Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Oswaldo, age 14, was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after he admitted the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed misdemeanor battery on the property of a school, park, or hospital. The court dismissed an allegation of felony resisting an officer. Another section 602 petition, filed a month later, alleged two counts of felony vandalism causing damage of over $400. Days later, the probation officer filed a notice, alleging that Oswaldo had violated probation by failing to obey all laws, comply with his court-ordered curfew, attend school and behave appropriately in school. He admitted the first count, reduced to a misdemeanor; the second count and probation violation allegations were dismissed. The court removed Oswaldo from parental custody and ordered conditions of probation, to which Oswaldo objected, including that Oswaldo “not be in any specific locations where gang members are known by him to meet or gather or specific locations known by him for gang-related activity or specified by his probation officer or a parent, in writing, as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement. View "In re Oswaldo R." on Justia Law

Psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect subpoenaed records from disclosure to the Department of Consumer Affairs, because Business and Professions Code section 2225, a statute enacted after codification of the privilege, permits disclosure of records that the privilege would otherwise shelter when the Department and the Board are investigating potential improper prescribing of controlled substances by a psychiatrist. Furthermore, a psychiatric patient's constitutional right to privacy requires the Department to demonstrate a subpoena for the patient's records is supported by a compelling interest and that the information demanded is "relevant and material" to the particular investigation being conducted. In this case, the State had a compelling interest in investigating excessive or otherwise improper prescribing of controlled substances, and petitioner's declaration established most of the records demanded by the subpoena were relevant and material to that investigation. However, further narrowing of the Department's subpoenas was required to comport with the weighty privacy interests at stake. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals granted the petition in part and vacated in part. View "Cross v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made it clear that ordinarily, a conviction on any factual theory that is supported by the evidence will be upheld. The Court of Appeal concluded that this case, however, comes under an exception to that rule: when the prosecution has elected to proceed on one factual theory, and when that election has obviated the need for a unanimity instruction, courts are bound by the prosecution’s election. Darnell Brown was found guilty of rape in concert of a minor 14 or older, forcible rape, rape of an intoxicated person, and rape of an unconscious person. He was sentenced to a total of 29 years in prison, along with the usual fines. Defendant raised a host of contentions as grounds for appeal, including that there was insufficient evidence of force to support the convictions for rape in concert and forcible rape. Here, because the prosecution’s elected factual theory was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court reversed defendant’s rape in concert and forcible rape convictions and modified the judgment accordingly. View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

R.S. acknowledged that he did not object to two issues he raised on appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Court determined R.S. forfeited those issues. R.S. was found trespassing on school grounds as a nonstudent. Officers detained him after he became belligerent. One of the officers suffered a hairline fracture to his thumb during the struggle. R.S. was arrested in connection with a robbery outside of a Starbucks approximately two months later. At the police station, R.S. at first denied punching the victim in the head, later admitting to striking the victim. R.S. conceded that he attacked the victim to steal his iPhone. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court imposed, among others, the following probation conditions: "Minor shall submit [his] person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant, by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties [search condition]." "The minor shall not knowingly be in any privately owned vehicle with more than one person the minor knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, a responsible adult, or with permission of the probation officer [supervision condition]." R.S. challenged these two conditions, arguing the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague while the supervision condition was unconstitutionally vague. Because he was making facial challenges to the conditions, R.S. argues his claims of error raised pure questions of law that the Court of Appeal should review. The Court disagreed, concluding R.S. forfeited these challenges by not raising them sooner. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law

The trial court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(D) by sufficiently considering I.V.'s educational needs. I.V. appealed a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions. On appeal, I.V. argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under Rule of Court 5.651(b)(2)(D). I.V. also argued that a probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his "person, property, vehicle, and any property under his/her immediate custody or control" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it may encompass searches of his electronic devices and data. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re I.V." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. The prosecutor directly filed charges against Vela in “adult” criminal court. The jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court conditionally reversed the judgment: the electorate recently approved Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an “adult” criminal court. Vela was retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case was not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determined that Vela was amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions would be deemed juvenile adjudications. View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Keith Costella, shot his victim, dumped his body in an undeveloped area next to a highway, and set fire to it. A jury convicted him of second degree murder and arson of forest land. The jury also found defendant personally discharged a firearm and caused the death of his victim. The court sentenced defendant to 40 years to life for murder and the firearm enhancement and a concurrent term of two years for arson of forest land. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily there was insufficient evidence that “forest land” was burned within the meaning of the arson statute, and therefore, the Court of Appeal should reverse his arson conviction. After review, the Court concluded substantial evidence demonstrated this land was brush covered and thus constituted forest land. Defendant further argued the Court should order a limited remand pursuant to "California v. Franklin," (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)), so that the parties could make a record in anticipation of his youth offender parole hearing during the 25th year of his sentence. The State conceded he was entitled to a limited remand for this purpose. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant’s arson conviction, but ordered the limited remand pursuant to "Franklin." View "California v. Costella" on Justia Law

In 2001, defendant Emigdio Valdez was convicted of possession of a sharp instrument in prison and assault by an inmate by means likely to cause great bodily injury. The trial court found true three prior strike allegations, for which the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 25 years to life on each count. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. As to each conviction, defendant argued: (1) the trial court was not authorized to make findings of fact and the State was required to plead and prove any disqualifying facts in the prosecution of his commitment offense; (2) substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s determinations regarding his ineligibility; and (3) the trial court employed the wrong standard of proof, in that it should have applied the “clear and convincing evidence” standard rather than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. In the published part of this opinion the Court of Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that defendant was “armed” with the sharp instrument in prison. In the unpublished parts of this opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. View "California v. Valdez" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant John Wismer was accused of sexual molestation by the nine- and 13-year-old daughters of Wismer's friend and business associate, Richard S. The physical evidence was inconclusive; the prosecution's case turned largely on the credibility of the two girls and, to a certain extent, their parents. The primary incident, involving the younger of the two girls, allegedly took place on an evening in late November. Roughly a week later, police arranged for Richard to make a recorded pretext call to Wismer in which he confronted Wismer with his daughter's allegations. Although the pretext call failed to elicit any admissions from Wismer, jurors nonetheless focused on the call during their deliberations, listening to it three times and discussing whether Wismer's reaction to the call was consistent or inconsistent with guilt. One of the jurors (of Asian descent) took it upon herself to conduct what she characterized as an "experiment" illustrating for her colleagues how a truly innocent person would respond to a fabricated allegation. Using racially charged language, she falsely accused a male Hispanic juror of slapping her behind, punctuating the accusation by claiming he said "he wanted to put his Mexican burrito in my chicken fried rice." The Asian juror's false accusation and the Hispanic juror's reaction were not part of the evidence in the case, yet they were presented to and considered by the jury in reaching a verdict. The Court of Appeal concluded that was juror misconduct of a fundamental nature that required reversal of the judgment. View "California v. Wismer" on Justia Law

Real Party in Interest Margarita Rodas was granted probation in 2007 after entering a negotiated plea of no contest to transporting heroin under former Health and Safety Code section 11352. At the time, the statute prohibited transporting a controlled substance for personal use. After violating probation on several occasions, Rodas eventually absconded and her whereabouts were unknown until 2015 when she appeared in court and filed a motion to vacate her felony transportation conviction and replace it with a misdemeanor sentence for simple possession. Rodas sought the retroactive benefit of a 2014 statutory amendment to section 11352 that required transportation for sale rather than merely for personal use. The trial court later granted her oral motion to withdraw her plea and reinstated the original charges. The State petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order allowing Rodas to withdraw her nearly nine year old plea. According to the State, Rodas’ conviction had long been final for review purposes because she did not challenge the probation order within the six-month time limit set forth in Penal Code section 1018. The court thus acted outside of its jurisdiction in granting the motion because Rodas was not entitled either to withdraw her plea or to the retroactive benefit of the intervening amendment to section 11352. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting Rodas’ motion to withdraw her no contest plea. The ruling vacating the no contest plea and reinstating the charges was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for appropriate proceedings on the probation violation allegation. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law