Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Phillip Baranchik and Eric Baranchik filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, claims of excessive force, false arrest, and malicious persecution. The trial court subsequently granted a motion to strike Eric's malicious prosecution claim, denied a motion to reinstate the claim, and granted summary adjudication in favor of defendants on Eric's excessive force claim and Phillip's false arrest claim. The court concluded that the undisputed facts were sufficient to support the legal conclusion that Officer Fizulich had a reasonable basis to believe that Phillip was intoxicated and unable to care for the safety of others, in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f); the court rejected Eric's contention that the trial court erroneously concluded his excessive force claims against Officer Ho were barred under Heck v. Humphrey; Eric's civil claim for excessive force was barred under Heck because the criminal jury necessarily found Officer Ho's conduct to be lawful and not an unreasonable use of force; because Officer Ho fired his taser when Eric was ignoring commands to stay back, the actions were part of a continuous interaction and the Heck bar applies; dismissal under section 1203.4 does not invalidate Eric's conviction; and the court rejected Eric's malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baranchik v. Fizulich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, SCPMG, alleging that the company refused to rescind her resignation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12940 et seq., and public policy. Plaintiff alleged that while she was working for the company, she suffered a temporary disability, which arose as a result of a relatively uncommon side effect of the medication she was taking. The adverse drug reaction she suffered allegedly caused her to suffer from an altered mental state. While she was experiencing this altered mental state, she resigned from her job at SCPMG. After the company declined to rescind the resignation, plaintiff filed suit, alleging that SCPMG acted with discriminatory animus by refusing to allow her to rescind her resignation. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for SCPMG, concluding that the company's refusal to allow plaintiff to rescind her resignation was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA, and that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the SCPMG employees who accepted and promptly processed her resignation knew of her alleged temporary disability at the time they took those actions. In this case, summary judgment was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of material fact about the legality of SCPMG's actions. View "Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group" on Justia Law

Shantel Jackson filed suit against former boxing champion Floyd Mayweather, Jr., alleging, inter alia, claims for invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's claims were based, either entirely or in part, on Mayweather's social media postings about the termination of Jackson's pregnancy and its relationship to the couple's separation and his comments during a radio interview concerning the extent to which Jackson had undergone cosmetic surgery procedures. Mayweather filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, (the Anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that the challenged causes of action arose from protected activity under section 426.16, subdivision (e)(3); the statements concerned an issue of public interest; and Jackson failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for defamation and most aspects of her causes of action for invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to Jackson's causes of action for defamation and false light portrayal and her cause of action for public disclosure of private facts based on Mayweather's comments about cosmetic surgery. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Jackson v. Mayweather, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-parents Gabrielle A. and Nicholas G., and John A. and Gregory A. (the children) appealed a judgment following the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment by the County of Orange (the County) and several social workers. Plaintiffs’ claims related to the detention of the children for six months. Gabrielle went into early labor, and gave birth at Hoag Hospital to Gregory at 31 weeks. Three days later, Gabrielle was released, and she returned to her mother Barbara’s home. Gregory remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). A few days later, Hoag employees filed a referral for an immediate response from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Hoag staff reported to Villa that Gabrielle had appeared at Hoag with John and Barbara, wearing a trench coat with nothing on underneath, displaying “irrational and aggressive behavior,” including removing the trench coat and walking around unclothed. She had previously asked for Gregory to be placed back inside of her, and she asked a nurse to cut her ankles for blood letting. According to staff, she attempted to wheel Gregory’s isolette out of the NICU and became violent with them. Hospital employees informed Villa that Gabrielle had expressed thoughts of hurting her children and demonstrated paranoia. Gabrielle disputed this version of events, but did not dispute that she was placed on a hospital hold pending evaluation. The trial court found that exigent circumstances existed to detain the children without a warrant at Hoag, and that Nicholas’s arrival at Hoag after the children were detained did not alter matters; there was no evidence to show conduct by the social workers to establish a claim for deliberate indifference, or behavior that shocks the conscience; the social workers were entitled to immunity because there was no evidence of material false statements; numerous claims by the plaintiffs were barred by the parents’ pleas of no contest in dependency court. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the parents’ knowing and voluntary pleas of no contest to the jurisdictional allegations during dependency proceedings defeated their claims, and the social workers were entitled to immunity. “[E]ven if we were to disregard the no contest pleas and the relevant immunity doctrines, defendants correctly argue they met their burden to establish they were entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action, and plaintiffs failed to raise triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.” View "Gabrielle A. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

This case presents the question of whether sentencing judges, in cases where the state sentence is ordered to run concurrently with a foreign sentence, must issue an order directing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to comply with its statutory duty to make the prisoner available for transfer to the foreign jurisdiction. Jose Alberto Antonio pled guilty to one count of residential robbery, and admitted using a firearm during that robbery. Antonio was sentenced to an eight-year prison term. The court later recalled the sentence when it learned of a federal case in which Antonio had previously been sentenced to 110 months in federal prison. The court chose not to alter the initial eight-year state sentence. Antonio appealed, contending the trial court erred in failing to determine whether the state sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively to the federal sentence. On remand, the trial court ordered the state sentence to run concurrent with the federal sentence. Antonio requested the court sign an order directing the Department to have Antonio transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) so that he could serve the federal and California sentences, "thus fulfilling th[e] court's duty to make the prisoner available to the foreign authorities." The trial court denied Antonio's request to sign the order. The Court of Appeal held the sentencing judge is not required to independently order the Department to perform its established legal responsibility. If the Department fails or refuses to carry out its duties the prisoner may resort to administrative review within the corrections system, and ultimately review by the courts by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court rejected appellant's claim that trial courts, at the time of sentencing, must issue a preemptive order to the Department to do its job. View "California v. Antonio" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant David Lua guilty of one count of transportation for sale of a controlled substance, as well as a misdemeanor count of simple possession of a controlled substance, a lesser included offense of the charged offense, possession for sale of a controlled substance. The trial court found true allegations that defendant had five drug-related prior convictions, and had served three prior prison terms. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of 17 years. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the trial court’s instructions to the jury with respect to the transportation for sale charge were erroneous; that the trial court failed to adequately respond to questions from the jury during deliberations; that the verdict form for the transportation for sale charge contradicted the jury’s instructions for the offense; that the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal; that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion; and that the sentence imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion, and an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeal found the matter had to be remanded for resentencing, because some of the trial court’s remarks during sentencing suggest that it may not have properly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Lua" on Justia Law

Officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) challenged the trial court's order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gregory Rhoades, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria). In granting Rhoades's petition, the trial court concluded that the prohibition on the use of straight tobacco during prisoners' Native American religious ceremonies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and it ordered the California Department of Corrections to "formulate and implement policies permitting and reasonably regulating the possession and use of straight tobacco" during those ceremonies. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly granted relief in favor of Rhoades without holding an evidentiary hearing on disputed factual issues, and reversed and remanded matter with directions that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Rhoades" on Justia Law

Defendant Brady Douglas’s former boyfriend, a male prostitute, told him “Jeffrey B.” had shorted him money following a prearranged sexual encounter. Defendant and codefendant Clifton Sharpe tracked down Jeffrey and demanded money. During a high speed freeway chase, Jeffrey swerved his car into defendant’s vehicle after defendant pointed a gun at him, shooting several times. Jeffrey was able to escape unharmed. A jury convicted defendant of attempted second degree robbery, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and other related crimes. The jury found true certain firearm enhancements attached to the robbery and assault charges. It acquitted defendant of pimping, and found not true other alleged firearm enhancements. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in denying his “Wheeler” motion after the prosecutor peremptorily excused two openly gay prospective jurors. He also argued the court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 460, the pattern jury instruction for attempt, which he asserts is unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly creates a mandatory presumption concerning an accused’s intent. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s instructional error challenge, but found the court did not properly evaluate defendant’s “Wheeler” motion. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Douglas" on Justia Law

A jury found appellants-defendants Marcellus Lee, Daniel Romero and Francisco Martinez, Jr. guilty of fraud in the offer or sale of commodities. Lee and Romero were also convicted of conspiracy and grand theft of personal property. The jury found that the takings exceeded certain dollar amounts and that the victims' losses were in excess of $150,000. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants' motions for a new trial on some of the counts and dismissed other counts for insufficiency of the evidence. The State appealed. In Lee, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in reversing the jury's verdicts. The Court reversed the trial court's orders and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the verdicts rendered by the jury and sentence the defendants accordingly. In the interests of justice, the Court ordered the proceedings on remand to be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose orders were reviewed on appeal. On remand, at the State's request, the sentencing court dismissed the counts on which the defendants were subject to retrial. The court sentenced Romero to a total of seven years in prison. Martinez received a one-year jail sentence and a five-year probation term. Lee was sentenced to a total of five years in prison. In the this appeal, Appellants asserted there was not sufficient evidence to support their convictions for commodities fraud because they entered into money management contracts with their clients, not contracts for the sale or purchase of commodities. Appellants claimed the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that scienter was an element of the offense of commodities fraud. They also contended reversal was required because the sentencing court refused to consider a motion for a new trial on grounds not decided by the trial court. The State conceded certain sentencing errors, and that the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that scienter was an element of the offense of commodities fraud. However, regarding scienter, the State argued the error was harmless. The State asked the Court of Appeal to review the possibility the sentencing court may not have imposed a mandatory fine under Penal Code section 186.11, subdivision (c). After review, the Court concluded the restitution award to Ricky Lutz was incorrectly determined and vacated Romero's conviction on count seven and remanded for resentencing. Otherwise, the Court found no error and affirmed. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Sharpe, with several other men, went to someone else’s marijuana garden in the night to steal some plants. Confronted by the owner, the men knocked the owner down and fled. The owner pursued until one of the men brandished a gun. A few minutes later, defendant and the other men rammed the owner’s truck. Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to state prison for six years. On appeal, defendant made several arguments as to why his convictions should have been reversed, but the Court of Appeal found they lacked merit. Defendant also argued the trial court abused its discretion in making the restitution award because it awarded the victim both (1) the decrease in fair market value of the truck resulting from the damage caused by the ramming and (2) the cost to repair the truck. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court could not apply both methods because it resulted in a windfall to the victim. The Court also concluded that the trial court improperly calculated restitution by awarding the victim the salvage value of the truck retained by the victim. The Court modified the judgment by reducing the restitution award, and as modified, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Sharpe" on Justia Law