Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The superior court granted real party in interest Armando Rodriguez Mendez’s motion under California Penal Code section 995 and dismissed an assault with a deadly weapon charge against him. The State petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to reinstate the charge. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel argued that there was not “enough evidence” for the count of assault with a deadly weapon because it was not clear “exactly what happened with the knife, did [Mendez] hold it above his head, was it down around his waist area.” Counsel emphasized that it was not clear what happened because of the numerous accounts of the incident given by the victim, Jane Doe. Doe lived with Mendez and her three children. Mendez was the father of Doe’s two daughters. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that the magistrate made a factual finding when he concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to hold Mendez on the assault with a deadly weapon count. The State argued to the contrary. The trial court agreed with defense counsel and granted the motion. The State argued to the Court of Appeal that upon independent review, there was sufficient cause to believe that Mendez had committed the offense. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State on all points. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Mendez)" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angelita Garcia DeMontoya appealed an order denying a motion under California Penal Code section 1473.7, filed in 2021, in which she sought to withdraw her guilty plea to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon that was entered in 2016. The superior court denied that motion on the grounds of collateral estoppel. The court found that DeMontoya had filed a section 1473.7 motion in 2018 and that motion, which was denied, involved identical issues as the 2021 motion. DeMontoya argues that the superior court erred in denying her 2021 motion because the 2018 amendment to section 1473.7 created a new right, which did not exist when she filed her first motion in 2018. The Court of Appeal found DeMontoya overlooked the fact she appealed the order denying her 2018 motion, and the Court affirmed that order in early 2019, considering the impact of the 2018 amendment on DeMontoya’s claims and independently concluding that DeMontoya’s first motion failed even under the 2018 amendment. DeMontoya did not challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion through a petition for rehearing or a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. As such, whether the 2018 amendment created a new right did not matter for analysis here. The Court of Appeal specifically considered that amendment during DeMontoya’s appeal of the order denying her 2018 motion. Thus, DeMontoya’s second motion under section 1473.7 did not involve any new rights that were not considered in her previous motion. In addition, she contends that her 2021 motion involved new facts. The Court concluded that claim was without merit too. View "California v. Demontoya" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Claypool petitioned for a writ of mandate or prohibition to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges. Petitioner was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, unauthorized alteration of a firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, along with an enhancement for a prior strike pursuant to the three strikes law. The evidence at issue was found in a locked glove box in petitioner’s car during a parole search of a back seat passenger. Petitioner, who was both the driver and owner of the car, was neither on searchable probation nor parole at the time. Police used a key to open the glove box and found a gun containing ammunition. The State argued the parole search of the back seat passenger permissibly extended to the locked glove box because officers could reasonably expect the parolee could have hidden contraband there after he became aware of the police. But, absent additional evidence, the Court of Appeal found the facts did not support such an attenuated inference. Therefore, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate and directed respondent trial court to grant petitioner’s motion. View "Claypool v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

YouTube, a video-sharing website, places “advertising restrictions” on certain videos to prevent the user who posted the video from realizing advertising revenues. Network administrators and individual subscribers can also elect to limit user access to YouTube videos using “Restricted Mode.” YouTube considers whether the content involves drugs, alcohol, sex, violence, tragedies, inappropriate language, and whether the content is "gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an individual or group.” YouTube uses an “automated filtering algorithm.” Users whose videos have been restricted or demonetized may request human review. Prager has posted more than 250 YouTube videos and has been prohibited from monetizing over 50 of its videos. In some cases, other users have posted videos identical to Prager’s restricted videos; the copycat videos have not been restricted. Prager claims the restrictions are based on its political identity or viewpoints.After a district court dismissed its federal lawsuit, Prager sued in state court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, for interactive computer service providers acting as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by others. The challenged conduct is the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, The court rejected arguments that the defendants are themselves information content providers, that their terms of service and public pronouncements subjected them to liability notwithstanding the Act, and that the Act, in immunizing defendants from Prager’s state law claims, is unconstitutional. View "Prager University v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

In 1992, a jury convicted Heather Henley of: (1) murder; (2) two counts of robbery; and (3) assault with a firearm. However, the jury found not true the allegation that Henley personally used a firearm in connection with counts 1 through 3. The court sentenced Henley to prison for 25 years to life on count 1 plus an additional term of six years for counts 2 through 4. Henley appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In 2019, Henley petitioned for resentencing under California Penal Code section 1172.6 as to her murder conviction. The superior court appointed counsel, determined that Henley had made the requisite prima facie showing under the statute, and issued an order to show cause. The parties agreed that Henley’s original murder conviction was premised on a felony murder theory and that her eligibility for section 1172.6 relief was contingent on whether the evidence showed she was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. After holding an evidentiary hearing in 2021, the superior court found that Henley was not entitled to relief because the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Henley appealed, contending the court improperly found that she personally used a firearm in contradiction to the not-true finding of the jury during her 1992 trial. She also argued substantial evidence did not support the court's finding that she was not entitled to relief. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court prejudicially erred in finding that Henley personally used a firearm during the robbery. As such, that portion of the trial court’s order denying Henley’s petition under section 1172.6 was reversed. However, the Court of Appeal did not agree with Henley that the court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. As such, the case was remanded back to the superior court to hold another section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Henley" on Justia Law

Police arrested 18-year-old high school student Ismael Avalos on a murder charge and questioned him in an interrogation room at a police station. During the interview, a forensic technician removed his shirt, pants, socks, and shoes. The technician gave him a paper gown to wear. After about five hours of questioning by police, Avalos said, “I wanna talk to a lawyer.” After some further dialog, a detective said, “I respect your decision that you wanna talk to a lawyer, but if for some reason you want to change your mind and you wanna talk to me, you can, just ask for me. I don’t care if it’s 2:00, 3:00 in the morning I’ll come back. Okay? Because I care about you getting your story the right way out. Okay?” After spending the night in a holding cell, Avalos told one of the jailers he wanted to speak to the detectives again. Avalos was brought back to the same interrogation room for a second interview, still apparently wearing the same paper gown from the day before. Avalos asked, “Whatever I tell my lawyer, he’s going to tell you the same thing, right?” After waiving his Miranda rights, Avalos admitted shooting the murder victim, stating: “I, I self-defended myself, you know?” Avalos was convicted of murder with a firearm enhancement and a substantive gang crime. On appeal, Avalos contends the trial court erred by admitting the second interview into evidence over his objection. Avalos also argues that due to a recent change in the law, his substantive gang conviction must be reversed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review of the trial court record that Avalos did not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent Miranda waiver prior to the second interview. The Court further found the admission of the interview into evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Attorney General conceded Avalos’ substantive gang conviction should have been reversed and the Court of Appeal agreed. Thus, it reversed the judgment. View "California v. Avalos" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from an order denying Defendant’s to strike Plaintiff’s causes of action against him pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s causes of action against him for civil extortion and violation of the Ralph Act.   The court wrote that there is no dispute that Defendant’s underlying conduct was in furtherance of petitioning activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1). But the trial court concluded Defendant’s prelitigation letter responsive to a demand from Plaintiff’s counsel amounted to extortion as a matter of law so as to deprive it of section 425.16 protection under Flatley v. Mauro (2006). The court explained that even though the trial court declined to reach it, the court decided to exercise our discretion to consider the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and conclude that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to show a probability of prevailing on his causes of action. The sole cause of action that Plaintiff defends on appeal is for civil extortion. The court agreed with Defendant that the litigation privilege defeats this cause of action. View "Flickinger v. Finwall" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order as to her minor child, G.Z. First, Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that her minor son’s subdural hematomas were the result of her neglectful acts. Second, Mother argues her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1’s rebuttable presumption in finding neglect by Mother when it “never notified its intent to do so until all parties had argued and submitted the case.”   The Second Appellate District vacated the court’s factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. The court reversed the juvenile court’s order given the lack of substantial evidence. The court explained that here, as set forth in the preceding section, Mother presented evidence that G.Z.’s subdural hematomas were not the result of abuse or negligence by her, rebutting the presumption of section 355.1, subdivision (a). Mother’s family members who were interviewed all told the CSW they have no concerns of neglect or physical abuse by Mother. Because Mother provided rebuttal evidence, the burden shifted back to DCFS to prove the petition’s allegations. Here, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. View "In re G.Z." on Justia Law

In 2010, Cannon pled guilty to assault with intent to commit rape and dissuading a witness. Cannon was sentenced to a term of seven years. In 2016, the district attorney filed a petition to commit Cannon under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600). Cannon’s SVPA trial was continued several times. Updated evaluations were prepared in 2018, revealing a split in opinion among the experts as to whether Cannon qualified as an SVP. At a pretrial conference unattended by Cannon, his counsel waived his right to a jury trial. Cannon’s bench trial began in 2020. There was testimony that Cannon suffered a traumatic injury to the prefrontal lobes of his brain and subsequently became obsessed with sex and began consuming large amounts of pornography. He was aggressive toward teenage girls. Family members became overwhelmed with Cannon’s sexual disinhibition.The court of appeal remanded the resulting commitment order for a determination of whether Cannon’s constitutional right to equal protection was violated by the court’s failure to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to obtain his personal waiver of that right. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to expert witness testimony that included case-specific hearsay. View "People v. Cannon" on Justia Law

A 49-year-old jiu-jitsu student injured during a sparring match sued the studio where he was taking lessons as well as the national jiu-jitsu association under whose auspices the studio’s students could compete. The trial court granted summary judgment for the national association (as well as the association’s founder) on the ground that the association was not liable for the student’s injury because it had no actual control over the studio’s sparring practices and the association’s conduct did not give rise to a reasonable belief in the student that it had such control. The student appealed. His appeal raises two questions, one procedural and one substantive.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that the trial court did not violate the student’s right to due process by granting summary judgment on the issue of lack of control, when it was the student who first explicitly raised and briefed that issue in his opposition to summary judgment. Further, the court found that the student’s belief that the association had control over the studio’s sparring practices was not “reasonable” by virtue of the franchise-type relationship between the association and studio. View "Pereda v. Atos Jiu Jitsu LLC" on Justia Law