Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Daniel Webb was an amputee with only one leg. He challenged his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, claiming he lacked the present ability to commit a violent injury when, balanced on his remaining leg and braced against a table in front of him, he lunged at a restaurant worker with a knife. The Court of Appeal accepted that a defendant’s own physical limitations or other circumstances might affect how far he could move to strike a victim, which in turn may affect whether that defendant had the present ability to commit a battery. "But this case lies nowhere near that line." One victim testified that the tip of Webb’s blade came within a foot of him and would have struck him had he not backed away. On this record, the Court concluded substantial evidence supported Webb’s assault conviction, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Webb" on Justia Law

In a joint trial involving a gang shooting, a jury convicted Daniel Ramos and Elias Ramos of: first degree murder; attempted first degree murder; and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also made true findings on firearm and gang enhancements. The court sentenced Daniel (the shooter) to an aggregate prison term of 92 years to life and Elias (the aider and abettor) to 84 years to life. Daniel and Elias appealed, raising over 30 issues. The Court of Appeal originally issued an opinion in late 2020, addressing all of the issues raised by defendants and affirming the judgments. The California Supreme Court subsequently granted Daniel and Elias’s petitions for review and held the matter pending its eventual decision in California v. Tirado, 12 Cal.5th 688 (2022). After Tirado issued, the matter was transferred back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of Tirado. As a result of the remand, and as a result of statutory amendments to Penal Code section 186.22, the appellate court found the true findings on the gang enhancement allegations as to both Daniel and Elias in counts 1, 2, and 3 had to be reversed, as well as the true finding on the firearm enhancements for Elias in counts 1 and 2, which depended on the true finding on the gang enhancements. As a result of the new enactments the following sentences and enhancements became legally impermissible,: (1) For Elias, (a) the 25-year- to-life sentence for the firearm enhancement in count 1; (b) the 20 year sentence for the firearm enhancement in count 2; (c) the four-year sentence for the gang enhancement in count 3; (d) the upper term three-year sentence on count 3; (e) a $154 fee imposed (to the extent it remained unpaid); and (2) for Daniel, (a) the 15-year- to-life sentence on count 2, which had to be reduced to a sentence of seven years to life, absent a legally permissible finding on the gang enhancement for that count; (b) the four-year sentence for the gang enhancement in count 3; (c) the upper term three-year sentence on count 3; and (d) the $154 fee imposed (to the extent it remained unpaid). The case was remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgments were affirmed. View "California v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested and convicted of murder charges after law enforcement obtained a geofence warrant, leading to the discovery of evidence connecting them to the crime. Defendants filed motions to quash and suppress, which were denied. Defendants then entered guilty and no contest pleas and then appealed their conviction based on the geofence warrant.The Second Appellate District found that, while the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, it was overbroad and violated the 4th Amendment. However, the court affirmed Defendants’ convictions nonetheless, finding that the officers relied on the geofence warrant in good faith. View "P. v. Meza" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In May 2022, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer defendant minor T.A. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. T.A. argued the Court of Appeal should remand so the juvenile court could reconsider its ruling in light of recent ameliorative changes to the law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The State conceded that the changes applied retroactively to a minor, like T.A., whose case was not final when they took effect. Nevertheless, the State argued, no remand was necessary here because there was no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the amended law. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Thompson and Simon Cole were professors at the University of California, Irvine, and taxpaying residents of Orange County. They filed a taxpayer lawsuit under California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a against Todd Spitzer, in his capacity as the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA), and the County of Orange (County; collectively, County defendants). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin County defendants from operating an allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection program (the OCDNA program) that authorized County prosecutors to obtain DNA samples from persons charged with misdemeanors. Specifically, County prosecutors offered to drop or reduce charges or punishments in exchange for alleged misdemeanants’ DNA, which the OCDA stored indefinitely in its own databank. Plaintiffs claimed the OCDNA program violates alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process and violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The trial court sustained County defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend, characterizing plaintiffs’ claims as facial challenges to the OCDNA program. It also noted that alleged misdemeanants were required to sign waivers to participate in the program, in which they waived their rights to privacy and counsel. These waivers, the court concluded, barred any facial challenges to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer as to the claims based on the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process: these claims asserted both facial and as-applied challenges to the OCDNA program, and Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the OCDNA program, as implemented by the OCDA, was unconstitutional. The Court determined Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that including a DNA provision as part of a plea deal or negotiated dismissal was facially unconstitutional. The Court also concluded plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring their claims. On remand, the trial court was instructed to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process, and sustaining it as to the remaining claims. View "Thompson v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

In February 2001, Bounthanom Didyavong was convicted by jury of first degree murder for his role in the 1998 gang-related beating and shooting death of David D. In May 2019, following California’s adoption of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Didyavong petitioned the superior court for resentencing, alleging he was not the actual killer or a major participant who acted with a reckless disregard to human life, and he did not act with intent to kill. The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial and directed the superior court to issue an order to show cause. On remand and following a hearing that complied with Penal Code section 1172.6, the superior court concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Didyavong committed second degree implied malice murder. It denied the petition for resentencing. Didyavong appealed that determination, contending there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion. The Court of Appeal agreed with Attorney General that section 1172.6 did not provide a mechanism to reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder. We further conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s denial of Didyavong’s petition. View "California v. Didyavong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vondetrick Carr drove drunk with four children in his car. He ran three red lights; the third time, while going 70 miles an hour, he hit a pickup truck. One of the children was killed. As a result, in 2004, petitioner was convicted of, among other crimes, second degree murder. In 2021, petitioner petitioned to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition because petitioner was not convicted either on a natural and probable consequences theory or under the felony murder rule. Petitioner appealed, contending the theory under which he was convicted — causing death unintentionally but with implied malice while driving drunk was an “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” within the meaning of section 1172.6. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Implied malice is not imputed malice. ... Petitioner’s contrary argument is an artificial concoction that takes the words 'natural consequences' and/or 'natural and probable consequences' out of their proper legal contexts and dumps them all together into a confused semantic stew." Petitioner argued that, by enacting section 1172.6 as it then stood, the California Legislature somehow embraced the view of the dissenting justices in California v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981) that an unintentional killing while driving drunk should be no more than vehicular manslaughter." The Court held the trial court correctly ruled petitioner was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Carr" on Justia Law

This case involves the City of Clovis’s (City) housing element and related zoning ordinances and whether they comply with specific statutory requirements designed to assure affordable housing opportunities to lower-income families in California. These requirements for a municipality’s housing element have statewide importance because the housing elements of all cities and counties must include compliant zoning that accommodates the municipality’s need for lower-income housing. Adequacy of Housing Element. Plaintiff, a Clovis resident, sued the City, alleging its housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period, including amendments and zoning changes adopted in March 2019, did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.The Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment issuing the peremptory writ of mandate to the extent the writ is based on the trial court’s finding the amended housing element does not satisfy the requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g) because it does not include the required analysis for sites within the P-F Zone. The court otherwise  affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the City to (1) adopt “a housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period that substantially complies with Government Code section 65754”; and (2) implement Program 4 “by zoning or rezoning an adequate number of sites, compliant with Government Code Section 65583.2(h), to accommodate the City’s unmet share of the RHNA from the 2008-2013 planning period, pursuant to Government Code section 65584.09.” View "Martinez v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law