Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two consolidated cases involved the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (the Act), popularly known as “AB 32”). The Act was passed by a simple majority vote of both legislative houses. Its general purpose is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to protect the environment. Plaintiffs attacked one part of the implementing regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (Board). The Board created a “cap-and-trade” program that included the auction sale of some, but not all, GHG emissions allowances. The Board distributed some emissions allowances for free, but sold others at quarterly auctions. On appeal plaintiffs asserted: (1) the auction sales exceed the Legislature’s delegation of authority to the Board to design a market-based emissions reduction system; and (2) the revenue generated by the auction sales amounts to a tax that violated the two-thirds supermajority vote requirement of Proposition 13. As to the first question, the Court of Appeal held that the Legislature gave broad discretion to the Board to design a distribution system, and a system including the auction of some allowances did not exceed the scope of legislative delegation. Further, the Legislature later ratified the auction system by specifying how to use the proceeds derived therefrom. As for the second question, although the Court's reasoning differed from that of the trial court, it agreed that the auction sales did not equate to a tax. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments denying the petitions in these consolidated cases. View "Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Officers saw a vehicle rolling backwards without lights. Parrott exited from the driver’s side and pushed the car to the curb. The officers approached, offering assistance as Parrott began to lift the hood. Parrott said he did not need help. The officers noticed that Parrot was nervous and kept touching a large item bulging from the front pocket of his sweatshirt. While questioning Parrott, the officers learned that his drivers’ license was suspended. A pat-down search revealed a loaded gun in the sweatshirt pocket. After his motion to suppress was denied, Parrott pled guilty to two charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code 29800(a)), and admitted to two sentencing enhancements. He was sentenced to five years in state prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that Parrott’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search and seizure resulting in the discovery of one of the firearms and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing. While the record does not establish Parrot properly waived his right to counsel and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Parrott" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to determine the value of a blank check for the purpose of distinguishing between misdemeanor and felony receiving stolen property after passage of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Respondent Angela Vandiver pled guilty in 2012 to a single felony count of receiving stolen property based on her possession of blank checks she knew had been stolen. She later petitioned to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor under the new provisions of Proposition 47 on the ground the checks were worth $950 or less. The State opposed, arguing the balance of the victim’s checking account was greater than $950. The trial court found the value of the blank checks to be de minimis and granted the petition. The State argued on appeal the court erred by: (1) reaching the merits because Vandiver did not attach evidence of value to her petition; and (2) determining the checks’ value was de minimis. The State contended the court should have dismissed the petition as unsupported or found the checks were worth the full amount in the linked checking account and denied the petition on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vandiver" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint charged petitioner Shawn Melcher with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and other crimes. One of petitioner’s alleged assault victims was Alan Serpa. Serpa’s wife, Barbara Yook, was the Calaveras County District Attorney. Before the trial court, petitioner moved to recuse the Calaveras County District Attorney’s office from prosecuting his case because of the connection between the victim the district attorney. The trial court denied the motion, ruling petitioner failed to show the conflict of interest was so grave he was unlikely to receive fair treatment. Petitioner sought writ relief from the Court of Appeal. After review, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore denied the petition. "The mere fact the victim and the district attorney are married does not establish a disabling conflict where there is no evidence she has influenced the prosecution, an ethical wall prevents the district attorney from influencing the case, and the district attorney waives any rights to participate in the case as a victim or a member of the victim’s family." View "Melcher v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the president and CEO of American Apparel, filed suit against Standard General, alleging several causes of action stemming from his claim that Standard General's press release, regarding investigations into allegations against plaintiff, contained false and defamatory information about him. The trial court granted Standard General's anti-SLAPP motion, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of showing there was a minimal chance his claims would succeed at trial. In this case, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the press release falsely stated he was investigated by an independent third party because such a claim did not allege a falsehood about plaintiff himself. Furthermore, because the press release did not articulate why plaintiff was terminated, plaintiff's allegation that it falsely stated he was terminated for "cause" did not constitute an actionable defamation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Charney v. Standard General, LP" on Justia Law