Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

As four medically comprised inmates who required skilled nursing care were approaching their parole dates, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) unsuccessfully attempted to locate post-parole skilled nursing facilities. When their parole dates arrived, the CDCR paroled them to Kern County and transported them to the emergency department at Kern Medical Center (KMC), a licensed general acute care hospital. Kern County Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority), which operates KMC, sought a peremptory writ of mandate and injunction against the CDCR and its Secretary.The trial court granted the Writ, and the CDCR appealed, arguing it does not have a ministerial duty to obtain Hospital Authority’s express consent before transporting parolees to KMC’s emergency department.The Fifth Appellate District reversed, holding that the Department failed to comply with regulation 79789 when transferring the parolees to KMC, and therefore abused its discretion. However, finding that the injunction was overbroad, the Fifth Appellate District remanded to the trial court for issuance of a new peremptory writ. View "Kern County Hospital Auth. v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The Contra Costa County Superior Court found McKneely, the defendant in multiple criminal actions, incompetent to stand trial. McKneely was admitted to Napa State Hospital. A year later, the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) issued a certificate that McKneely had regained mental competence, with a comprehensive report prepared by a senior forensic psychologist. McKneely was returned to court. His attorney filed an “Objection,” accompanied by counsel’s declaration “setting forth the basis for her good faith belief that [McKneely] was not competent to stand trial.” A 2022 amendment to Penal Code 1372(b) required that “[i]f the court rejects a certificate of restoration, the court shall base its rejection on a written report of an evaluation, conducted by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, that the defendant is not competent.” The attorney argued that no further expert declaration should be required if McKneely could present a sufficiently detailed declaration from his attorney.The court concluded that the court could not reject a certificate based solely on that declaration. Although the court was prepared to appoint an expert, McKneely requested that it not do so. The court of appeal rejected McKneely’s arguments that section 1372(c)(2)’s requirement of the appointment of an expert violated separation of powers principles and due process because, by “dictat[ing] the form of proof” required to reject a certificate of restoration, the Legislature “usurps the judiciary’s role.” View "McKneely v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

During a confrontation with three strangers, defendant Thomas Scott shot and killed one of them. As a result, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, with various enhancements and one “strike” prior felony conviction. On appeal, Defendant contended, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence that his prior conviction violated Penal Code section 186.22 (amended effective January 1, 2022), and therefore there was insufficient evidence that it was a strike. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, because the prior was a strike on the date of the conviction, it remained a strike, regardless of the amendments to section 186.22. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found an error in the abstract of judgment, which had to be corrected. Otherwise, the Court found no other error requiring reversal. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after the jury found him guilty with respect to four victims of three counts of false imprisonment by violence; three counts of forcible oral copulation; three counts of forcible rape; and one count of attempted forcible rape. Defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process by ordering him to wear a restraint belt during jury selection, which was held in an unsecured jury assembly room instead of a courtroom because of the pandemic. Further, he argued that the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights by receiving the jury verdicts in his absence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of conviction, vacated the sentence, and directed the trial court to resentence Defendant per sections 654 and 1170, subdivision (b), and any other applicable ameliorative legislation. The court agreed that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Defendant to wear a restraint belt without making an individualized finding at the time of jury selection that Defendant posed a safety or flight risk or that he was likely to disrupt the proceedings; however, the error was harmless. Further, the court held that there was no constitutional violation because Defendant’s absence during the reading of the verdicts did not interfere with his ability to defend against the charges. However, the court held that Defendant is entitled to resentencing under amended section 654 because the one-strike law does not preclude a stay under section 654. View "P. v. Govan" on Justia Law

Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which created new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Jury selection for the trial of defendant Moises Jamie Jaime (for two counts of transporting controlled substances and two counts of possessing controlled substances for sale) began two months after section 231.7 became applicable. A prospective juror ("L.") asked to speak privately with the court and parties. In a private hearing, L. disclosed that her “cousin was actually convicted of murder in this court” and that the current district attorney spoke to her class when she was a child and “ended up bringing up [her] cousin’s trial in class before it had gone to trial.” She further disclosed that she spoke with a lawyer about the district attorney’s conduct. The prosecutor later exercised a peremptory challenge against L. After a jury found defendant guilty on all four counts, the trial court placed defendant on two years of formal probation. On appeal, defendant’s principal argument was that the Court of Appeal had to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial because the State's peremptory challenge was presumptively invalid under section 231.7 and the State offered no evidence to overcome that presumption. The Court determined the prosecutor provided no evidence to rebut the presumptively invalid reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge, and the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing it. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "California v. Jaime" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act, misdemeanor false imprisonment, and forcible rape in concert of a minor 14 years or older as an aider and abettor.  On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and the judgment should be reversed on the basis of instructional error.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Section 236.1, subdivision (c), prohibits the human trafficking of a minor and attempted human trafficking of a minor. Defendant was convicted under the attempt prong. Relying on People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893 (Moses I), she contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the People had to prove specific intent as to age and by instructing the jury that mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to the attempt charge. The court held there was no instructional error: A defendant violates section 236.1, subdivision (c), when the defendant attempts, but fails, to traffic an actual minor, even if the defendant lacks specific intent regarding the victim’s age. Mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to attempted human trafficking under section 236.1, subdivision (c) when the victim is a minor. Also, substantial evidence supports her conviction for trafficking. View "P. v. Middleton" on Justia Law

In 2021, police identified Andre Lepere as a person of interest through DNA “Investigative Genealogy.” In 1980, a 79-year-old woman was raped and murdered in her Anaheim home. Police booked a rape kit into evidence. In 2002, a forensic scientist was able to extract male DNA from the rape kit. Lepere was living in New Mexico at that time, but there was evidence he had lived in Anaheim in 1980. Police obtained a search warrant and recovered Lepere’s DNA from a trash can next to his home. Lepere’s DNA was a match with DNA recovered from the 1980 murder victim. A jury found Lepere guilty of the 1980 murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, Lepere claimed the police officer’s affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked probable cause and the prosecutor misstated the law during the closing argument. After review, the Court of Appeal found the facts about the DNA evidence and the other corroborating facts in the affidavit established probable cause for the search. As far as the closing argument goes, even if we assume the prosecutor misstated the law, we presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions. We also find there was overwhelming evidence of Lepere’s guilt. Thus, we affirm the judgment. View "California v. Lepere" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from judgments of conviction entered after a jury found them each guilty of one count of grand theft. Defendants contend there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions because the evidence failed to establish the value of the stolen items—15 boxes of adjustable dumbbells—exceeded $950. The only evidence of the dumbbells’ value was the testimony of the manager of the warehouse facility where the theft occurred, who testified to the prices listed on three retailers’ websites for the same product. Defendants contend this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the dumbbells’ value.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that evidence of a retail price for a stolen item, whether based on an online listing or a brick-and-mortar store price tag, is admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that a retailer is advertising the item for a specified price in the marketplace. This price, in turn, is circumstantial evidence of the fair market value of the item, defined under California law as the highest price obtainable in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The jury need not decide the truth of whether a specific retailer would sell the item for the advertised price or the value the retailer places on the item, nor should the jury consider the evidence for these hearsay purposes. Further, the court held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence co-Defendant aided and abetted the theft. View "P. v. Portillo" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Alex Alexander challenged the constitutionality of laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition under the Second Amendment in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (2022). Applying the new analytical framework set forth in Bruen for assessing Second Amendment challenges, the Court of Appeal concluded that the laws are facially valid. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Alexander" on Justia Law