcia, Pettie, and another man. Someone called Delgadillo a “cop caller” and Delgadillo was attacked. Delgadillo saw Garcia point a pistol at him, but otherwise did not specifically identify which men personally participated in the attack. After suffering injuries, Delgadillo ran away. He heard gunshots as he fled. Garcia, Lanford and Pettie were convicted of attempted murder, assault, and witness dissuasion, with gang and firearm enhancements. The court of appeal reversed, first rejecting claims of failure to bifurcate, Brady violation, juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and insufficient evidence, including a claim of insufficient evidence that the defendants belonged to a unitary gang. Defendants’ claim that the admission of testimonial hearsay through the prosecution’s gang expert violated their confrontation rights required reversal of the findings on gang enhancements; did not require reversal of the Garcia and Lanford convictions for attempted murder and assault; required reversal on all counts as to Pettie. The court also failed its sua sponte duty to give the “mere presence” portion of CALCRIM No. 401 with respect to Pettie’s role in aiding and abetting and failed to instruct the jury on the requisite mens rea for witness dissuasion View "People v. Pettie" on Justia Law

Defendant Demetrius Mays and several of his relatives went with Charles Williams to confront Marcel Hatch, who had previously beaten Williams. When the group arrived, Williams shot and killed Hatch. A jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter, with an enhancement that a principal was armed, and the trial court sentenced him to 12 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution to the estate of the victim’s mother for the victim’s funeral and burial expenses paid by the mother before her death. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluded the restitution order was proper because (1) the victim’s mother was, herself, a victim under the restitution statute and (2) the funeral and burial expenses were incurred before she died. View "California v. Mays" on Justia Law

The plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, applies to a petition to enforce a no contest clause. In this case, a beneficiary filed a petition for instructions as to whether the no contest clause of his mother's trust had been violated after his sister sought to reform the trust to eliminate his interest. The sister, as trustee, filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition. The trial court granted the motion to strike and awarded attorney fees to the sister. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied because the beneficiary established a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits. Therefore, the order granting attorney fees was also reversed. View "Urick v. Urick" on Justia Law

Defendant Nan Hui Jo was convicted by jury of child custody deprivation, for which she was sentenced to 175 days in county jail and thirty-six months probation. She appealed, raising nine alleged evidentiary and procedural errors that occurred at trial, all of which she contends entitle her to a reversal of her conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s first and second arguments had merit, but the errors were harmless. View "California v. Jo" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Thomas molested his daughter for 10 years, beginning when she was four or five years old. He admitted his conduct in a telephone call with his daughter and in a letter to her mother. A jury convicted defendant on nine counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child. The trial court sentenced Thomas to a total indeterminate sentence of 135 years to life. On appeal, defendant argued that there was no substantial evidence that he committed his crimes by means of force, fear, menace, or duress. Furthermore, he argued his counsel’s failure to object to the detective’s testimony about the timeline of one instance of assault constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supported a finding of aggravated sexual crimes because of defendant’s ongoing physical violence against the victim. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed on the merits. View "California v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioner Darren Williams sought relief from the superior court’s order denying his Penal Code section 9951 motion to dismiss an indictment issued by a grand jury charging him with a series of cell phone store robberies. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the deputy district attorney’s excusal of a juror for hardship violated the grand jury’s independence and rendered it improperly constituted. The California Supreme Court was considering the related question of whether a prosecutor’s improper dismissal of a grand juror denied a defendant a “substantial right” in Avitia v. Superior Court (Apr. 18, 2017, C082859) [nonpub. opn.], review granted June 21, 2017, S242030.2 Petitioner also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the gang allegations and counts regarding a March 10, 2014, robbery. Pending further guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal resolved this matter by concluding the superior court should have granted the motion to dismiss the indictment. “The deputy district attorney’s exercise of authority he did not have over the grand jury, in front of the grand jurors, was not harmless. It was a fundamental misunderstanding of the prosecutor’s role that damaged the structure of the grand jury process and the independence of the grand jury itself.” The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate vacating the superior court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment and directed the court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Williams v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2012, police searched a residence where Bobbie McCloud happened to rent a room. The officers were initially there to perform a probation search of someone else, but ended up arresting McCloud when they found crack cocaine and a loaded gun inside his bedroom. In early 2013, after McCloud had been released from custody on bail for charges related to that incident, police once again found him in possession of crack cocaine. The prosecution charged McCloud with felony possession for sale for the 2012 incident, along with three felonies based on firearm possession. For the 2013 incident, the prosecution charged him with felony transportation for sale, misdemeanor possession of a stun gun by a felon, and misdemeanor resisting an officer. The jury convicted McCloud of all the charges except the three firearm-related felonies. In a subsequent trial, the court found McCloud had a prison prior, a prior strike conviction for robbery, and three prior super strike convictions for assaulting an officer with a machine gun, and it sentenced him to a total of 28 years 8 months to life. McCloud appeal, arguing: (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that “transportation” means for the purpose of sale following the 2014 amendment to Health and Safety Code section 11352; (2) the evidence supporting the possession-for-sale conviction was the fruit of an unlawful warrantless search; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to amend the super strike allegations to correct a clerical error after the jury had been discharged. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded McCloud’s second and third arguments lacked merit, but the first did not. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the jury instructions for transportation for sale omitted an essential element of the offense and the evidence supporting the missing element was not overwhelming. That conviction was reversed, but the judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. McCloud" on Justia Law

Believing nonpublic content of the victim's Facebook account might provide exculpatory evidence helpful in preparing for trial, real-party-in-interest Lance Touchstone served petitioner Facebook with a subpoena for the subscriber records and contents of the victim's Facebook account, including timeline posts, messages, phone calls, photos, videos, location information and user-input information from account inception to the present date. Touchtone was awaiting trial for attempted murder. On the public portion of his Facebook page, the victim posted updates of court hearings in this case, asking his friends to attend the preliminary hearing. In public posts the victim also discussed his personal use of guns and drugs, and described his desire to rob and kill people. Facebook filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground the Stored Communications Act (SCA) prohibited disclosure of the victim's account contents. In an accompanying declaration, counsel for Facebook stated that Touchstone could obtain the requested contents directly from the victim or by working with the prosecutor to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to quash and ordered Facebook to produce the contents of the victim's account for in camera inspection by a certain date. Facebook seeks a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash the subpoena and to enter a new order granting the motion to quash. Facebook contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to quash and ordering production of documents for in camera inspection because the SCA prohibits Facebook from disclosing the content of its users' accounts in response to a subpoena. Facebook further contends that compelling it to disclose the contents of the victim's account is not necessary to preserve Touchstone's constitutional right to a fair trial because Touchstone can obtain the contents directly from the victim or through the prosecutor via a search warrant. The Court of Appeal granted Facebook’s application and granted a writ of mandate, vacating the trial court’s order and effectively quashing the subpoena duces tecum. View "Facebook v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Dr. Leah Levi, a neuro-ophthalmologist, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Regents of the University of California (Regents), and Dr. Robert Weinreb, the chair of the department of ophthalmology at the University of California, San Diego (University). Levi asserted various causes of action against the Regents and Weinreb related to discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and due process violations. The retaliation claims alleged protected conduct under both California's Whistleblower Protection Act, and Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Levi contended the trial court granted summary judgment based on its mistaken application of the law. The Court of Appeal concluded Levi raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on: whether she made a protected disclosure of improper governmental activity or a condition threatening the health and safety of the public to support her CWPA retaliation claim and whether the Regents and Weinreb denied her due process by failing to issue reports on grievances she had filed, failing to provide her notice before reducing her salary and appointment, and failing to provide her an opportunity to cure deficiencies and return to good standing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment and directed the court to grant Weinreb and the Regents' alternative motion for summary adjudication on Levi's remaining causes of action for retaliation under the FEHA, gender discrimination, gender harassment, failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and Tom Bane Civil Rights Act violations. View "Levi v. Regents of the University of Calif." on Justia Law

Julio Martinez III, was convicted of possessing and transporting a controlled substance. In addition to three years of supervised probation, the trial court ordered Martinez to pay two mandatory fees: a $50 crime-lab fee and a $150 drug program fee. The court concluded both these “fees” were actually “fines” subject to additional assessments, penalties, and a surcharge (collectively referred to as penalty assessments). On appeal, Martinez contended statutory fees were not penal in nature and, therefore, not subject to penalty assessments. The Court of Appeal found a split of authority in the appellate courts on this issue. Almost all California appellate districts, except this court, have weighed in on the topic (albeit in unpublished opinions). As noted by one appellate court, "the conflict will likely require resolution by our Supreme Court." In the meantime, the Court agreed n the meantime, the case was remanded for recalculation of the criminal laboratory analysis and drug program fees on each count without the addition of penalty assessments. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law