Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dwayne Burgess appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing after an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. There was no dispute defendant was eligible for such a hearing, the question was what independent findings the trial court was required to make when determining defendant’s guilt and whether those findings were sufficient. The Court of Appeal found that although defendant claimed the trial court erroneously considered itself to be bound by the jury’s verdict at trial, the trial court did conduct an independent analysis of the record and evidence before finding defendant guilty of murder under current law. The Court agreed with defendant that this independent analysis was required, and that the principles of collateral estoppel were inapplicable to this analysis. Although the State argued the trial court was bound by the jury’s finding that defendant committed attempted robbery under principles of collateral estoppel, and even if not, the trial court’s ultimate finding that defendant was guilty of murder under current law iswassupported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the State on both points. Because theft by false pretenses was not a predicate felony to felony murder, the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder under current law. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "California v. Burgess" on Justia Law

In 1992, a jury convicted Pepe Lopez of first degree murder with a true finding on a prior-murder special circumstance after hearing evidence the victim was shot and killed during a robbery in which Lopez participated and that Lopez had previously been convicted of first degree murder for his involvement in another robbery. In 2019, Lopez filed a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition seeking to vacate his conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) which amended the definition of felony murder and eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of murder. The trial court summarily denied the petition, concluding the special circumstance finding rendered Lopez ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because it demonstrated the jury had found he “personally killed, or personally shared a specific intent to kill.” Lopez conceded the special circumstance finding established the requisite mental state for a conviction of first degree murder under current law, but argued it did not similarly establish “the actus reus necessary for direct aider and abettor liability.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the record established his guilt under the current felony-murder rule. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Christopher Kenney was inside his mother’s home in violation of a temporary DVRO that had not yet been served. Sheriff’s deputies yelled through a locked bedroom door, “There’s a restraining order on file, Christopher” and “You’re not allowed to be here.” After Christopher’s reply, “Break my fucking door down, dude. This is my fucking house”: deputies forced the door open and after a scuffle arrested him. Kenney was not charged with violating the temporary DVRO, but instead with resisting an executive officer. The fundamental issue on appeal was whether deputies acted lawfully, which in turn depended on whether they gave Kenney sufficient notice of the restraining order’s “contents.” To keep the peace while at the same time affording due process, Penal Code section 835 (c) provided that a law enforcement officer could enforce a DVRO after verifying it exists and orally informing the restrained person of its “contents.” The Court of Appeal held the deputies gave such notice and affirmed Kenney’s conviction. View "California v. Kenney" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of first-degree murder, three counts of second-degree murder, four counts of attempted murder, one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of due process by coercing the jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court held that allowing a jury to deliberate during the COVID pandemic is not coercive and does not deprive a defendant of the due process of law. Defendant describes the proceedings below as “a shambles” and having gone “off the rails” because of the pressure placed on the parties and jury. The court reasoned that there was no “hard deadline” of April 30. And the verdicts were reached ten days before that. Defendant’s case required verdicts on four counts of murder, four counts of attempted murder, two firearms-related felonies, and special allegations relating to nine of the ten counts. A few of the jury instructions and verdict forms contained errors that were quickly corrected. The issues identified during jury polling were likewise addressed promptly. These facets of the instant proceedings are not remarkable in a case of such complexity. Accordingly, the court wrote that it cannot conceive of any further efforts the trial court could have undertaken. View "P. v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several sex offenses against Jane Doe, his adoptive niece: oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child ten years old or younger (count 2), sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child ten years old or younger (count 3), and forcible rape (count 4). He argued that (1) the conviction on count two must be reversed as violating the prohibition on ex post facto laws, an argument which the People concede; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) statistics, or, in the alternative, that he received ineffective assistance due to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the statistics testimony; and (3) his aggregate indeterminate sentences on counts 2 and 3 are unconstitutionally excessive.   The Fifth Appellate District, in the published portion of the court’s opinion, held that the admission of the expert’s testimony regarding CSAAS statistics was not an error. In the unpublished portion, the court reversed the conviction on count two and remanded for possible retrial on that count, but the court did not otherwise reach the constitutional challenge. The court explained that there was no error in admitting the expert’s CSAAS statistical testimony about the prevalence of preexisting relationships between abuser and abused because the testimony targeted a common misconception regarding child sexual abuse. That CSAAS statistic thus served the permissible purpose of helping the jury evaluate Doe’s credibility, free of preconceived misconceptions, while not relieving jurors of their ultimate duty to independently determine the truthfulness of her testimony. View "P. v. Sedano" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Travon Venable, Sr. guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder. The jury also found true, on each count, a gang enhancement and a gang-related firearm enhancement. Bullets fired from a small white car killed one victim and wounded another. Both victims were members or associates of the Westside Projects (Projects) gang. Months later, when the police arrested a known informant for an unrelated offense, he offered to give them information about the shooting. He told the police Venable drove the car used in the shooting and Elgin Johnson was the shooter. Both Venable and Johnson were members of the California Gardens Crips (California Gardens) gang, a rival of the Projects. Venable raised multiple arguments on appeal; the State conceded four: (1) the trial judge erred by sentencing Venable on both the firearm enhancements and the gang enhancements; (2) Venable was entitled to a remand so the trial judge could consider striking the prior serious felony conviction enhancement under newly enacted legislation; (3) the gang enhancements and the gang-related firearm enhancements should have been reversed because the jury was not instructed in accordance with newly enacted legislation; and (4) Venable was entitled to a remand for the trial judge to consider reducing the firearm enhancements under newly enacted legislation. The Court of Appeal initially found no errors other than those conceded by the State. However, the California Supreme Court granted review, transferred the matter back to the appellate court, and directed the appellate court to vacate its opinion and reconsider the case in light of the newly effective Evidence Code section 352.2, enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2799 (Stats. 2022, ch. 973) (AB 2799). It was uncontested the trial judge did not consider those additional factors before admitting a rap video in Venable’s trial and that the trial, as a result, didn’t comply with the new requirements for admission. "The question is whether these new requirements apply retroactively to cases like Venable’s, which are pending on appeal at the time of their enactment." To this, the Court concluded the requirements of Evidence Code section 352.2 did apply retroactively in nonfinal cases and that their application likely would have influenced the trial in Venable’s favor. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "California v. Venable" on Justia Law

Kelly Sundberg appealed the denial of his application for outpatient placement pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. In 1999, Sundberg was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) following a criminal trial, resulting in his commitment to a state hospital. Over two decades later, Sundberg applied to be discharged from the hospital and placed under community supervision on an outpatient basis, but the trial court denied his application. He appealed that order. Sundberg’s appointed counsel raised no arguable issues, but asserts that the procedures set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and California v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) applied to this appeal. Following existing authority, the Court of Appeal conclude that the review required by Anders and Wende did not apply here. The Court offered Sundberg the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but he declined to do so. Accordingly, in the absence of any arguable issues to review, the appeal was dismissed. View "California v. Sundberg" on Justia Law

G Companies Management, LLC, a California limited liability company, appealed an order staying its cross-complaint against LREP Arizona, LLC, based on the forum selection clause in a loan agreement between the parties. The cross-complaint alleged multiple causes of action, all based on the assertion that the interest rates charged in the loan agreement were usurious under California law, and G Companies contended the trial court erred because a forum selection clause was not enforceable if doing so would deprive a California resident of the protections of the state's fundamental public policy. The trial court held enforcement of the selection clause was appropriate because: (1) the loan transaction was substantially related to the chosen forum (Arizona); and (2) California had a complicated relationship with usury and allowed unlimited interest rates to be charged in numerous circumstances. LREP contended the court’s decision was correct because the “many exceptions” to California’s interest rate limits demonstrate that the prohibition of usury “is not a fundamental policy” in California. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed and therefore reversed. "By virtue of its inclusion in article XV, section 1, of our Constitution, and because it cannot be waived, we find that California’s usury law does reflect a significant public policy. It prohibits money lending at rates higher than specified, even while recognizing numerous exceptions to those rate limitations. The complexity of the law does not imply a lack of commitment to the policy. To the contrary, such a fine-tuned approach suggests that significant effort has gone into determining the circumstances under which interest rate limitations are necessary for the protection of Californians." View "G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, Hunter W. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, as well as allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon. Shortly after, he was charged with driving without a license and driving under the influence of drugs. After he admitted to the assault with a deadly weapon and driving under the influence charges, the juvenile court granted Hunter conditional probation. In 2018, after multiple reports of probation violations, the juvenile court revoked probation and committed Hunter to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of seven years. Hunter appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dispositional order and issued the remittitur on August 15, 2019. After the passage of California Senate Bill No. 823, on December 2, 2021, Hunter petitioned to modify the commitment order to the middle term of six years—the maximum confinement permitted under the new law. The District Attorney opposed the petition on the grounds that the new law did not apply to Hunter’s final judgment. The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution and denied Hunter’s petition. Appealing that order, Hunter again argued his juvenile disposition was not a final judgment and because the new law was ameliorative, he was eligible for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the case was final for purposes of retroactivity of the new law, and affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification. View "In re Hunter W." on Justia Law

In 2021, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) sent a letter to the superior court recommending that it resentence Gabriel Mendoza because of errors in his original sentence. Mendoza was resentenced in 2022, after amendments to Penal Code section 1385 became effective. The trial court concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not always require dismissal of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(c), even when imposition of the 20-year sentence for that enhancement results in a sentence of over 20 years. On appeal, Mendoza argued that under section 1385(c)(2)(C) dismissal of the enhancement was mandatory, not discretionary. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not mandate dismissal of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would endanger public safety. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the enhancement. View "California v Mendoza" on Justia Law