Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

Ross was charged with battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Ross pleaded guilty to the administrative charge of battering the counselor. At trial, several officers and an intercepted letter corroborated the victim’s testimony about the attack. The defense presented no evidence. During discussions about jury instructions, Ross declared, “Man, you are fired” and “I will represent myself.” Ross cursed at the court, which had him removed. Defense attorney Fallman stated that he tried to talk with Ross, who refused and declined to return to the courtroom. Fallman noted that Ross had fired his previous attorney and that he knew of no “provocation.” The court continued without Ross. During closing arguments, Fallman admitted Ross touched the officer willingly, in a harmful or offensive manner, but argued there was no preplanning or weapon. Fallman asked the jury to find Ross guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The jury convicted Ross, finding two prior strike allegations true. Finding six aggravating factors true and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Ross to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years under the Three Strike Law.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Ross’s argument that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding his guilt. There was no evidence that his claimed desire to maintain innocence to the exclusion of all other defense strategies was ever communicated to Fallman or the court. The court remanded for resentencing due to Senate Bill 567., which requires that when a statute specifies three potential terms of imprisonment, a court must presumptively impose the middle term. View "People v. Ross" on Justia Law

In May 2006, a then-25-year old defendant Matthew White, while drunk and speeding, struck a car stopped on the shoulder of the highway with its hazard lights on, killing the driver and injuring two passengers. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence causing injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher causing injury, with enhancements for causing and inflicting great bodily injury on multiple victims. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, and a consecutive determinate middle term of two years for driving under the influence with injury. In 2020, defendant requested and received a hearing pursuant to California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) to make a record of information relevant to an eventual youthful offender parole hearing. He then filed a motion to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) based on amendments to Penal Code section 654 following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) the Franklin hearing rendered the judgment nonfinal and subject to Assembly Bill 518; (2) Assembly Bill 518 should have been applied retroactively to all convictions; and (3) failure to remand for resentencing would deprive him of equal protection under the law. Rejecting all these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. sought habeas relief ordering her release, arguing that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. A hearing was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. M.G. is hearing impaired; she requested two sign language interpreters: an ASL interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. On Tuesday, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued to Thursday, September 1. On August 31, M.G. petitioned the appeal court.After the court issued an order to show cause, counsel indicated M.G. had been released. Unable to grant the relief requested—release from confinement—the court denied her petition as moot, noting that temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, so a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. Welfare and Institutions Code 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person’s request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Lonnie Kocontes of murdering his ex-wife for financial gain. Kocontes conceded sufficient evidence supported his conviction; he challenged numerous procedural and evidentiary rulings. Although the trial court erred by admitting evidence, Kocontes was not prejudiced by its admission, and his constitutional rights were not infringed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Kocontes" on Justia Law

The California Constitution directs that laws be made to exclude “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Former Code of Civil Procedure 203(a)), provided, “All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except” “Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.” In 2019, Senate Bill 310 eliminated the exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries. Section 203(a) now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors “Persons while they are incarcerated. … Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. … Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender … based on a felony conviction.”Plaintiffs alleged that the categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denied registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statutory disparity withstands rational basis scrutiny. Plausible reasons for the Legislature’s line-drawing include ensuring impartial juries by excluding those persons convicted of felonies deemed more likely to harbor anti-government bias. View "Doe v. Finke" on Justia Law

After defendant Ishmael Carter was housed for more than 14 years in a state hospital awaiting trial, the trial court found him to be a sexually violent predator and committed him to an indeterminate term. Defendant appealed that order, contending the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion; and (2) failed to obtain a valid waiver of defendant’s right to a jury trial. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2012, at the age of 61, Sam Consiglio was committed to Coalinga State Hospital (Coalinga) as a sexually violent predator (SVP). For every subsequent year until 2021, the annual Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluation concluded that he still qualified as an SVP. In 2021, however, a DSH psychologist, Dr. Michelle Vorwerk, performed the annual evaluation and concluded that Consiglio was no longer likely to commit sexually violent predatory crimes because of his age (then 70) and a severe and progressively worsening heart condition that impaired his ability to breathe and exert himself. In a report, she concluded that Consiglio no longer met the definition of an SVP. After Consiglio filed a petition for unconditional release, the trial court held a show cause hearing, rejected Dr. Vorwerk’s opinion, and found no probable cause to believe Consiglio was no longer an SVP. Accordingly, the court did not set the matter for a full hearing under Welf. & Inst. Code section 6605 (a)(2)-(3). Consiglio appealed the trial court’s probable cause ruling. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the proper reasonable person standard for determining probable cause, and improperly rejected Dr. Vorwerk’s opinion based on its own personal belief that Consiglio still qualified as an SVP: "We merely apply the governing probable cause standard to conclude that a full hearing is necessary because a reasonable person evaluating the evidence could at least entertain a strong suspicion that Consiglio no longer qualifies as an SVP. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion." View "California v. Consiglio" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to carrying a loaded, unregistered handgun in a vehicle. He contends a warrantless search of his vehicle, during which a police officer discovered the handgun, did not fall within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and the trial court should have suppressed the evidence from the vehicle search on his motion under Penal Code section 1538.5.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, concluding that the officers had probable cause to search the car under the automobile exception, and the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence from the vehicle search. The court explained that based on the “strong odor” of “burnt marijuana” emanating from Defendant’s car, Defendant’s admission he had smoked marijuana, and the fact all occupants of the car were under 21 years of age, the officers had probable cause to believe they would find contraband or evidence of a crime (e.g., marijuana possessed by someone under 21) in the car. View "P. v. Castro" on Justia Law