Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, the California Legislature passed a law titled the “Keep Groceries Affordable Act of 2018” (the Groceries Act). The Act sought prohibit charter cities, counties, and other local governments from imposing taxes, fees, or assessments on certain grocery items, including, most relevant here, on sodas and other sugar-sweetened drinks. The act also imposes a penalty—the loss of all revenue from sales and use taxes—for violations of its terms. But it imposes its penalty only on charter cities and only if the city’s “tax, fee, or other assessment is a valid exercise of [the] city’s authority under Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution with respect to the municipal affairs of that city.” A nonprofit health advocacy organization and a city council member appearing in her individual capacity filed suit to challenge the act’s penalty provision, arguing the provision wrongly served to penalize charter cities that lawfully exercised their constitutional rights under the home rule doctrine. The trial court ultimately agreed the Groceries Act’s penalty provision was unlawful and deemed it unenforceable. On appeal, the State of California, the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, and the department’s director (collectively, the Department) challenged the trial court’s decision, arguing: (1) the Groceries Act’s penalty provision did not penalize a charter city only when its tax on groceries “is a valid exercise” of the city’s constitutional powers; and (2) even if the trial court properly construed the act’s penalty provision, the trial court should have severed certain words from the penalty provision rather than deem the provision unenforceable in its entirety. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Cultiva La Salud v. State of California" on Justia Law

Andre Myles was homeless when he broke into an unoccupied Oceanside house. During the 15 hours he was inside, he did not take anything of significant value. But he drank a juice box and ate ice cream belonging to the owner, and he charged the battery in the owner’s vehicle. Several months later, Myles tried to break into the house again. The only disputed issue at Myles’ trial for first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary was whether he had the specific intent to commit theft when he entered or tried to enter the house. Myles claimed he did not have the required specific intent and presented evidence he suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to experience delusions, and at the time of each incident, these delusions caused him to believe the home belonged to him because it had been given to him by an “entity” named “Archangel Michael.” The trial court modified the pattern instruction on the definition of theft by larceny (CALCRIM No. 1800). The modified instruction also contained citations to appellate decisions involving burglary charges arising from alleged incidental use of utilities and consumption of food inside a victim’s home. The jury convicted Myles of both charges. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error when it modified the definition of theft and provided the jury with citations to appellate decisions that included factual summaries of other burglary cases. Consequently, Myles’ convictions of burglary and attempted burglary were reversed and the case remanded for possible retrial. View "California v. Myles" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Latravius Gobert strangled his girlfriend to death in front of their six-year-old daughter. After a jury convicted him of second degree murder, the court imposed a 35 years-to-life prison sentence. On appeal, Gobert contended his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay evidence of two prior domestic violence incidents. He also sought independent review of the materials considered by the trial court during a Pitchess hearing. Gobert additionally contended that the portion of the minute order from the sentencing hearing prohibiting him from owning, possessing, and controlling deadly weapons and related paraphernalia should be stricken because it was not part of the oral pronouncement of judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment: although the hearsay was inadmissible, it was harmless error. On the Pitchess claim, although the trial court did not follow the correct procedure at the in camera hearing, the Court independently reviewed the materials and concluded there was no resulting prejudice to Gobert. The Attorney General conceded that the discrepancy in the minute order required a strike of the terms “deadly weapon” and “related paraphernalia” from the minute order. At the same time, the Court rejected Gobert’s related contention that a notation in the minute order memorializing the court’s instruction that he not possess any firearms and ammunition constituted an unauthorized sentence. View "California v. Gobert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the State of California, and Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra in their capacities as the current and former Attorney General after a federally licensed firearms dealer refused to complete Plaintiff’s purchase of an antique shotgun. Plaintiff alleged the dealer had received a letter from the Department pursuant to section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), advising it that the Department had been unable within the statutory period to ascertain Plaintiff’s eligibility to purchase the firearm. Although the Department’s letter, in accordance with section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), authorized the immediate transfer of the firearm to Plaintiff at the dealer’s discretion, the dealer elected not to do so, telling Plaintiff it was unwilling to “take the risk.” In his operative second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged a federal civil rights claim and requested declaratory relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained Plaintiff’s causes of action are premised on the contention that section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), violates the Second Amendment or is preempted by federal law. Both arguments are wrong as a matter of law. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated how his complaint could be amended to state viable claims, the trial court did not err in sustaining the State’s demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. View "Regina v. State of California" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of carjacking, attempted robbery and arson, all committed shortly after he turned 19 years old. At the conclusion of a resentencing hearing, Defendant’s trial counsel said that he would prepare a notice of appeal. He never did so. As it turns out, Defendant’s counsel had a brain tumor which was diagnosed five months after the hearing. He died in the hospital later that same year. Defendant contends his trial counsel did nothing to assist him at the resentencing hearing and had no tactical reason for his inaction. Defendant also filed this related habeas corpus petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Second Appellate District granted Defendant’s habeas relief and remanded to the trial court for a new resentencing hearing. Here, the available evidence from Defendant and his trial counsel’s secretary supports Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is not a case where counsel was silent because there was nothing to say. There was no tactical reason to say or do nothing. In addition to the declarations described above, Defendant possessed documentation of his programming in prison, demonstrating that his trial counsel would have had a basis to argue that Defendant had in fact been rehabilitating himself. The court explained that Defendant’s trial counsel had a legal argument to make to strike the gang enhancement. Defendant had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing. As a result of his trial counsel’s total inaction on every front, Defendant was on his own. View "P. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful constructive termination, discrimination, and retaliation actions against her former employer, Rite Aid Corporation and Thrifty Payless, Inc., dba Rite Aid. Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemmed from an offsite and after-hours text exchange she had with a Rite Aid district manager in which the latter sent lewd photographs to her. Plaintiff and the district manager knew each other and were friends from a time before Plaintiff started working at Rite Aid. The Rite Aid defendants brought a summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rite Aid defendants as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to the required showing that her manager was acting in the capacity of a supervisor in the text exchange in which he sent the inappropriate texts. Rather, as the trial court found, Plaintiff and the manager had “an extensive texting relationship,” and their January 4, 2019, late-night text exchange, which “occurred outside the workplace and outside of work hours,” was “spawned from a personal exchange that arose from a friendship between [them].” Summary judgment is, therefore, proper as to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Further, the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that “as opposed to a constructive termination, the evidence shows that Plaintiff resigned her position.” View "Atalla v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant-appellant Carl Tice, Jr., was arrested and charged with committing a felony offense. He was later charged with three counts of battery on a custodial officer, and one count of battery on a detention facility employee by gassing, arising out of four separate incidents that occurred while he was confined awaiting trial. Defendant was convicted on all four counts in a court trial. On appeal, defendant challenged only his conviction on count 4 for a violation of Penal Code section 243.9(a). Subdivision (b) of the statute defined gassing as: “intentionally placing or throwing, or causing to be placed or thrown, upon the person of another, any human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances or any mixture containing human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances that results in actual contact with the person’s skin or membranes.” Defendant argued: (1) because the alleged victim testified she was employed by the county of Riverside, she was not an “ ‘employee of a local detention facility’ ” within the meaning of section 243.9(a); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish that the substance he threw on the victim was a bodily fluid, bodily substance, or a mixture containing a bodily fluid or bodily substance. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Tice" on Justia Law

In May 2020, the state transferred 194 inmates from CIM to San Quentin. The transferees were at risk of developing serious symptoms of COVID-19 (persons over the age of 65 and/or with underlying medical conditions); although they had tested negative two weeks prior, several had COVID-19 at the time of the transfer. Some exhibited symptoms before exiting the transfer bus. San Quentin then had no COVID-19 cases among its prisoner population. A month later, at least 1,400 inmates, including Malear, were diagnosed with COVID-19. Several inmates have died from it. Malear filed a putative class action, alleging failure to take reasonable action to summon medical care for prisoners who were in immediate need. The trial court dismissed, holding that Malear had not complied with the Government Claims Act, having filed suit before the rejection of his government claim.The court of appeal reversed, Although Malear filed suit before the denial of his government claim, he filed an amended complaint as of right after the denial and before the defendants were served with the original complaint or appeared in the action. The amended complaint alleged denial of his claim. Malear has established substantial compliance with the statutory requirement. Assuming the truth of the material allegations in the amended complaint, Malear has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; the complaint does not disclose the existence of a statutory immunity defense as a matter of law. View "Malear v. State of California" on Justia Law

A trial court denied defendant Matthew Burke's request to strike a prior strike conviction under Penal Code section 1385 and to consider applying recent amendments to section 1385 to that determination. Defendant pled no contest to identity theft and admitted the prior strike conviction. The Court of Appeal appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a Wende brief, and the Court requested supplemental briefing on whether the amendments to section 1385 enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) applied to prior strike convictions. Defendant contended the language and legislative history demonstrated the Legislature’s intent that the amendments apply to prior strike convictions. The State disagreed, arguing the plain language of the statute demonstrated the amendments applied only to enhancements. The Court of Appeal found the State's argument more persuasive. The Court found a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment regarding fines and fees. But the Court found no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The trial court was ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of judgment, and the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Burke" on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law