Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Marsha Woods was on probation for two prior offenses when she was arrested and charged with five theft- and drug-related offenses. Under a plea agreement, she agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted burglary and admit one strike prior, and to serve concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense and seven years on each of the probation cases. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. The trial court accepted the plea. At sentencing, however, after expressing frustration at the parties' disagreement over the proper calculation of custody credits, the trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months for the current offense and terminated probation on her earlier cases, reasoning the stipulated seven-year sentences on the probation cases were "just about eaten up by credits." The State appealed, contending the sentence imposed by the trial court was not within the bounds of the parties' plea agreement. The Court agreed the sentence imposed by the trial court is not within the bounds of the parties' plea agreement. The Court also rejected defendant's contentions as to forfeiture, prejudice, and mootness. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Police identified an IP address for an Internet account sharing child pornography online. Comcast identified the account subscriber as Reynolds at 309 South 23rd Street in San José. The police obtained a search warrant for the residence, garages, and outbuildings at the address. While searching Reynolds’ house, the police discovered Nguyen, a Mountain View police officer, was living in a separate residence behind the house. The police then searched Nguyen’s residence and found a laptop with child pornography. Based on a computer found in the main house, Reynolds’s husband was also charged with possession of child pornography. The trial court granted Nguyen’s motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The police lacked probable cause to search Nguyen’s residence. The warrant did not expressly authorize the search, and the police lacked good faith reliance on the warrant. The warrant did not mention Nguyen; the police had no reason to believe that Nguyen had access to the Reynolds Internet account. When police realized the rear structure was a separate residence, the law required them to halt their search and seek an additional warrant. View "People v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

This appeal presented the issue of whether the fees imposed on criminal defendants convicted of certain drug offenses were subject to additional penalty assessments under Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000. Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 imposed a criminal laboratory analysis fee not to exceed $50, and section 11372.7 imposed a drug program fee not to exceed $150. The trial court added penalty assessments to the criminal laboratory analysis fee imposed on defendant Zack Uriah Moore, III, after his conviction of section 11550, subdivision (a), for being under the influence of a controlled substance. The Court of Appeal concluded the levy imposed under section 11372.5 constituted a fine or penalty subject to penalty assessments imposed by Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000. Despite the similarity of language used in sections 11372.5 and 11372.7, the Court did not reach the issue of the applicability of penalty assessments to 11372.7’s drug program fee. The trial court did not impose the drug program fee, and the appellate division erroneously construed a silent record as indicating a failure by the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering whether to impose the drug program fee. View "California v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant Bac Tieng Nguyen’s father called 9-1-1 to report that there was a man at his house who was making threats while carrying a large knife or samurai sword. Garden Grove Police Officers responded to the scene, and learned upon their arrival that the sword-wielding man was defendant. Defendant’s father, who was standing in the front yard when the officers arrived, appeared stressed and nervous. He told the officers that defendant was inside the house and was “loco.” Defendant appealed following his conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer, because he was wielding a large knife and took a step toward police officers after the officers ordered him to put the knife down. He argued that the “present ability” element of the crime was missing, as a matter of law, given the 10- to 15-foot distance between him and the officers at the time of the incident. He also requested that the Court of Appeal independently review the documents reviewed in camera by the trial court in conjunction with a “Pitchess” motion he filed, which sought to obtain information from confidential police officer personnel records. The Court’s independent review revealed no error, and, thus, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the ability of a district attorney to petition for revocation of parole without first completing certain procedural steps and including in the petition information required when a revocation petition has been filed by the supervising parole agency violated his and other parolees' right to equal protection of the law under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeal held that defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the parole revocation petition was properly denied; the statutory scheme under which the district attorney's petition was filed did not violate parolees' right to equal protection of the law; and thus the superior court did not err in overruling the demurrer and denying the motion for sanctions. View "People v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Police validly stopped defendant Jaime Cervantes for driving with expired vehicle registration. They searched his vehicle after they learned that the adult female riding in the front passenger seat had provided them with a false identity and was subject to a felony warrant and probation search condition. Police initially discovered large quantities of illegal drugs and paraphernalia in a closed toiletries bag and an opaque plastic drawstring bag in the backseat behind the driver. They continued their search and found more methamphetamine in the front center console. They arrested defendant, who admitted to transporting drugs for sale. Defendant moved to suppress the seized drugs and a subsequent confession because the probationer on whom the police justified their search was female, the closed bags in the backseat contained male toiletries and clothing. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. The prevailing California case law upheld searches of personal items in the backseat of a car based on a front seat passenger’s status as parolee, and applied here to justify the search of defendant’s car based on his passenger’s status as a probationer. The Court of Appeal concluded the discovery of illegal drugs would have inevitably led to the discovery of drugs in the backseat and in the bags containing his clothing and toiletries. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s suppression motion. View "California v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appealed the trial court’s order granting Donta Campbell’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argued: (1) the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); (2) Campbell was not in custody on his prior convictions; and (3) Proposition 47 did not apply to prior prison terms. Because the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, it did not address the other contentions. The trial court order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Campbell" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that a period of supervision following deportation is impractical and inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the legislation that mandates imposition of split sentences. At the time of his sentencing, the trial court considered Arce's request for a split sentence and denied it. The trial court noted that upon his release from physical custody, defendant Jose Arce was subject to deportation proceedings initiated by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The trial court found that, given the risk Arce would be deported during the period of any mandatory supervision, and thus not be subject to the probation department's supervision or able to participate in the rehabilitative services offered by the department, a split sentence was not a realistic disposition. On appeal, Arce argued the trial court should have considered the possibility that he would be able to challenge his deportation and stay in this country either temporarily while his immigration status was litigated or, although unlikely, permanently. He noted that a number of other factors that show he was amenable to mandatory supervision, including the fact that he has been in this country lawfully since 2000, had no prior criminal record, was married to a United States citizen and had three children, all of whom were also United States citizens. Split sentences are the preferred disposition in eligible cases because they provide released prisoners with close supervision and supportive services designed to substantially reduce the risk of recidivism. As a practical matter, such supervision and services are not available after a prisoner has been deported. View "California v. Arce" on Justia Law

A lawsuit filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech is called a "SLAPP" suit and, if without merit, such an action may be dismissed early under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this anti-SLAPP case, investigative newsource (inewsource), an independent, nonprofit journalism organization, entered into contracts with KPBS, San Diego's public radio and television station, to gather and produce news stories with and for KPBS, in exchange for the right to use KPBS offices, media equipment, and related news facilities. KPBS was a department of San Diego State University (SDSU), and inewsource and KPBS have jointly created hundreds of news stories. In February 2015 inewsource began publishing articles critical of attorney Cory Briggs. After inewsource published about a dozen more critical stories about Briggs, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), an entity inewsource reported is controlled by Briggs, sued inewsource, along with its founder, Loretta Hearn, and also SDSU, California State University (CSU), and San Diego State University Research Foundation (SDSURF), alleging the contracts between KPBS and inewsource violate statutory prohibitions on self-dealing involving public funds because Hearn was allegedly influencing both sides of the transaction - for SDSU as a faculty member, and for inewsource as its executive director. SDOG also alleged inewsource and Hearn misappropriated the names KPBS and SDSU. Asserting SDOG's lawsuit was based on the exercise of their constitutionally protected speech rights and lacked merit, Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions. The trial court granted the motions. SDOG appealed, contending the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because: (1) its lawsuit is a public interest lawsuit, exempt from the anti-SLAPP law under section 425.17, subdivision (b); and (2) the exception to that exemption for media defendants under section 425.17, subdivision (d) was inapplicable because its lawsuit has "nothing to do with stopping news reporting" but was instead directed to stopping "self-dealing by a public employee." The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a middle school math teacher, filed suit against various defendants after she was involuntarily detained for mental health evaluation and treatment. Plaintiff alleged that school defendants did not have probable cause to detain her under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, that hospital defendants lacked probable cause to continue to detain her and to admit her to the hospital where she spent one night before being released, and that she was entitled to monetary damages for various alleged violations of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare and Institutions Code 5000 et seq., and of her civil rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no private right of action for the violations of the Act plaintiff alleged; the school district and the school police were immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity; the hospital and physician were not state actors for purposes of plaintiff's section 1983 claims; most of the provisions of the California Constitution plaintiff invoked did not create causes of action for damages; plaintiff failed to state a claim for violations of those provisions that might provide such a cause of action; and, because the hospital defendants were not state actors for purposes of section 1983, they cannot be liable for plaintiff's alleged violations of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining the hospital defendants' demurrers to plaintiff's third amended complaint and granting the school defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Julian v. Mission Community Hospital" on Justia Law