Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Defendant was charged and convicted with various offenses related to this incident. On appeal, among other claims, Defendant contends remand is required for the court to resentence him in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 731 (Senate Bill No. 567), and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), statutes 2021, chapter 695 (Assembly Bill No. 124), and the court erred in ordering restitution in favor of Garton, the agricultural equipment company whose property was damaged in the collision, because the company was not a direct or derivative victim of a crime of which Defendant was convicted.   The Fifth Appellate District remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. However, the court affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that as the People concede, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 are ameliorative changes in law that apply retroactively to Defendant. Here, the trial court imposed an upper-term sentence on count 5, thus implicating Senate Bill No. 567. Additionally, Defendant’s statement in mitigation, submitted to the trial court at sentencing, suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma, including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly Bill No. 124. View "P. v. Suazo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Davis Boat Manufacturing-Nordic, Inc. (Davis Boat), which prevailed in a breach-of-contract action against Defendant applied for an order to sell Defendant’s home. The Stanislaus County Superior Court denied the application on the basis of Code of Civil Procedure section 699.730, a recently added statute that prohibits the forced sale of a judgment debtor’s principal place of residence to satisfy a “consumer debt” except under certain circumstances.   The Fifth Appellate affirmed. The court rejected Davis Boat’s assertions on appeal and held that the definition of “consumer debt” in section 669.730 is not latently ambiguous, and that section 669.730 neither violates the contract nor the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The court explained that section 699.730, subdivision (a) defines “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Thus, a debt incurred for business or commercial reasons would not be a debt incurred for “personal, family, or household purposes.” The court wrote that notwithstanding the plain meaning of the statute, Davis Boat suggests “consumer debt” is latently ambiguous. The court reasoned that it does not believe that the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 2463 is frustrated simply because the language approved by the Legislature means debt incurred by an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Moreover, the court wrote that it cannot deem a statutory exemption that allows financial institutions to force the sale of a judgment debtor’s principal place of residence to satisfy a high-priced debt “so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection. View "Davis Boat Manufacturing-Nordic, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. (SPARC) and Lucky Pup Dog Rescue (Lucky Pup) (collectively Appellants) appealed a judgment of dismissal following the trial court’s order sustaining, without leave to amend, Defendant County of Los Angeles’s (the County) demurrer to Appellants’ petition for writ of mandate. Appellants contend that the Hayden Act and, more specifically, Food and Agriculture Code section 31108 and similar provisions impose on the County a ministerial duty to (1) release a dog or other shelter animal to a requesting animal adoption or rescue organization with Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status prior to euthanasia without first determining whether the animal has behavioral problems or is adoptable or treatable, and (2) release the aforementioned animal to the requesting animal rescue or adoption organization without requiring the organization to meet qualifications additional to having Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) status.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that the demurrer was improperly granted because the County lacks discretion to withhold and euthanize a dog based upon its determination that the animal has a behavioral problem or is not adoptable or treatable. However, the County has discretion to determine whether and how a nonprofit organization qualifies as an animal adoption or rescue organization. View "Santa Paula Animal Rescue Center, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, LLC, and Bongo, LLC, for breach of contract and eight other causes of action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged she conceived the idea for and worked to develop and coproduce a popular television program that came to be known as Bling Empire on Netflix. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiff presented the idea for the program to Defendant Jenkins during a series of discussions, and she gave Jenkins written development material concerning the program. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and other claims. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that adhering to the two-part test announced in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), that while the creation of a television show is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression, in this case, there is no “functional relationship” between the activity challenged in the complaint and the issue of public interest, as required by FilmOn.  Further, the court wrote that the conduct challenged, while it “implicates” a public issue, does not “contribute to public discussion of that issue” Consequently, Defendants’ activity excluding Plaintiff and failing to compensate her was not undertaken “in furtherance of free speech ‘in connection with’ an issue of public interest.” View "Li v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, co-Appellant purports to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals. The court held that the orders appealed were non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained, the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Slaton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. During jury selection, the State exercised a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda. On appeal, Aranda argued the State's challenge for cause during jury selection was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this was a presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection to the challenge. The Court of Appeal determined that argument failed because section 231.7 applied only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. View "California v. Aranda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Narro molested two of his stepdaughters and one of his stepdaughter’s friends for a period of over 10 years. He was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and sentenced to 195 years to life. On appeal he argued: (1) the judgment should have been reversed because CALCRIM No. 1191B violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution by allowing jurors to rely on currently charged crimes to find he had the propensity to commit other currently charged crimes; and (2) the trial court erred by awarding restitution in the amount of $9,461.34 as noneconomic damages pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) in order for a victim’s mother to replace the furniture where the molestations had occurred because the furniture invoked painful memories. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Narro" on Justia Law

Defendant Fermin Perez-Robles, a massage therapist, was convicted by jury on 16 counts of sexual penetration and sexual battery involving six clients and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on 10 counts, including those for sexual battery by restraint; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on lesser included offenses on four counts; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on using other charged sex offenses as propensity evidence; (4) the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument; and (5) the imposition of the upper term sentence on one count had to be reversed and remanded based on recent changes to Penal Code section 1170. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence was insufficient to support one count (count 4); although there was sufficient evidence of restraint, the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses on two counts (counts 14 & 20); and the imposition of the upper term sentence on count 11 had to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Perez-Robles" on Justia Law

In 2001, petitioner Ronnie Harrell was charged with five felonies, including attempted murder, each with a firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement; a prior prison term enhancement and a strike prior were also alleged. He was allowed to enter into a plea bargain, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to robbery, with a firearm enhancement, and admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison — the term prescribed by the plea bargain. In 2023, Harrell filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Harrell was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981, and he claimed to suffer from several service-related disorders. The trial court denied the petition, relying on case law holding that a person serving a stipulated sentence was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. It rejected Harrell’s argument that recent amendments to section 1170.91 had abrogated that case law. To this, the Court of Appeal found was error: the amendments deleted language from section 1170.91 that courts had previously relied on in holding that persons serving a stipulated sentence were ineligible. They also added new language allowing a trial court to reduce a conviction or a sentence “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea . . . .” View "California v. Harrell" on Justia Law