Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court appointed the same attorney (counsel) to represent defendant Mark Foley and Raymond Gladden, who had been a codefendant in the underlying criminal trial, at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had filed separate petitions for resentencing. Both men were not the actual killer, but both had been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. At the hearing, to save the murder convictions, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant’s and Gladden’s individual participation in the underlying felony of kidnapping made them major participants in the kidnapping and that they acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecution argued those elements were satisfied for defendant and Gladden. Counsel then argued factors she considered favorable to defendant and also argued factors favorable to Gladden. But the same factors did not favor both, and counsel stated Gladden “certainly [had] the stronger petition.” The court granted Gladden’s petition only. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of defendant’s petition because the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free representation. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Foley" on Justia Law

The trial court here dismissed a violent felony charge filed against defendant-respondent Brian Turner for the third time, finding that the two prior dismissals did not result from any excusable neglect. The Riverside County District Attorney appealed. If a charge for a violent felony has been dismissed twice, Penal Code section 1387.1 authorized prosecutors to refile the charge for a third time so long as one of the dismissals was “due solely to excusable neglect . . . on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses,” and the prosecution did not act in bad faith. Because the first dismissal was due to the trial court’s excusable neglect, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "California v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in 2004 of first-degree murder and robbery arising from a shooting death and attempted murder and a second count of robbery based on two separate incidents on June 30, 2022. In January 2020, the superior court granted Defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 expressly finding Defendant had been a major participant in the robbery but not the actual shooter and impliedly finding he did not act with reckless indifference to human life during the robbery. The court vacated the murder conviction, resentenced Defendant on the remaining three convictions and ordered him released from custody based on time served. Defendant petitioned pursuant to section 851.8 for a finding of actual innocence, arguing as evidence of his innocence that the victim’s companion, the only eyewitness to the robbery-murder, had not identified Defendant as a participant in the crime and that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The superior court denied the petition. On appeal, Defendant argued the order vacating his murder conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled him to a finding of factual innocence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s successful section 1172.6 petition did not entitle him to a finding of factual innocence. The court explained that an order granting Defendant’s petition for resentencing does not mean, without more, Defendant is factually innocent of the crime of murder. The court noted that the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt. View "P. v. Hollie" on Justia Law

James Koenig petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Court of Appeal. Koenig contended the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) and the Board of Parole Hearings erred in denying his request for nonviolent offender early parole consideration under Proposition 57, The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. Koenig was sentenced in July 2013 to an aggregate term of 42 years eight months in prison: (1) a 12-year principal term on one count of sale by a false statement consisting of five years plus a three-year enhancement for multiple fraudulent felonies and a four-year enhancement for taking property in excess of $3.2 million; (2) 28 one-year consecutive subordinate terms on 28 counts of sale by a false statement; and (3) 2 one-year and four-month consecutive subordinate terms for two counts of first degree burglary. The court imposed and stayed under Penal Code section 654 sentences for one count of fraudulent use of a scheme, one count of conspiracy, and two counts of sale by false statement. Koenig contended was eligible for early parole consideration because he served the full term of his primary offense—as defined by Proposition 57—and also “the violent offense portion of his total sentence.” The Court of Appeal concluded Koenig was not being unconstitutionally excluded from early parole consideration because he was convicted of and sentenced for violent felony offenses, and he was serving a term for these violent felonies throughout his aggregate term. "The fact he has completed the full term for his primary, nonviolent offense within the meaning of Proposition 57 is insufficient to render him eligible for early parole consideration." His petition for habeas relief was denied. View "In re Koenig" on Justia Law

This is the second appeal arising out of Defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint filed by Plaintiffs.  In the first appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Defendant failed to show Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of protected activity because he filed only a “perfunctory antiSLAPP motion.” In this appeal, Defendant challenges the fee award.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded the matter with directions for the court to enter a new order denying plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions. The court wrote that Plaintiffs don’t contend that it would have been impractical for them to provide Defendant safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ motions were not complex and include less than a single page of analysis explaining why Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. Nor do Plaintiffs contend that Defendant could not have withdrawn or corrected his anti-SLAPP motion had they provided him timely notice of their attorney fees motions under section 128.5, subdivision (f). The court explained that the trial court should have denied Plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions because they failed to provide Defendant a 21-day safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. View "Zarate v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

In July 2020, a correctional sergeant was processing mail in the prison mailroom and searched two large manila envelopes addressed to inmate Arlonzo Banks. The sergeant intercepted the envelopes in the prison mailroom, and inmate Banks was issued a rules violation report charging him with conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into prison for distribution or sale. During the investigation, inmate Banks tried to ask the sergeant who issued the rules violation report, "'What, if any, evidence demonstrates I agreed with another individual to introduce a controlled substance into the facility?'" The hearing officer deemed the question irrelevant, but the Court of Appeals found Banks’s question was "spot on:" the record contained no evidence of the first element of conspiracy, namely, the existence of an agreement between at least two persons. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s grant of inmate Banks’s petition for writ of habeas corpus that vacated a guilty finding of conspiracy. View "In re Banks" on Justia Law

Trammel was sentenced to 12 years in prison: the upper term of eight years for kidnapping, a consecutive 16 months for burglary, a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive two years for a June 2017 domestic violence conviction (one year for the conviction plus a year on an attached arming enhancement). The court imposed concurrent three-year terms for two remaining domestic violence convictions and concurrent time-served sentences for misdemeanors.The court of appeal concluded that the court erred by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence and simple assault, based on the same incident. The trial court conducted a full resentencing, noting that new sentencing laws (effective January 2022) applied. The court reviewed a mitigation assessment and resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months–eight years for kidnapping; a consecutive 16 months for burglary; a consecutive two years for a 2017 domestic violence conviction–one year for the conviction plus a year on the attached arming enhancement; and consecutive one-year terms on the remaining domestic violence counts. The court stayed the punishment for criminal threats and misdemeanors. The court found that the lower term or middle term would be inappropriate because Trammel showed no remorse.The court of appeal again remanded. The imposition of a longer sentence on remand violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy. The court rejected Trammel’s request for another full resentencing hearing before a different judge, finding no showing of vindictiveness. View "People v. Trammel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Matthew Mazur appealed his third sentencing for multiple criminal offenses arising out of a fraudulent investment scheme. The sole issue raised on appeal of his reduced 23-year prison sentence was that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a five-year white-collar enhancement for loss greater than $500,000. Mazur argued the trial court was required to dismiss this enhancement because its imposition “result[ed] in a sentence of greater than 20 years.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Mazur" on Justia Law

After hearing a rumor that Cesar Gonzalez had raped a child, and after being encouraged by a close friend to exact revenge, appellants Daniel Gallegos and Gustavo Nunez, Jr., chased Gonzalez and beat him with metal pipes as he lay on the ground. Gallegos then stabbed Gonzalez six times in the back, killing him. A jury convicted Gallegos of first degree murder, and Nunez of assault with a deadly weapon. Both appealed, Gallegos arguing the trial court erred when, in response to a jury question during deliberations, it instructed the jury that in order for provocation to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder, the provocation must come from the victim, not a third party. As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal concluded the court’s instruction was correct, and any potential error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that the murder was premeditated, deliberate, and willful. Gallegos and Nunez also both contended the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss their prior strike convictions under California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996), and then sentenced them under the Three Strikes law. To this the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on Gallegos’s motion and therefore affirmed the judgment as to him. As for Nunez, however, the record indicated the court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing discretion; the appellate court therefore remanded the matter so the court could exercise its informed discretion as to whether to dismiss Nunez’s prior strikes. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ (2022), individuals charged in California with unlawfully possessing a handgun have contended that their charges and resulting convictions were unconstitutional. They argued, unsuccessfully, that Bruen rendered California’s entire licensing scheme facially unconstitutional, and as a result, it was unconstitutional to punish nonfelons such as them for carrying a firearm in public solely because they did not have a license. Defendants-respondents Jaime Mosqueda and Juanita Mosqueda successfully raised the same contention against their unlawful possession charges by demurrer in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determined defendants had standing to raise the defense by demurrer, but also that Bruen did not render California’s entire licensing scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional. The offending “good cause” requirement was severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as was the “good moral character” element which, for the sake of argument, presumed to violate the test laid down in Bruen. "Bruen is also not grounds for a facial attack on the discretionary nature of California’s licensing scheme, and it did not invalidate any of the other licensing provisions in [Penal Code] section 26150." The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, which concluded otherwise. View "California v. Mosqueda" on Justia Law