Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Karl Doron appealed after his guilty plea to nine counts of robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, and allegations he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robberies. Before entering into his plea, Doron unsuccessfully requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court sentenced Doron to a prison sentence of 10 years four months in accordance with his plea. In his initial appellate briefing, Doron contended the trial court abused its discretion by ruling he had not made a prima facie showing he was entitled to mental health diversion. After the State filed its respondent’s brief, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to revise the eligibility test for pretrial diversion (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), and the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. Doron then contended under the amended statute, which applied retroactively to his case, the trial court was required to find his mental disorder was a substantial factor in the commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. He maintained there was no substantial evidence to rebut this presumption, and thus he was both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental health diversion. Doron alternatively asked the Court of Appeal remand his matter for an evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new principles. The State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that amended section 1001.36 applied retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. The State argued, however, the proper remedy was not for the Court to engage in factfinding so as to decide whether Doron met the criteria for diversion, but to remand the matter for a new prima facie evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1001.36’s amendments. To this the Court concurred, and remanded the case with directions that the trial court consider Doron’s request for mental health diversion under amended section 1001.36. View "California v. Doron" on Justia Law

Castaneda-Prado was convicted of five counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, with allegations that the charges involved multiple victims and substantial sexual conduct. Castaneda-Prado was sentenced to 125 years to life; five consecutive prison terms of 25 years to life. Castaneda-Prado argued the court erred by excluding evidence that one of the children believed that, by accusing Castaneda-Prado of sexual molestation, she was helping her mother obtain a “U visa,” which can provide legal status for victims of certain crimes who assist in the investigation of those crimes.The court of appeal reversed his convictions. The exclusion of this evidence violated Castaneda-Prado’s right to confront a witness against him under the federal and state constitutions. On the record cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury’s guilty verdicts turned almost entirely on the credibility of the girls. There was no physical evidence of the alleged sexual offenses. The court noted that it was irrelevant whether a U visa was possible or whether the mother actually sought a visa; what mattered was the girl’s belief. In addition, the prosecutor highlighted the absence of any proven basis to question the motives of either witness. View "People v. Castaneda-Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Ceja was convicted by jury of being a felon in possession of ammunition and other charges. On appeal, Ceja’s sole claim was that the felon in possession of ammunition statute facially violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Another Court of Appeal recently held that California’s laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition did not violate the Constitution because “only law-abiding citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms is protected by the Second Amendment.” To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Ceja" on Justia Law

In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street, 16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained, searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group. T.F.-G. ran. Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code 148(a)). In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions. The totality of the circumstances, establishing the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his possession of a loaded handgun in public–indicated that a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave. The court also rejected a Second Amendment facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. View "In re T.F.-G." on Justia Law

This original proceeding involves a protracted legal battle between several rural telephone companies and the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”). Petitioners are telephone corporations that provide telephone service in rural areas. After the Rural Telephone Bank (“RTB”) had just dissolved and redeemed all shares of stock it had issued. Many telephone companies, including Petitioners, owned RTB stock. The Commission had clarified in a 2006 decision that all gains on the sale of public utility company assets that were never in rate base accrue to company shareholders. Relying on this decision, the companies that never had stock in rate base so stated in the application and did not disclose any of their redemption proceeds. The Commission penalized the companies in the amount of $2,752,000 for violating Rule 1.1. The companies challenged the decision in an administrative appeal, but the Commission denied rehearing.   The Fifth Appellate District annulled penalty decision and the decision denying rehearing. The court agreed that Petitioners lacked fair notice of their obligation to disclose their redemption proceeds in the 2007 application. The court explained that Petitioners’ redemption proceed amounts were irrelevant to a ratemaking determination because Petitioners’ shares were never in rate base. All gains or losses on the redemption accrued to Petitioners’ shareholders, not the ratepayers. No other allocation was legally allowed. The Commission should have instructed Petitioners to disclose their redemption proceeds in the Application if that is what the Commission wanted from Petitioners. But the Commission did not give fair notice to Petitioners of this disclosure requirement and penalized them for essentially failing to intuit the disclosure requirement. View "Kerman Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Sacramento County District Attorney charged defendant Stephanie Miller with carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle under her control. Penal Code section 25400(a)(1) did not apply to individuals, unlike Miller, who were licensed to carry concealed firearms under California law. Later that year, Miller filed a demurrer asserting her concealed firearm charge was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) which held the “proper cause” requirement in New York’s public carry licensing regime violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court sustained Miller’s demurrer and dismissed the charge against her. On appeal, the State argued Miller lacked standing to raise her constitutional challenge because she never attempted to apply for a license and could not show she would satisfy any valid conditions California places on receiving one. The State argued Bruen only invalidated the “good cause” requirement in California’s firearm licensing statutes and they remained otherwise constitutional pursuant to the severability doctrine. The State further argued the trial court’s interpretation of Bruen was overly broad and the criminal charge of having a concealed firearm under section 25400 remained valid post-Bruen. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, to the extent Miller had standing, her assertions were ultimately unavailing because section 25400 did not violate the Second Amendment regardless of the constitutionality of California’s firearm licensing statutes. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s order sustaining Miller’s demurrer and dismissing the charge against her. View "California v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant M.F. and her husband, J.F., were the paternal grandparents (PGPs) of R.F. and B.F. In 2021, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to the children and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plans. In Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 reports for each child, respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) recommended that the court designate the PGPs as the children’s “prospective adoptive parents” (PAPs). But at a hearing for B.F., counsel raised a concern about J.F.’s alcohol abuse; J.F. later tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines. In March 2022, DPSS removed the children from the PGPs’ home on an emergency basis. DPSS then filed a Judicial Council form JV-324 for each child, stating that the removals were “due to methamphetamine used by [J.F].” Together with the notice forms (JV-324), DPSS filed a form JV-326 for each child, stating that M.F. was given notice of the removals “orally, in person” on March 11. The proofs of notice (forms JV-326) did not show that M.F. was given: (1) copies of the notices of emergency removal DPSS filed on March 11; (2) blank copies of forms JV-325 (objection to removal); or (3) blank copies of forms JV- 321 (request for prospective adoptive parent designation). M.F. went to the courthouse to ask whether she could “do anything,” and she was told she could file an objection to removal on form JV-325. On March 25, M.F. filed a form JV-325 for each child, requesting a hearing on the removals, and claiming the children would suffer harm the longer they were separated from M.F.’s family. The juvenile court never set a hearing on the removals. On September 1, 2022, M.F., through an attorney, filed a section 388 petition for each child, asking the court to return the children to her care and claiming she was never notified of her right to file objections to, and request a hearing on, the removals.The court denied the petitions, without a hearing, on grounds: (1) M.F. was provided with notice of the removals on March 11; (2) thus, M.F.’s objections were untimely filed; and (3) a hearing on the removals was discretionary, not mandatory, pursuant to section 366.26(n)(3). M.F. appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with orders to the juvenile court to hold a noticed hearing on the children’s March 11, 2022 removals. View "In re R.F." on Justia Law

Defendants were identified as suspects of murder after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of his murder. After their motions to quash and suppress evidence were denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder; and co-Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress, arguing the geofence warrant violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and did not comply with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (CalECPA).   The Second Appellate District explained that although the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, the court agrees it lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment and was impermissibly overbroad. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the convictions under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established by United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon). The court explained that given the dearth of authority directly on point and the novelty of the particular surveillance technique at issue, the officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing the warrant was valid, even if the issue, upon close legal examination, is not a particularly close one. View "P. v. Meza" on Justia Law

In People v. Bartholomew (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 775, 778, the Second Appellate District Court’s majority opinion acknowledged, “‘No provision of section 17, subdivision (b), authorizes the superior court judge to [determine a wobbler to be a misdemeanor] prior to judgment or a grant of probation.’” But the majority opinion held that “the People have no authority to appeal” the superior court’s pretrial order reducing a felony wobbler to a misdemeanor. The majority rejected the People’s claim that section 1238, subdivision (a)(6) authorizes such an appeal. The People did not raise the issue of whether an appeal is authorized under section 1238, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(8).   The Second Appellate District disapproved of the holding in Bartholomew. Here, the People petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its post-preliminary hearing, pretrial order reducing a felony wobbler to a misdemeanor. The People also filed an appeal. Because the superior court’s order is both unauthorized and appealable, the court issued the requested writ. The court directed the Superior Court of Ventura County to vacate its order reducing the felony wobbler to a misdemeanor and to reinstate the felony charge. View "P. v. Super. Ct. (Mitchell)" on Justia Law

After the Court of Appeal reversed the summary denial of her request for resentencing, Petitioner Elvira Torres sought on remand to peremptorily challenge the judge who had originally denied her request for resentencing, when he was again assigned to hear the request. Petitioner’s challenge was essentially denied as untimely, and she asked the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate or prohibition. The Court found remand for further resentencing proceedings held pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 did not constitute remand for a “new trial” as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6(a)(2); thus, petitioner’s challenge to the trial judge pursuant to that section was properly denied as untimely. View "Torres v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law