Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Los Angeles (the City) approved a project at 1719-1731 North Whitley Avenue in Hollywood (the Project) that would replace 40 apartments subject to the City’s rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) with a hotel. The City determined the Project was exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to CEQA Guidelines relating to certain development projects. The relevant guideline addresses what is often referred to as the “infill” exemption or the “Class 32” exemption. Respondent United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles (United Neighborhoods) sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing, among other things, that the in-fill exemption does not apply because the Project is not consistent with a General Plan policy concerning the preservation of affordable housing. The trial court granted the writ, effectively halting the Project until the City was to find the Project is consistent with that policy or 148-159 undertakes CEQA review. The City and real parties in interest appeal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that the City’s suggestion that the Project’s consistency with the Framework Element implies consistency “with the entirety of the General Plan” because of the Framework Element’s foundational role assumes, contrary to authority, the Framework Element stands in perfect harmony with the General Plan. However, the court explained that although it affirms the trial court, it does not suggest that the City was necessarily required to make formal findings that Housing Element policies are outweighed by competing policies favoring the Project. View "United Neighborhoods for L.A. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Here, a police officer received information via a radio broadcast from another officer that a juvenile on probation with a firearm restriction likely placed a firearm under the front passenger seat in defendant Hilario Leal, Jr.’s car before defendant got into his car and drove away. Defendant’s car was under constant surveillance from the time of the alleged firearm placement until the searching officer conducted the search. When a search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s car yielded no firearm, the searching officer decided to search the trunk, where he discovered a firearm. Defendant was charged with several offenses and filed a motion to suppress the firearm; the trial court denied the motion. Defendant ultimately pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The question presented was whether the search of defendant’s trunk was justified under the automobile exception. The Court of Appeal concluded it was not. "[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, enter an order granting the motion, and allow defendant to move to withdraw his plea. View "California v. Leal" on Justia Law

In 2001, G.A. was charged with lewd acts with a child, sexual battery by restraint, and false imprisonment. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court committed G.A. to the Redwood Regional Center. G.A. never regained competency but was released and received services through the Center until 2008. In 2010, G.A. was charged with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a child under the age of 10 and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court again committed him.A 2021 petition to extend G.A.’s commitment alleged that G.A. suffers from developmental disabilities and that he represents a danger to himself or to others. A psychologist, who evaluated G.A. several times, calculated G.A.’s I.Q. at 42 and testified that G.A. poses a danger to himself and to others, particularly children. The court continued the commitment.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal because the commitment order has expired. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code 6500 does not violate due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness but that substantial evidence did not support the finding of G.A.’s danger to others--it was based on the testimony of an expert witness who relied on unsupported assumptions of fact about G.A.’s offenses. The court noted significant ambiguity as to the meaning of “danger to self.” View "People v. G.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Oscar Lopez was convicted of multiple crimes including: first degree murder and willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. He was sentenced to 141 years to life. In his direct appeal, the Court of Appeal modified the sentence; the Court also reversed conditionally and remanded with directions to consider striking defendant’s prior serious felony conviction enhancement and firearm enhancements. On remand, in October 2022, the trial court struck the prior serious felony enhancement but refused to strike the firearm enhancements. It resentenced defendant to 101 years to life. Defendant appealed again, contending that at resentencing, the trial court erred under various amendments to the Penal Code, all of which went into effect on January 1, 2022. In the published portion of the Court's opinion, the Court addressed his contention that under section 186.22 — as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) — there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement to count 5 (unlawful possession of a firearm). To this, the Court held that, because the judgment against defendant was not final, he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of A.B. 333. However, because the Court reversed solely with respect to the sentence and directed the trial court to resentence defendant, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the gang enhancement. "A.B. 333 was simply irrelevant to anything the trial court had jurisdiction to do." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found no other error. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order summarily denying his petition to vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6.   The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that although Defendant’s petition is facially sufficient and thus entitled him to the appointment of counsel, it is devoid of factual allegations concerning the killing of the victim. Defendant does not deny that he was the actual killer, nor does he assert that another person fired the shot that killed the victim or that he acted without the intent to kill. He merely states the legal conclusion that he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes made to the law of murder under Senate Bill No. 1437. Under these circumstances, where Defendant alleged no facts concerning the murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript showing that the Defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and Defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition, Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Pickett" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). View "Estrada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In a challenge to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, the Coalition argued that the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied a motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief.The court of appeal reversed. The challenged warrantless tows are not permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The defendants have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. The court rejected an argument that the governmental interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The tows at issue may not be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context. View "Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant Keandre Session was convicted of five counts of residential burglary, street terrorism, and numerous enhancements. On appeal he argued: (1) the placement of a GPS surveillance device on his vehicle without a warrant was unconstitutional because the officer who did so did not offer specific testimony as to how he knew that defendant (who was, indeed, on parole) was on parole; and (2) due to changes in the law, he is entitled to a new trial where the gang counts are bifurcated from the other charges. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding: (1) the surveillance device argument had no merit because no case or statute has ever articulated such a requirement with respect to parolee searches; and (2) even if the change in the law should be retroactively applied, any error was not reasonably likely to change the outcome of the case. View "California v. Session" on Justia Law

Defendant acknowledged that in 1991 he “was convicted of provocative act murder.” He appeals a post-judgment order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly Section 1170.95) petition to vacate the first-degree murder conviction.1 Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). Appellant claimed the trial court erred in denying the second petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argued he made a prima facie case for relief based on S.B. 775’s amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to add the following ground for relief: the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Appellant maintains he was convicted of provocative act murder pursuant to such a theory of “imputed” malice because he did not personally commit a provocative act. The provocative acts allegedly were committed by his accomplices.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Appellant was convicted of provocative act murder, as a matter of law, he is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief. The court explained that a conviction of provocative act murder cannot be premised on “malice that is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” The court further explained that the law of provocative act murder requires that the defendant personally harbor malice. View "P. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant MaeReichelle Villamor Marquez appealed a court order directing her to pay restitution to the victim of her crimes. Marquez and two others fraudulently used the identities of 60 prisoners to obtain unemployment benefits from the Employment Development Department (the Department). The State of California charged Marquez with 21 felonies, some arising out of her participation in the fraudulent scheme and others out of her possession of controlled substances. Marquez and the State agreed to an indicated prison sentence range of four to seven years, and Judge Link granted the State's motion to dismiss all other charges. Marquez agreed “[r]estitution to [the Department] [would] be joint and several with co-defendants.” Appealing the restitution order, Marquez claimed the trial court breached the implied agreement under California v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) that the same judge who accepted her guilty plea and sentenced her to prison would also determine the amount of victim restitution to be awarded. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law