Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The City of San Diego (the City) placed a citizen’s initiative, Measure C, on the ballot for the March 2020 general and special election. Ballot materials for the measure stated that it required a two-thirds majority to pass, but by March 2020, at least two trial courts in San Francisco concluded that citizens’ initiatives required only a simple majority. Measure C ultimately received 65.24% of the votes cast. The City thereafter adopted a resolution that stated the number of votes for and against measure C and identified that there was a split of authority about the voter threshold requirement for a citizens’ inintiative, but did not state whether Measure C passed. By April 2021, several appellate courts concluded citizens’ initiatives required a simple majority, and the City adopted a resolution that Measure C had passed. Various groups sued to challenge the adoption of Measure C, calling into question the voter threshold required for its passage. The Court of Appeal determined the application of a simple majority voting requirement did not violate due process or constitute “fraud on the voters,” even though ballot materials and the ordinance placing the measure on the ballot stated a two-thirds majority applied. View "Alliance San Diego, et al. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco voters amended their city charter to authorize voting in local school board elections by noncitizen parents and guardians of school-age children. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance implementing Proposition N, including provisions requiring the City’s Department of Elections to develop a noncitizen voter registration form for school board elections. In 2022, after multiple school board elections in which noncitizens voted, this lawsuit was brought alleging the charter amendment violated the California Constitution. The trial court granted found the effective ordinance void and unenforceableThe court of appeal reversed and awarded the city costs. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor its history prohibits legislation expanding the electorate to noncitizens. The relevant constitutional provisions authorizing home rule permit charter cities to implement such an expansion in local school board elections. This authority is consistent with the principles underlying home rule and permits the voters of each charter city to determine whether it is good policy for their city or not. View "Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gregory Vance, Jr., his girlfriend (and codefendant) Katherine Schumann, and the victim were operating a fraudulent check-cashing scheme. Vance and Schumann suspected the victim of taking more than his share of the proceeds. Armed with knives, they went to the victim’s home. By the time they left, the victim had been fatally stabbed. According to the prosecution’s evidence, it was Vance who stabbed the victim; according to petitioner, it was Schumann. Vance was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, on a felony murder theory, and sentenced to 56 years to life in prison. The trial court denied Vance’s petition under Penal Code section 1172.61 to vacate his murder conviction. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) considering only the facts as stated in the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Vance’s direct appeal, rather than the facts as shown by the record of conviction; and (2) applying an erroneously low burden of proof. After review, the Court of Appeal found Vance’s counsel forfeited the trial court’s erroneous reliance on the Court’s prior opinion by failing to object, and that in the absence of any objection, that prior opinion constituted substantial evidence. The Court also held that, in a section 1172.6 proceeding, the trial court’s erroneous application of an unduly low burden of proof was not reversible per se. “Rather, the appellant has the burden of showing that it is reasonably probable that, in the absence of the error, he or she would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome. As Vance has not even tried to meet this burden, we cannot say the error was prejudicial.” View "California v. Vance" on Justia Law

The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition against defendant-appellant J.P. alleging he committed second degree robbery, assault with a firearm and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him in a vehicle. A court found all three allegations true and sustained the petition. On appeal, J.P. argued Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 precluded commitment to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) unless the juvenile’s most recent offense was listed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), and J.P.’s most recent offense, the gun possession, was not such an offense. The State moved to dismiss the gun possession offense, to which J.P. objected, arguing that the court only had the power to strike the entre petition, not any single allegation. The court granted the State’s motion, dismissed the gun offense, and committed J.P. to an SYTF. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ramon Del Rio appealed a the trial court’s decision to redesignate robbery as the basis for his conviction after granting Del Rio’s petition to vacate his two first degree murder convictions under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). Del Rio contended the trial court violated his due process rights because he had no notice the court might take this action. He further argued the robbery conviction was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed the lack of notice and substantial evidence supporting the robbery conviction warranted reversal. The Court therefore remanded the case for further proceedings. View "California v. Del Rio" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs’ petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The court held the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law.the voters of Los Angeles County (County) amended the County charter by enacting Measure J. The charter amendment adopted by Measure J requires the County Board of Supervisors (Board) to annually allocate at least 10 percent of the County’s locally generated unrestricted revenues in the general fund to direct community investment (such as youth programs, job training, rental assistance, and affordable housing) and alternatives to incarceration (including health, mental health, and substance use disorder programs). The charter amendment also specifically prohibits Measure J funds from being allocated to any carceral system or law enforcement agency. Immediately after Measure J’s enactment, a coalition of County employee unions and two individuals filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting the Board, the Los Angeles County Auditor (auditor), and the Los Angeles County Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from enforcing the charter amendment. The trial court granted the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court wrote that because the charter amendment enacted by Measure J defines a “power of the County’s “governing bod[y]” (the Board)—and because it concerns “[t]he performance of functions required by statute” (adopting a budget)—it is a permissible exercise of the County’s authority to amend its charter. Further, contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, the amendment neither impairs the exercise of essential government functions nor violates state law. Measure J thus is enforceable, and the court, therefore, reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Coalition of County Unions v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Defendant Anterion Suggs appeals a judgment following entry of a plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of a concealed firearm after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and methamphetamine found in his vehicle. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the detention was unlawfully prolonged. Specifically, defendant claimed that once the arresting officer noticed the proper documentation attached to his vehicle’s rear window and thus learned that the reason he had stopped defendant was invalid, any further detention was unlawful. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal concurred: the detention became unlawful when: (1) the purpose of the stop completely dissipated (when the officer saw the documents in the window and thus realized that defendant had not committed the Vehicle Code violation that was the purpose of the stop); and (2) the officer then made inquiries aimed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. The judgment was reversed, the conviction was vacated, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to enter a new order granting that motion. View "California v. Suggs" on Justia Law

Kelsey Carpenter gave birth to a baby girl at home, alone, after deciding that she would not risk having her child removed from her custody as had happened with her two older children when they tested positive for drugs after being delivered at the hospital. She again used drugs during her pregnancy. After Carpenter’s daughter was born, the baby struggled to breathe, and Carpenter attempted to provide her with CPR. Carpenter also cut the baby’s umbilical cord but did not clamp it, and the umbilical stump continued to bleed. Carpenter bathed, diapered, clothed, and attempted to breastfeed the baby before seemingly passing out. When she woke up, her newborn daughter was dead. Before Health & Saf. Code, § 123467(a) was effective, the State charged Carpenter with implied malice murder and felony child endangerment, contending that Carpenter intentionally chose an unattended at-home delivery, despite being warned of the dangers, in an effort to evade child welfare services and at the risk of her daughter’s life. According to the State, Carpenter’s acts and omissions, including her failure to seek medical assistance after realizing her baby was in distress, caused the baby to bleed to death. Carpenter challenged the superior court’s order denying her motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause under Penal Code section 995. She contended she was immune from prosecution based on the new law, which went into effect after the preliminary hearing, but before the superior court ruled on her section 995 motion. While the Court of Appeal agreed that Carpenter could not be prosecuted for her decision to have an unattended home birth or any effect that her alleged drug use or lack of prenatal care during pregnancy may have had on her baby, the law did not preclude the State's prosecution for her acts and omissions after her daughter was born alive. The Court therefore denied Carpenter's petition. View "Carpenter v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Valle appealed restitution order regarding an undamaged cell phone. Valle and his girlfriend M. got into an argument at defendant’s home. The argument turned physical when defendant headbutted M. in the face, causing bleeding and a nasal fracture. M. was able to quickly get out, but she left her purse and new phone behind. Later that month, defendant pled no contest to battery in a dating relationship. On April 19, 2022, defendant returned the phone to M. at his sentencing hearing. A few weeks later at the victim restitution hearing, M. sought $629.99 for her phone. She testified she had intended to get a refund for the phone in that amount, but the refund period had lapsed by the time defendant returned the phone to her. The court awarded her the purchase price of the phone and allowed her to keep the phone. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion because it overcompensated the victim, and reversed and remanded with one of two options: (1) if the victim has not sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference in value of the phone between the day the victim purchased the phone and the day the defendant gave it back to her; or (2) if the victim has sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference between the purchase price and the amount for which she sold it. The defendant shall then be ordered to pay that difference. View "California v. Valle" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District dismissed two Appellants’ appeals of the trial court’s post-judgment orders. One Appellant purported to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code 2 section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, the other Appellant purported to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals, holding that the orders appealed from are non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained that the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s order. “‘It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.’” View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law