Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court entered in favor of East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) on Plaintiffs' purported class action complaint, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Plaintiffs brought this complaint alleging that a tiered-rate water structure employed by EMBUD to determine the cost of residential and commercial water service in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties violated Cal. Const. art. XIII D, 6(b). The trial court sustained EBMUD's demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the applicable statute of limitations had run, and therefore, the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer. View "Campana v. East Bay Municipal Utility District" on Justia Law

Defendant inmates Jesse Farias and Fernando Miranda were found guilty of various charges stemming from their attack on a fellow inmate. Defendants, their counsel, and the State then agreed to allow the trial court to determine the truth of allegations that they had previously been convicted of crimes that constituted both serious felonies under Penal Code section 667(a), and strikes under Penal Code sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2), without their appearances. The trial court expressly found the prior convictions were for serious felonies under section 667 (a), but made no mention of the allegations under sections 667(e)(2) and 1170.12(c)(2). However, at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed sentences on the defendants as if it had found the strike allegations to be true. Had all parties attended the hearing on the priors, the Court of Appeal surmised someone in the group would have requested the court clearly make an oral record of its findings. Instead, the record was silent "with little way to know if the error was purely clerical in nature or if the trial court, in fact, failed to consider the strike allegations at all." On appeal, both defendants argued the court could not impose a strike sentence here, because it made no strike finding. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed a strike sentence was not appropriate, and vacated the sentence without prejudice for the trial court to correct the record. In addition to joining Farias’s challenge to the strike sentence, Miranda also challenged the trial court’s finding that two of his prior convictions were for serious felonies on grounds that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. While the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding on one of the two subject prior convictions, the Court agreed with Miranda that, considering changes to the law governing gang offenses, the trial court lacked substantial evidence to support its finding that his prior conviction under section 186.22(a), was for a serious felony as contemplated by section 667(a). Both Defendants argued that amendments to Penal Code section 654 made after the trial court entered its sentence applied here; to this the Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the amended law. View "California v. Farias" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrick Ocegueda was convicted by jury for first degree murder. He contended on appeal that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the theory of provocation as it related to the premeditation and deliberation elements of the offense and, relatedly, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying pinpoint instruction. Ocegueda argued the combination of some of the standard instructions given (CALCRIM Nos. 521, 522 & 570) might have misled the jury to believe that provocation could negate the elements of first degree murder only if it satisfied an objective, “person of average disposition” standard. Additionally, Ocegueda claimed the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Ocegueda" on Justia Law

The City of Pomona (the City) decided to allow commercial cannabis activities in specific locales within its boundaries. In doing so, the City determined it was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Guidelines adopted to implement CEQA (Cal. Code Regs.) (Guidelines). Thus, when the City chose areas to locate commercial cannabis activities, it did not conduct additional environmental review under CEQA. Appellant wanted his storefront property included among the locales where commercial cannabis activity would be allowed. The City, however, excluded Appellant’s property. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn the City’s designation of areas for permissible commercial cannabis activities. He contended the City made the decision improperly by foregoing further environmental review. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the City properly determined that the Project is Exempt per Guidelines Section 15183 and requires no additional environmental review. The court explained that substantial evidence shows the Project’s proposed commercial cannabis activities were similar to or “consistent” with existing land uses or development density established by the 2014 EIR and General Plan Update and thus meet the statutory exemption per Guidelines section 15183. Further, the court found that substantial evidence—the General Plan Update, the 2014 EIR, the Project, the DOS, and Findings of Consistency—shows the Project “has no project-specific effects” that are “peculiar” to it. View "Lucas v. City of Pomona" on Justia Law

The City of San Buenaventura (City) removed a statute of Father Junípero Serra because it is now offensive to significant members of the community. This appeal stems from the denial of the Coalition for Historical Integrity’s (Coalition) writ of mandate requiring the City to restore the statue.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The Coalition contends that the removal of the bronze statue requires review under CEQA. Here the 2020 HRG report discusses the history of the statue and the criteria for evaluating its historical significance. Among other matters, the report points out that the bronze replica statue does not meet the 40-year-old threshold required for local designation as a historical landmark. The report constitutes substantial evidence.   Further, the Coalition contends that removal of the bronze statue violates the City’s Specific Plan. The court found the Specific Plan provides that the demolition of a historical resource may require review by the Historic Preservation Committee, the committee that approved removal of the statue. Nothing in the Specific Plan prohibits the destruction or removal of a statue that is listed as a historical resource upon a finding that on reexamination, it, in fact, never had historical value.   Moreover, The Coalition contends that the City failed to follow the procedure set forth in the municipal code for removing landmark status from the statue. But the City found that the bronze statue was never a landmark. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. The code provisions for removing landmark status do not apply. View "Coalition for Historical Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a gun. The jury also convicted him of second-degree murder, finding he had personally and intentionally discharged a gun causing death. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the felon-in-possession law violates the Second Amendment.The Second Appellate District rejected Defendant's argument. Relying on dicta from various opinions, including District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 592, the court found that all constitutional rights have limits and the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not offended by a statute prohibiting individuals who have been convicted of felony offenses from possessing a firearm. The court also rejected Defendant's jury instruction claims. View "P. v. Odell" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition. View "P. v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Travis Cody petitioned for postconviction relief under California Penal Code former section 1170.95. In 2012, a jury found Cody and codefendant Steven Banister guilty of murder during a home invasion burglary/robbery and found true a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. Under the prior felony-murder rule, if a death occurred during a listed felony, all the participants in the underlying crime could be convicted of murder. And under the felony-murder special-circumstance enhancement, if a participant was the actual killer, directly aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill or was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, then he or she could be sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). As to Cody, the trial court imposed an LWOP sentence plus two years. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by failing to give the accomplice felony-murder special-circumstance jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 703), but the Court determined the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The California Supreme Court later clarified the terms in the felony-murder special-circumstance statute. In 2016, a federal court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal and found the error in Cody’s trial was prejudicial. The district court ordered the state to either (a) grant Cody a new trial on the felony-murder special-circumstances allegation, or (b) vacate Cody’s special-circumstances enhancement and resentence him. n 2017, the prosecutor elected not to retry Cody on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. The court then resentenced Cody to 25 years to life based on the murder charge, plus two years for two prison priors. In 2019, the California Legislature limited the scope of the felony-murder rule, which now mirrored the felony-murder special circumstance. The Legislature also enacted section 1172.6, which allowed persons to challenge prior convictions under the former felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Cody then filed a 1172.6 petition. After reviewing the 2012 trial transcripts (neither side offered additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing), the trial court denied Cody's petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed the court's order denying Cody's section 1172.6 petition. View "California v. Cody" on Justia Law

In 2016, petitioner Daniel Garcia was diagnosed as having porphyria, an extremely rare condition that is potentially fatal, especially if not properly treated. Garcia was in jail awaiting trial on charges including murder. Garcia made a series of requests for testing, evaluation, treatment, and preventive measures to deal with his porphyria. The trial court granted some of them (which may not even have been contested). However, when Garcia made an ex parte application for multiple measures — including being given protective clothing, being kept out of direct sunlight, and being transported only in air-conditioned vehicles with tinted windows — the court denied the application. About a month later, Garcia filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the jail’s failure to deal properly with his porphyria constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case was assigned to the same judge who denied his ex parte request. Garcia promptly filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The Court denied the section 170.6 challenge as untimely; he reasoned that the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Garcia thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate to require the judge to grant his section 170.6 challenge. The Court of Appeal determined the trial judge correctly found the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Hence, the court correctly rejected the section 170.6 challenge as untimely. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging Governor Gavin Newsom’s reversal of her 2020 grant of parole. Petitioner is serving concurrent sentences of seven years to life for the 1969 murders which she committed with other members of a cult led by Charles Manson. This is the fourth time a governor has reversed Petitioner’s parole.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court held that there is no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusions. The court explained that Petitioner provided an extensive explanation as to the causative factors leading to her involvement with Manson and the commission of the murders, and the record does not support a conclusion that there are hidden factors for which Petitioner has failed to account. The court wrote that the Governor’s finding of inconsistencies between Petitioner’s statements now and at the time of the murders fails to account for the decades of therapy, self-help programming, and reflection Petitioner has undergone in the past 50 years. The historical factors identified in the criminal risk assessment are the sort of immutable circumstances our Supreme Court has held cannot support a finding of current dangerousness when there is extensive evidence of rehabilitation and other strong indicators of parole suitability, all of which Petitioner has demonstrated. View "In re Van Houten" on Justia Law