Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

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The City of Oxnard and two other public agencies formed the City of Oxnard Financing Authority through a joint powers agreement. The Financing Authority approved two lease revenue bonds to finance public capital improvements. Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. and Aaron Starr challenged the approval of these bonds, arguing they violated constitutional debt limits under the California Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the City and the Financing Authority, leading the plaintiffs to appeal.The trial court found that the bonds did not require voter approval under the Offner-Dean rule, which allows for contingent obligations that do not create immediate debt. The court also determined that the City and the Financing Authority complied with the procedural requirements of the Joint Exercise of Powers Act in authorizing the bonds. The trial court dismissed other causes of action for writ of mandate/administrative mandamus and declaratory relief, as the plaintiffs had an adequate legal remedy through the reverse validation action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the additional payments required by the lease agreements were not unconstitutional long-term debt obligations, as they were contingent upon the City's use and occupancy of the leased properties. The court also found that the lease-leaseback funding arrangement complied with the Offner-Dean rule and that the City had made a valid finding of significant public benefit under the Marks-Roos Act. The judgment in favor of the City and the Financing Authority was affirmed, allowing the issuance of the lease revenue bonds to proceed. View "Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. City of Oxnard" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Temecula Valley Educators Association and individual students, teachers, and parents from the Temecula Valley Unified School District (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued the District and five members of the District’s school board (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of “Resolution No. 2022–23/21” (the Resolution), which prohibits the use of Critical Race Theory (CRT) or similar frameworks in teaching topics related to race. The Resolution lists specific elements and doctrines of CRT that are banned. Plaintiffs argued that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague and sought a preliminary injunction to halt its enforcement.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Resolution was sufficiently clear and that Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also concluded that the balance of harms favored denying the injunction, as enjoining a government action would cause irreparable injury.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague because it employs ambiguous language, lacks definitions, is unclear in scope, and contains no enforcement guidelines. The court noted that the Resolution’s language leaves teachers uncertain about what is prohibited, leading to self-censorship and fear of arbitrary enforcement. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the significant harm Plaintiffs would face without an injunction and by incorrectly concluding that the Resolution did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying the preliminary injunction as to the Resolution and remanded for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court dismissed the appeal related to the Board’s “Policy 5020.01” as moot, given that the relevant portions of the Policy had been rescinded following changes in the law. View "Mae M. v. Komrosky" on Justia Law

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Arthur Lee Henderson appealed the judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) concerning his attempted murder conviction. The court resentenced him on his remaining convictions for murder (with a felony-murder special-circumstance finding) and attempted robbery, imposing a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence. Henderson argued that the application of section 1385.1, which restricted the court's discretion to strike the felony-murder special circumstance, violated the ex post facto clauses of the California and United States Constitutions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Henderson in 1988 to LWOP for first-degree murder, plus additional terms for attempted murder and attempted robbery. Henderson's petition for resentencing was partially granted, leading to the dismissal of his attempted murder conviction. However, the court maintained the LWOP sentence for the murder conviction, citing section 1385.1, which prohibits striking special circumstances in first-degree murder cases.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the application of section 1385.1 at Henderson's 2023 resentencing did not violate ex post facto principles. The court reasoned that the resentencing under section 1172.6 was an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution, and Henderson's new sentence was no more severe than the punishment prescribed at the time of his crimes. The court also found that the law of the case doctrine barred reconsideration of Henderson's petition for resentencing as to his murder conviction, as the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Curiel did not constitute a significant change in the law regarding direct aider and abettor liability.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, directing the Superior Court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

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Carlos and Ana Carachure filed a lawsuit against the City of Azusa, claiming the City violated article XIII D of the California Constitution by charging sewer and trash franchise fees that exceeded the cost of providing those services and using the fees to fund general city services. The City argued that the Carachures failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not follow the statutory procedures for a refund, which require paying the fees under protest and filing a claim for a refund. The trial court agreed with the City and entered judgment in its favor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the Carachures were required to file a claim for a refund with the City before seeking judicial relief, as they claimed the fees were illegally collected or assessed. The court denied the Carachures' petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment for the City. The Carachures filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, arguing the trial court relied on inapplicable property tax cases and the current version of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Carachures' constitutional challenge to the City's collection and use of franchise fees seeks relief outside the scope of the statutory claims procedure for refunds. The court concluded that the Carachures did not have to file a claim for a refund before bringing this action, as their challenge was not an action for a refund governed by section 5472 and Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The judgment was reversed, allowing the Carachures to proceed with their constitutional claims. View "Carachure v. City of Azusa" on Justia Law

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Matthew Morrison was convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to prison. Before his release, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to commit him as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court found the petition true, declared Morrison a sexually violent predator, and committed him to the State Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.Morrison appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by not personally advising him of his right to a jury trial and securing a personal waiver of that right. He claimed that the SVPA’s failure to require a personal jury trial advisement and waiver, unlike other civil commitment statutes, violated the constitutional equal protection guarantee.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that Morrison’s equal protection challenge was subject to rational basis review. Since Morrison did not raise the issue in the trial court, the appellate court conditionally affirmed the commitment order and remanded the matter to allow Morrison to raise his equal protection claim before the trial court. The appellate court provided guidance on the principles the trial court should apply when resolving Morrison’s constitutional claim. View "P. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

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Emiliano Gomez was found guilty by the trial court of multiple offenses, including stalking, criminal threats, and possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon. The police found a flare gun in Gomez's possession, and based on an officer's testimony, the trial court convicted him of possessing a firearm as a felon under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). Gomez appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon and that the statutes prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition violate the Second Amendment.The trial court found Gomez guilty on all counts except for possession of body armor. The court also found special allegations and aggravating factors true, sentencing Gomez to an aggregate term of four years in state prison. Gomez contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove the flare gun was a firearm designed to be used as a weapon, as required by section 16520, subdivision (a).The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the prosecution needed to prove the flare gun was designed to be used as a weapon. The court found the evidence insufficient to support such a finding and vacated the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court also rejected Gomez's Second Amendment challenge to the statutory prohibitions on possession of firearms and ammunition by felons, citing the reasoning in People v. Anderson. The judgment was reversed, the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

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The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the Attorney General of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements in their charitable solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations overvalued in-kind donations and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios, leading to misleading donor solicitations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional under the First Amendment as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General’s cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s constitutional rulings but vacated the permanent injunctions, stating that the trial court abused its discretion by granting them without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove entitlement to such relief. The appellate court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to seek injunctive relief and to prove they are entitled to it. The court also affirmed the trial court’s reformation of section 12591.1(b) and vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees, directing the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the appellate court’s rulings. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law