Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Robert Nash was convicted of three lewd acts on two young girls, and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of ten years after the trial court determined a 15-yers-to-life sentence on each count under California's One Strike Law would be cruel and/or unusual punishment. Nash appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with the State that a mandatory life term was constitutional. Following remittitur, the trial court resentenced Nash to concurrent 15-years-to-life terms on each of the three lewd acts counts. Nash again challenged the constitutionality of his sentence, an argument the Court rejected based on law of the case. The State further contended on appeal that prison terms of 15 years to life were unauthorized because Penal Code section 667.61(j)(2) of the One Strike law mandated 25 years to life where lewd acts involved multiple victims each under the age of 14. The Court of Appeal found California courts were divided as to whether imposing a 25-years-to-life sentence under subdivision (j)(2) violated due process where, as here, the accusatory pleading only alleged a violation of subdivision (b) of section 667.61. The Court of Appeal found the amended information expressly stated that the effect of the One Strike law allegations was potential exposure of 15 years to life, it did not place Nash on fair notice that he would face 25 years to life. Rejecting the State's argument on narrow factual grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Nash" on Justia Law

Jail personnel search inmate mail for contraband. To preserve confidentiality, mail from an inmate to an attorney is opened in front of the inmate; the contents are visually inspected but not read. An officer noticed an envelope from Cortez addressed to his attorney; with a “bulk in the center.” It smelled of feces. Suspecting the envelope contained contraband, he opened it but not in front of Cortez. The envelope contained another envelope fashioned from the lined yellow paper, marked “do not read.” The officer opened it and found multiple "kites," each made from different colored paper and with different writing. Kites are clandestine notes, written by inmates on small pieces of paper in very small print, then rolled up to minimize their size and facilitate concealment. The officer informed his supervisor.A magistrate conducted an in-camera examination and concluded: The messages have “the teeny tiny writing ... indicative of a gang-related kite…. I did not read the substance … none of them were addressed to [Cortez’s attorney]. None of them ... appeared to even be written by Cortez…. I do not find the attorney-client privilege applies.” The court of appeal agreed. The magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Even if the jail violated the regulation requiring legal mail to be opened in the inmate’s presence, the remedy would not automatically render everything inside the envelope—including communications intended for people other than an attorney—subject to attorney-client privilege. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law

The primary issue, in this case, is whether Respondent Whittier Union High School District (hereinafter Respondent or the District) is required to reimburse Appellant Law Office (hereinafter Appellant or Firm) for the “cost of work product” under California Elections Code section, 10010. Appellant had sent Respondent a demand letter that resulted in Respondent changing its at-large voting system to district-based voting. This case turns on whether the trial court’s determination that Appellant did not represent a “prospective plaintiff” under section 10010 requires evidence limited to identifying a person who has formally retained the lawyer, or whether it also encompasses a law firm working on behalf of one or more persons the law firm avers it will be able to name as a plaintiff if the demand letter is unsuccessful.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded so that the trial court may determine the “cost of work product” recoverable by Appellant. The court concluded that the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not represent a prospective plaintiff is based on an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute. The court further concluded that the “cost of work product” for which a prospective plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement is not limited to out-of-pocket expenditures by the prospective plaintiff, but also includes costs advanced by their lawyer. View "Law Office of Carlos R. Perez v. Whittier Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

In 2004, petitioner Robert Cress was convicted of first degree murder. In 2021, he filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction pursuant to California Penal Code section 1172.6. After considering documentary evidence and argument, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had the intent to kill when he aided and abetted the murder, and alternatively, that he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. It therefore denied the petition. While an order denying his section 1172.6 petition was on appeal, filed a second section 1172.6 petition. The trial court dismissed the second petition. The Court of Appeal held that, if that was error at all, the error was not jurisdictional. Moreover, it was both invited and harmless, and therefore not reversible. View "California v. Cress" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The original proceedings involve efforts by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC or the Commission) to discover whether the political activities of Southern California Gas Company (SCG) are funded by SCG’s shareholders, which is permissible, or ratepayers, which is not. The Commission propounded several discovery requests (called “Data Requests”) on SCG, and when SCG failed fully to comply, moved to compel further responses that ultimately resulted in an order to comply or face substantial penalties. SCG seeks a writ of mandate directing the Commission to rescind its order on the ground that the discovery requests infringe on SCG’s First Amendment rights.   The Second Appellate District granted the petition. The court held that SCG has shown that disclosure of the requested information will impact its First Amendment rights, and the Commission failed to show that its interest in determining whether SCG’s political efforts are impermissibly funded outweighs that impact. The court explained that the Commission argues that sometimes SCG misclassifies expenditures, and has at times moved expenditures from ratepayer to shareholder accounts. But this just shows that a less invasive discovery process is working, and the PAO can confirm that no funds have been misclassified to ratepayer accounts by reviewing above-the-line accounts. Further, because the court will vacate Resolution ALJ-391 insofar as it compels disclosure of shareholder expenditures, no basis for sanctions exists. View "So. Cal. Gas Co. v. P.U.C." on Justia Law

In three related actions, privately held public utilities sued for property tax refunds for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, following the County’s denial of refund claims submitted under Revenue and Taxation Code section 5097. Section 100(b) establishes formulas for calculating the debt-service component of certain property taxes. Pursuant to that statute, Santa Clara County imposed taxes on the utilities’ properties at rates higher than those imposed on non-utility properties. Although section 100(b) was enacted in 1986, the utilities argued that imposition of a higher debt-service tax rate on their property, under the statutory formulas, violated California Constitution article XIII, section 19, which provides that the state-assessed property of certain regulated utility companies “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”The trial court denied motions to dismiss, holding that the County had not carried its burden of establishing that the utilities cannot state a claim. The court of appeal reversed. Article XIII, section 19, does not mandate that utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. Instead, it provides that, after utility property is assessed by the State Board of Equalization, it shall be subject to ad valorem taxation at its full market value by local jurisdictions. View "County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

The City of Industry sued Cordoba Corporation, among others, after uncovering allegedly fraudulent billings for a solar energy development. Cordoba filed a cross-complaint, but the trial court granted the City’s special motion to strike it as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., Section 425.16), or anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order. The court explained that Cordoba does not deny filing a lawsuit is protected activity. Instead, it argues its three causes of action arise not from the City’s petitioning activity, but from the City’s noncompliance with its contractual obligations. The court wrote that this is a distinction without a difference. Further, the court explained that the court properly struck Cordoba’s breach of contract claim because the conduct Cordoba attacked was protected petitioning activity. Moreover, the court held that Cordoba cannot satisfy its burden because each of its three causes of action fails to state a valid claim. View "Cordoba Corp. v. City of Industry" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michelle Guiffreda appealed an order denying her petition for resentencing on a 2004 conviction for second-degree murder under California Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found there was insufficient evidence of malice aforethought to establish Guiffreda’s liability as a direct aider and abettor to murder. However, the court denied her petition based on a felony murder theory after finding beyond a reasonable doubt under current law that: (1) Guiffreda was a major participant in the underlying robbery which led to the victim’s death; and (2) she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Guiffreda contended on appeal that the record did not support the trial court’s major participant and reckless indifference findings. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal concurred there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Guiffreda acted with reckless indifference to human life. Consequently, the Court did not resolve whether she was a major participant. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate her murder conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "California v. Guiffreda" on Justia Law

In 1990, a San Diego jury convicted petitioner Christopher Box of three counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, first degree robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and residential burglary with associated weapons use enhancements. After the jury found special circumstances of multiple murder and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary, Box was sentenced to death in 1991. Box was African American, his codefendant was Hispanic, and the three murder victims were White. During jury selection, the prosecutor used two of her peremptory challenges to excuse both African Americans who were seated in the jury box. Defense counsel objected under California v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978). Although the court did not find a prima facie showing of racial bias as to either strike, it permitted the prosecutor to state her reasons for excusing the jurors on the record. Later the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse an alternate juror, and the defense again raised a Wheeler challenge. The court again found no prima facie case, but permitted the prosecutor to offer reasons for the strike. The judge then denied the motion, finding the prosecutor had not engaged in “racial discrimination” because she would not have excluded a Black prosecutor or police officer from the jury. Ultimately one African American alternate juror was seated, but none of the 12 jurors who deliberated the verdicts was African American. On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Box’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. In January 2022, shortly after the California Supreme Court decided California v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.5th 348 (2021, Jones II), Box filed a motion to compel the District Attorney to produce copies of the trial prosecutor’s jury selection notes to support his federal habeas claim of Batson error. The State objected to their production on grounds of work product privilege. The Court of Appeal found that where a prima facie case of racial bias under Batson/Wheeler has been made, a defendant is entitled to discover the prosecution’s jury selection notes under Penal Code section 1054.9. "Those notes are not categorically shielded from discovery by the absolute work product privilege. To the extent the People maintain that those notes reflect the prosecution’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research and theories about case strategy independent of conclusions or impressions about prospective jurors, they bear the burden to make that foundational proffer and seek appropriate redactions from the trial court." View "Box v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law