Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After the enactment of AB 5 and the filing of Proposition 22 but before the effective date of AB 2257—Plaintiff filed suit against LPL Financial LLC under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). LPL is a registered broker-dealer and registered investment adviser registered with Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (‘FINRA’) and the Securities Exchange Commission. Plaintiff and all allegedly aggrieved individuals (the ‘Financial Professionals’) were ‘securities broker-dealers or investment advisers or their agents and representatives that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The parties stipulated that on its face, Labor Code Section 2750.3(i)(2) makes the exemption set forth in Section 2750.3(b)(4) retroactive, such that it would cover the entire proposed PAGA period in this action. However, Plaintiff claimed both of those sections are unconstitutional and thus unenforceable. The parties did not stipulate the results of these two tests—the ABC test versus the Borello test. LPL moved for summary adjudication. The trial court upheld the statute as constitutional.   The Second Appellate District affirmed and held that the challenged provisions are constitutional. The court explained that Plaintiff maintains the registration aspect of the exemption creates a nonsensically narrow classification. The court held that legislation may recognize different categories of people within a larger classification who present varying degrees of risk of harm and properly may limit regulation to those classes for whom the need for regulation is thought to be more important. Further, the court wrote that, unlike the situation with equal protection law, there may be a large divergence between state and federal substantive due process doctrines. View "Quinn v. LPL Financial LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, challenger Joe E. Collins III and incumbent Maxine Waters competed for a seat in Congress. During the campaign, Waters accused Collins of a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. Collins shot back that he had not been dishonorably discharged. He showed Waters a document saying so. Collins sued Waters for defamation during the campaign, but Waters convinced the trial court to grant her special motion to strike his suit.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order. The court explained that the document apparently was official. There was nothing suspicious about its appearance. The document, if genuine, would have established without doubt that Defendant’s charge was false. Waters easily could have checked its authenticity but did not. Her appellate briefing asserts that today, years later, she still does not know the truth about whether Collins’s discharge was dishonorable. The court wrote that this disinterest in a conclusive and easily-available fact could suggest willful blindness. The court explained that the preliminary posture of the case required the court to accept Plaintiff's evidence as true. His evidence created a possible inference of Defendant’s willful blindness, which is probative of actual malice. Thus, the court concluded that it was error to grant Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. View "Collins v. Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angelo Sherman petitioned for resentencing nearly 20 years after multiple convictions and receiving a sentence of 123 years to life for raping and sexually assaulting five different women, with a prior serious felony conviction for rape of an unconscious woman. He contended the trial court improperly found him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91(b), because he adequately alleged that he suffered from a substance abuse problem related to his military service. The State contended Sherman was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91(c), which was added to the statute and made effective January 1, 2023, while this appeal was pending. Subdivision (c) stated that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who has been convicted of a super-strike offense or an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1170.91(c) applied to cases already pending when it became effective and made Sherman categorically ineligible for relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Delores Attig was murdered in 1986. She was with two male friends smoking and talking in their car when they were attacked by four male assailants, two of them armed with guns. The assailants bound her friends and robbed them. Delores was led a short distance away, where she was gang raped and then shot once in the head at close range. Her murder remained a cold case for more than 20 years, until DNA analysis of evidence collected from her body led to the arrest of four men in 2007: Eddie Montanez, his brother Steve Montanez, and two juveniles. In 2010, a jury convicted Eddie of the first degree felony murder of Delores, and found true a principal personally used a firearm. The jury rejected special circumstance allegations that Eddie aided and abetted the murder while engaged in the commission and attempted commission of robbery, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison, plus an additional year for the firearm enhancement. In 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In 2018, Eddie petitioned to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code 1172.6, enacted to allow certain defendant to take advantage of legislative amendments to restrict the scope of California's felony murder law. Eddie's petition was denied; on appeal he argued there was insufficient evidence to support the superior court’s findings he was a major participant in the felonies underlying Delores’ murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Finding no reversible error in the denial of Eddie's petition, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order. View "California v. Montanez" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought an alternative writ of mandate/prohibition after the superior court denied his Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss a charge for active participation in a criminal street gang. In the motion, Petitioner argued the gang offense and enhancements should be dismissed in light of the changes to section 186.22 effectuated by Assembly Bill No. 333, which became effective January 1, 2022. He asserted the gang offense and enhancements were proven at the preliminary hearing under the former law, but the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient under the new definitions of “pattern of criminal gang activity” and “criminal street gang” to support the charges. The court denied the section 995 motion, and initially, we denied Petitioner’s writ petition from the court’s order. Petitioner then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and the matter was transferred back to the Fifth Appellate District.   The Fifth Appellate District agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to the preliminary hearing proceedings. The court rejected Petitioner’s contention that dismissal of all gang-related charges is required. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate the magistrate judge’s holding order as to the active gang participation offense and the gang enhancements and to hold further proceedings. The court explained that even assuming the language of section 995a, subdivision (b)(1) does not support reopening the preliminary hearing proceedings under the circumstances, the remedy the court adopted is supportable as a rule of judicial procedure by application of the principles governing postconviction reversals based upon a change in the law. View "Mendoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Defendant St. Cecilia Catholic School. In her final year of employment, Defendant worked part-time as an art teacher and office administrator. Following her discharge, Defendant filed this action against St. Cecilia for age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The trial court granted St. Cecilia’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the ministerial exception, a constitutional doctrine that precludes certain employment claims brought against a religious institution by its ministers.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment in favor of St. Cecilia and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies in this case. Further, the court wrote that St. Cecilia did not waive the ministerial exception by failing to assert the defense in its answer. The evidence that Plaintiff promoted “Christ-like” behavior in her class does not establish, as a matter of law, that she performed vital religious duties for St. Cecilia or otherwise qualified as a minister. Because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies to Plaintiff’s former job position as an art teacher and an office administrator, St. Cecilia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s age discrimination suit. View "Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic School" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Bocanegra and Vernon R. were very close friends for decades. However, one Christmas, defendant, who was married, slept with Vernon R.’s girlfriend. The next year, Vernon R., by his account, slept with defendant’s wife, or, by her account, forcefully tried to. By this point, the friendship between defendant and Vernon R. was “dead.” Rather than allowing this saga to end, on the night of January 12, 2020, defendant drove from his home in San Jose to Vernon R.’s home in Manteca armed with three firearms including an AR-15 style rifle. Defendant broke a front window and fired shots into the house as Vernon R. scrambled through the house and dove out a bedroom window to get away. A jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder, but found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of an assault weapon, discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and causing a concealed firearm to be carried in a vehicle while an occupant, and found true an allegation that, in committing assault with a firearm, defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the matter had to be remanded for resentencing based on changes to Penal Code section 6541 made by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021- 2022 Reg. Sess.); and (2) his conviction of possession of an assault weapon had to be reversed because Penal Code section 30605 was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, ___U.S.___ [213 L.Ed.2d 387] (2002). Agreeing with defendant on his first point, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing. Otherwise, the Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. View "California v. Bocanegra" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Krissy Werntz sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Werntz committed murder by failing to protect her daughter. Werntz contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. She asked the Court of Appeal to review the denial of her petition de novo because there was no live testimony. In the alternative, she contended there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s factual conclusions. Furthermore, she contended the trial court’s order could not be affirmed based on a finding of aiding and abetting implied malice murder because such a theory was not valid under the current law. The Court of Appeal concluded the proper standard of review was substantial evidence, and found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Werntz failed to protect her child and was guilty of second degree murder. In addition, the Court rejected Werntz’s contention that aiding and abetting implied malice murder no longer exists under California law. View "California v. Werntz" on Justia Law

Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. View "Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law