Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In San Diego, California, Kevin Eugene Cartwright was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, robbery, burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and owning or possessing ammunition as a prohibited person. Cartwright appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress video footage from the City of San Diego's "City IQ" streetlight camera program and evidence derived from the footage. Cartwright contended that the police conducted a warrantless search when they accessed the streetlight camera footage and any evidence obtained as a result of the footage should be considered "fruit of the poisonous tree."The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, disagreed with Cartwright's argument. The court held that Cartwright did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he traversed a public right of way in downtown San Diego in the middle of a business day. The court found that the streetlight cameras only captured short-term movements and did not create a retrospective database of everyone's movements across the city. The court concluded that the police did not conduct a "search" when they accessed footage from the City of San Diego's streetlight cameras, and there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment against Cartwright. View "People v. Cartwright" on Justia Law

In California, a man named Clifford James Smyth, who was categorized as a tier two sex offender, sought to be removed from the California sex offender registry. However, at the time of his petition, he was living and registered as a sex offender in Oregon, not California. The Superior Court of Glenn County denied his petition, stating that he was not currently registered as a sex offender in California. On appeal, Smyth argued that the denial of his petition violated equal protection and was contrary to the legislative intent of California's sex offender registration laws.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the California law, which was restructured to establish three tiers of registration for sex offenders, only allowed people registered in California to petition for termination from the California sex offender registry. The court disagreed with Smyth's argument that excluding out-of-state registrants from obtaining relief was contrary to the legislative intent and was absurd. The court reasoned that as someone not registered in California, the legislative concerns did not apply to Smyth.Furthermore, the court rejected Smyth's equal protection claim, concluding that out-of-state registrants are not similarly situated to California registrants for purposes of the California law, as they do not contribute to the problems identified by the Legislature when it decided to adopt the statute. The court also noted that even if out-of-state registrants were similarly situated, the distinction between the two groups would survive the requisite degree of scrutiny as there was a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a legitimate governmental purpose. View "People v. Smyth" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Alexander Alberto Frias, was convicted of stalking. Frias appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The trial court denied the first three requests on the grounds that the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, with four different attorneys had handled Frias’s defense at his request. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Frias's fourth request. At the time of the fourth request, the case had been pending for three-and-a-half years, the case was set for trial, and the prosecutor and deputy public defender had announced they were ready for trial. An attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial. The trial court's concerns that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial and that Frias would seek to substitute new counsel were not sufficient grounds to deny Frias's request to have retained counsel of his choice. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the trial court's denial of Frias's right to counsel of his choice. However, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Frias's conviction for stalking and remanded for a new trial. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw from a person involved in a car accident, where unconsciousness or unresponsiveness occurred in a hospital about 90 minutes after the incident. The defendant, Francisco Andres Alvarez, was involved in a fatal car accident and was transported to the hospital. He appeared unresponsive approximately 90 minutes after the accident. An officer, suspecting Alvarez was under the influence of alcohol, requested a blood draw without obtaining a warrant. The blood test revealed a 0.05 percent blood alcohol level with the presence of cocaine and THC.Alvarez moved to suppress the blood testing results, arguing that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and that no exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw. The trial court initially granted the motion, but later, following a U.S. Supreme Court decision (Mitchell v. Wisconsin), the court reconsidered and denied the motion, ruling that exigent circumstances permitted a blood test without a warrant.On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District of the State of California reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court concluded that no exigent circumstances, as defined in Mitchell v. Wisconsin or Schmerber v. California, allowed a warrantless blood draw in this case. The court found that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and no emergency medical interventions were required that would have justified the warrantless blood draw. Furthermore, the court found that the officer did not reasonably and in good faith rely on California's implied consent statute, which allows for a blood draw without a warrant if the driver is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusal. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Alvarez's motion to suppress the blood test results and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. View "P. v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

In the case being reviewed, Alfredo Ramirez was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual offenses against minors and was sentenced to 107 years in prison. Ramirez appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained from his phone, which was unlocked using his fingerprint, was obtained unlawfully and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also argued that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse victims’ responses, incorrectly instructed the jury, and imposed fines without determining his ability to pay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed with Ramirez and affirmed the judgment. The court held that using Ramirez's fingerprint to unlock his phone did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or violate his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court also found no violation of Ramirez's due process rights. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury or in admitting the expert testimony. Finally, the court found that Ramirez had forfeited his right to challenge the imposed fines and fees due to his failure to object at sentencing. View "P. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In a criminal case in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, the defendant, Terrell Trammel, was convicted of multiple charges arising from his violent relationship with his former girlfriend, M.T. Trammel first appealed his aggregate 12-year prison term sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The appellate court agreed and remanded the case for a full resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected its errors and resentenced Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months.Trammel then filed a second appeal arguing that his new sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy in the California Constitution. The appellate court agreed with Trammel, finding that the addition of four months to his sentence upon resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the errors in his original sentence were not the result of "unauthorized leniency" that might have warranted a harsher sentence under the exception outlined in People v. Serrato. The court also found that the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect Trammel's total custody credits at the time of resentencing.The court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to modify the sentence and impose a total aggregate sentence of 11 years, four months, and to determine Trammel's actual total custody credits as of the time of his resentencing. The court also instructed the trial court to order the clerk of the superior court to prepare a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes. View "P. v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by Alexander Alberto Frias, who was convicted of stalking. Frias argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frias's first three requests as the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, during which time four different attorneys had represented Frias at his request. However, the court ruled that the trial court's denial of Frias's fourth request was an abuse of discretion. At the time of the fourth request, an attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial, subject to a few witness scheduling issues. The appellate court noted that while the trial court was concerned the Castaneda firm’s attorneys would seek a further continuance or that Frias would yet again seek to substitute in new counsel, nothing in the record showed that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial. Therefore, the court’s concerns were not sufficient grounds on which to deny Frias’s request to have retained counsel of his choice. The court held that the denial of Frias’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice was structural error, and thus reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

The case concerns Gary Marcus Hall, who was convicted on two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. Hall was a registered sex offender and lived with the victims' grandfather. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts. Hall challenged his sentence on three grounds. Firstly, he claimed the court mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation. Secondly, he argued that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded. Lastly, he contended that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to a jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District held that Hall's sentence was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing factors in aggravation. The court also ruled that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason. The court further concluded that even if Hall did not sufficiently waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore his aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Velasco, who was serving a sentence for attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). At a September 2022 resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b) and did not involve a sexually violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the minute order reflected his presence was waived, the record did not contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction factors should influence the new sentence. Velasco argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a full resentencing hearing as was required by section 1172.75. He further contended the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence without a valid waiver. The State argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal before the Court of Appeal in case No. D080603. However, should the appeals court determine that the trial court had jurisdiction, the State conceded remand was warranted because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 but reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not validly waive his presence. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law