Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

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Trevon Bey was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a loaded firearm in public. The trial court dismissed a prior strike conviction and sentenced Bey to three years for each count, to be served concurrently. Bey appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly revoked his self-representation status, that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon violated his Second Amendment rights, and that California's concealed carry laws were unconstitutional under a recent Supreme Court decision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially allowed Bey to represent himself but later revoked this status due to his disruptive behavior and failure to follow court rules. Bey repeatedly challenged the court's authority, disrespected the court, and disrupted proceedings, despite multiple warnings. The court appointed standby counsel to represent him, citing his inability to adhere to courtroom protocol.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bey's self-representation status due to his continuous disruptive conduct. The court also found that Bey's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon did not violate his Second Amendment rights, referencing recent Supreme Court decisions that upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by felons. Additionally, the court rejected Bey's challenge to California's concealed carry laws, noting that the unconstitutional "good cause" requirement was severable from the rest of the licensing scheme.The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the sentence for carrying a loaded firearm in public should be stayed under Penal Code section 654, as it was based on the same act as the possession charge. The court modified the judgment to stay the sentence on count 2 and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Bey" on Justia Law

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Two defendants, Martin Field and John Asher, were found to be sexually violent predators (SVPs) by separate juries and committed indefinitely to a state hospital. They were compelled to testify against themselves during their commitment trials. Both argued on appeal that they were similarly situated to individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs), who are not required to testify against themselves at their commitment trials. They claimed this disparity violated equal protection principles.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, previously found merit in Field's equal protection argument and remanded the case to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for an evidentiary hearing. The same conclusion was reached for Asher's case by Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the People had not met their burden to justify the disparate treatment of SVPs and NGIs. Consequently, the court concluded that equal protection principles were violated and ordered new commitment trials for both Field and Asher.The People appealed the new trial orders, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the disparate treatment of SVPs was not justified. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's orders. The appellate court held that the People had not demonstrated that the testimony of SVPs was more necessary than that of NGIs to justify the disparate treatment under the strict scrutiny standard. The court emphasized that there were sufficient records and other means to evaluate SVPs without compelling their testimony, and thus, the equal protection violation was not justified. View "P. v. Field" on Justia Law

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Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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Appellant M.T., a transgender woman, petitioned to legally change her name and gender in 2017, which was granted by the Stanislaus Superior Court in 2018. In 2023, M.T. requested the court to seal the entire record of her name change and gender marker correction, citing harassment and threats after being "outed" on social media. The trial court denied the request to seal the entire record but sealed the application to seal, its supporting documentation, and a physician's letter attached to the initial petition.The trial court found that M.T. had not shown an overriding interest that would overcome the right of public access to the records. The court noted that California's liberal name change policy presumes name changes should be public to prevent fraud and ensure creditors and others can locate individuals who have changed their names. The court also found insufficient evidence that the harassment M.T. experienced was directly linked to the public availability of her court records.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that M.T. had demonstrated an overriding privacy and safety interest in sealing her records. The court found that the harassment and threats M.T. experienced were likely linked to the public availability of her records and that there was a substantial probability of future harm if the records remained unsealed. The appellate court determined that M.T.'s privacy and safety interests outweighed the public's right of access to the records and that sealing the entire record was necessary to protect those interests.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order denying the request to seal the entire record and remanded the case with instructions to seal all records that reveal M.T.'s name change or gender marker correction. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law

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Cristian Omar Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code section 1473.7. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court denied. Martinez appealed, arguing that section 1473.7 does not allow the trial court to reinstate the original charges and that doing so violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General contended that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss is not appealable and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially granted Martinez’s motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. However, when Martinez subsequently moved to dismiss the charges, the trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1473.7 does not provide for dismissal after a plea is set aside.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Attorney General that the order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable. However, the court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Upon examining the merits, the court concluded that section 1473.7 does not mandate the dismissal of charges after a conviction is vacated and a plea is withdrawn. The court also found that section 1203.4, which provides for the dismissal of charges upon successful completion of probation, does not preclude the refiling of charges once a conviction is vacated under section 1473.7. Additionally, the court held that the original charges could be reinstated as felonies despite their prior reduction to misdemeanors. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate and directed the parties to proceed on the reinstated information. View "Martinez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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On November 5, 2021, officers from the Mountain View Police Department investigated a reported armed robbery at Brendan Krepchin’s apartment. They found no evidence of a robbery but discovered a note suggesting a plan for violence, law enforcement equipment, and firearms. The police department petitioned for a gun violence restraining order (GVRO), which the Santa Clara County Superior Court issued initially as an emergency order and later as a three-year order after a hearing in January 2023. The order barred Krepchin from possessing firearms or ammunition.The Santa Clara County Superior Court issued the emergency GVRO on November 5, 2021, and later a three-year GVRO after a hearing in January 2023. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Krepchin posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by possessing firearms. Krepchin appealed, arguing the GVRO violated his Second Amendment rights, was procedurally defective, and that the trial court erred in qualifying an officer as a threat assessment expert and admitting hearsay evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the GVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, which upheld firearm restrictions for individuals posing a threat. The court also found no procedural defects in the GVRO issuance and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the officer as an expert or admitting hearsay evidence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the GVRO, affirming the lower court’s decision. View "Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin" on Justia Law

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Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State of Cal." on Justia Law

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James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also argued the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred in ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed the section 1170(d) resentencing provision despite amendments to related laws. The court also found that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and placing him outside juvenile court jurisdiction.The court declined to reverse the stay order, noting it would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. The court presumed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would calculate Bagsby's custody credits correctly. View "People v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

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The case involves 11 public charter schools (the Schools) seeking to overturn a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the Schools violated section 3550 of the Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership by sending e-mails that tended to influence employees' decisions regarding union representation by United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA). The Schools argued that PERB's interpretation of section 3550 was erroneous and that the statute was unconstitutional as it violated free speech protections.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially dismissed the allegations, finding that the e-mails did not contain threats or promises and thus did not violate the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). However, PERB, applying its new interpretation from Regents I and Regents II decisions, found that the e-mails violated section 3550 because they tended to influence employee choice regarding union membership. PERB rejected the Schools' defenses, including claims of business necessity and constitutional free speech rights.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court upheld PERB's interpretation of section 3550, finding it not clearly erroneous. The court also rejected the Schools' constitutional claims, determining that section 3550 regulates only government speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment or the California Constitution. The court found that the Schools, as public employers, and their administrators and Alliance CMO, as agents, were engaged in government speech when communicating about union matters.The court concluded that substantial evidence supported PERB's findings that the Schools could be held responsible for the e-mails sent by Alliance CMO and the School administrators under theories of actual and apparent authority. The court affirmed PERB's decision and order. View "Alliance Marce & Eva Stern Math & Sci. High Sch. v. PERB" on Justia Law