Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

When Leonardo Fernandez arrived at the hospital with his son Marco, the child was 13 weeks old and already dead. Marco sustained 18 separate rib fractures and bruises spattered his body. Blunt forces had caused several skull fractures and contusions on his brain. An expert later testified that Marco died from a blow to the left side of his skull. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals was whether the State demonstrated a rational ground for concluding that Fernandez intended to kill Marco, an element necessary to charge the torture-murder special circumstance. The Court concluded that showing was made and granted a writ of mandate to order the charge reinstated. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Fernandez)" on Justia Law

Appellant V.R. is the mother of now 11-year-old N.R. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to N.R. Mother argued that the order is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness or child detriment. Specifically, she argued that termination cannot be predicated on earlier, unchallenged findings of parental unfitness or child detriment as to N.R. because, after N.R. and her younger half-sister R.L. were removed from mother’s custody, the juvenile court returned R.L. to mother. According to mother, R.L.’s return to mother “rebutted” the earlier findings as a matter of law. If these earlier findings are disregarded, mother continues, no substantial evidence otherwise supports termination of her parental rights as to N.R.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court explained that the record reflects manifest differences between N.R.’s and R.L.’s needs and mother’s ability to parent each child. Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court carefully considered this evidence and the respective risks the children faced in mother’s care. The court, therefore, rejected mother’s argument that R.L.’s return to mother rebutted or otherwise limited the vitality of prior findings of mother’s unfitness to parent N.R. or the detriment to N.R. of remaining in, or being returned to, mother’s custody. Notwithstanding its order returning R.L. to mother’s custody, due process permitted the juvenile court to rely on such findings at the section 366.26 hearing. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

Appellant Ventura29, LLC purchased property (the Property) in the City of San Buenaventura (City). Appellant filed a complaint against the City alleging that Appellant “is in the process of developing a multi-unit townhome project” on the Property. The first cause of action is for inverse condemnation. Appellant claims City’s modification of an approved grading plan for the Property “resulted in an unconstitutional taking for which [it] is entitled to just compensation.” The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to Appellant’s second amended complaint (complaint). Appellant contends the complaint states causes of action for private nuisance, trespass, and negligence based on the City’s dumping of uncertified fill on the Property in 1977.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that these causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Appellant’s “action on the case” theory is based on its claim that the primary injury to its property was not caused by the dumping of the uncertified fill. Instead, it was caused by the consequences of the dumping. Therefore, Appellant argued, the statute of limitations on the causes of action began to run when the City Engineer made the modification. The “action on the case” theory is of no assistance to Appellant. The theory, in effect, restates the first cause of action for inverse condemnation. Appellant forfeited its right to object to the modification of the grading plan because it had complied with the modification without exhausting its administrative remedies. View "Ventura29 v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law

Defendant was 22 years old when he committed various sex crimes for which he was sentenced to serve multiple life in prison without parole and multiple life in prison with parole terms. These sentences were based on the One Strike law. On an unrelated occasion, he stole a car and was convicted for its theft. On appeal, Defendant made several claims mostly related to sentencing. Primarily, he suggested the youthful offender parole scheme—which excludes people sentenced under the One Strike law, and people sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as adults—violates equal protection. The People disputed any equal protection violation. Second, Defendant complained the court erred in pronouncing one of the life in prison with parole terms. The People concede, but the parties diverge on the appropriate remedy. Their disagreement centers on due process and notice. Third, Defendant contends the trial court should have stayed some of the One Strike sentences pursuant to section 654, which generally prohibits multiple punishments for a single act. The People disagree.   The Fifth Appellate district, in the published portion of the opinion, found against Defendant on three issues. In the unpublished portion, the court addressed his remaining contentions. Ultimately, the court reversed the car theft conviction for insufficient evidence, directed the court to stay certain other sentences, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the judgment, including the life without parole terms. View "P. v. Bolanos" on Justia Law

In November 2018, appellant Ryan Kite was driving a truck while under the influence of alcohol. He pulled out of a parking lot into traffic without coming to a stop, causing motorcyclist D.P. to slam on his brakes and fall off his motorcycle. Kite drove away from the scene without stopping. D.P. got back on his motorcycle, called 911, caught up to Kite’s truck, and signaled for Kite to pull over. At first, Kite did not stop. Kite eventually did stop at an intersection, where his passenger exited the truck. When the police arrived, Kite’s eyes were watery and red, and he had a strong odor of alcohol. Kite failed a variety of field sobriety tests. The motorcyclist D.P. suffered a spinal compression fracture as a result of the accident.Kite was charged with three counts: (1) driving under the influence causing injury; (2) driving with measurable blood alcohol content causing injury; and (3) hit-and-run with injury. A jury convicted Kite as charged on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court placed Kite on formal probation for five years for counts two and three, imposed but stayed a 365-day jail term pending completion of probation, and stayed the sentence for count one under Penal Code section 654. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated Penal Code section 1203.1 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 by imposing a five-year term of probation. As amended, section 1203.1(a) generally limited felony probation to a maximum of two years. But the statute included several exceptions, including one for violent felonies or any offense that “includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.” For these offenses, the maximum length of probation was “the maximum possible term of the sentence.” The Court of Appeal held that the maximum term of imprisonment was that which could have been imposed, rather than the maximum probationary period allowable under another law specifying a specific probation length; the maximum possible probation length had to be calculated by reference to the aggregate prison term that could have been imposed for all counts of conviction. Based on this holding, the Court found Kite’s term of probation had to be reduced from five years to three years and eight months. View "California v. Kite" on Justia Law

Minor K.C. appealed the order imposing a condition of probation that prohibits unconsented sexual touching of another person. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the condition. The court explained that probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

In 1981, defendant Richard Morgan was convicted of vehicular manslaughter caused by unlawful exhibition of speed and DUI, neither of which was listed as a qualifying prior for elevating a DUI to a felony under California Vehicle Code section 23550.5 (b). The sole question presented in this appeal was whether Morgan’s nonqualifying 1981 convictions could be treated together as if they were a qualifying prior conviction for violating Penal Code section 191.5 (a), even though the latter statute was not enacted until five years later. After deciding that they could be, the trial court sentenced Morgan’s current DUI convictions as felonies. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by treating Morgan as if he had previously been convicted of violating a Penal Code provision that was not yet in existence at the time of his 1981 convictions. "Without legislative authorization, we cannot expand the statute by judicial fiat to authorize courts to cobble together the elements of older California convictions and treat them as if they were a violation of a Penal Code provision that was not enacted until years later." Accordingly, the Court vacated Morgan’s sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. View "California v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The California Public Employment Relations Board (Board) refused to file an unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of plaintiff Rebecca Wu, a substitute teacher representing herself in propria persona, against real party in interest Twin Rivers United Educators (Union), a teachers’ union. In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged the Union breached its duty to represent her in her claim against Twin Rivers Unified School District (School District), wherein she claimed to be misclassified as a substitute teacher. The Board declined to file a complaint against the Union based on Wu’s charge because Wu, as a substitute teacher, was not entitled to union representation given that substitute teachers were excluded from representation by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District. Wu argued she had a constitutional right to union representation as a misclassified teacher and as a substitute teacher. She further argued she had a statutory right to representation by the Union that could not be circumvented by a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Wu that she had a constitutional or statutory right to representation by the Union as an alleged misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Wu v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission (the Commission or PUC) oversees the California High-Cost Fund A program (CHCF-A), which provides subsidies to small, rural, independent telephone companies that provide local telephone service in rural and remote areas of California. The subsidies defray the high cost of providing service in such areas. Ten small rural telephone companies that participate in CHCF-A subsidies filed this writ proceeding to nullify the Commission’s broadband imputation order. They contend broadband imputation (1) is not authorized by section 275.6, (2) exceeds the authority granted to the Commission by other statutes and the California Constitution, (3) is preempted by federal law, and (4) is an unconstitutional taking of private property.   The Fifth Appellate District denied the telephone companies’ petition for a writ. The court reasoned that to implement broadband imputation in a general rate case, the Commission will be required to conduct several reasonableness inquiries before reaching a decision about a telephone company’s rates. At this point, the “total effect” of broadband imputation on the telephone companies’ rates cannot be determined because the Commission has not made the foregoing reasonableness determinations and established a telephone company’s rate design and CHCF-A subsidy. Consequently, the court wrote it cannot determine that the rates will be so unreasonably low as to be confiscatory in violation of the telephone companies’ constitutional rights. View "Calaveras Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant is a resident of the City of Oxnard (the City). Defendant gathered signatures for a number of initiatives, including Measures M and N. The City’s voters passed both initiatives. The City brought the instant action to have the measures declared void as administrative rather than legislative in nature. Defendant responded with an anti-SLAPP motion requesting that the trial court dismissed the City’s action. Defendant claimed that the City is not a proper party to bring the action, that he is not a proper defendant, and that the City cannot prevail on the merits. The court denied the motion on all three grounds.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment as to Measure M and affirmed as to Measure N. The court explained that the City argued that Measure M is invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. The City contends that the initiative intrudes into a subject exclusively delegated by statute to the City council. Thus, standards that allow greater access are purely a municipal affair. The provisions of Measure M are intended to allow for greater access. Measure M is not invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. Further, the manifest purpose of Measure N is to ensure that Measure O revenue is expended for road repair. Measure N tells the City how it must administer general tax revenue, even setting precise dates for the completion of the work. Measure N is clearly administrative in nature. View "City of Oxnard v. Starr" on Justia Law