Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Pacific Grove authorized “transient use of residential property for remuneration,” subject to licensing. One-year “STR” Licenses were subject to revocation for cause. In 2016, the city capped the number of short-term rental licenses citywide at 250 and established a density cap of “15 [percent] per block.” In 2017, the city prohibited more than one license per parcel and required a 55-foot buffer zone between licensed properties. The changes provided that a license could be withdrawn, suspended, or revoked for any reason and that renewal was not guaranteed. The city resolved to “sunset” certain licenses using a random lottery. In 2018, Pacific Grove voters approved Measure M, to prohibit and phase out, over an 18-month sunset period, all existing short-term rentals in residential districts, except in the “Coastal Zone,” as defined by the California Coastal Act. Measure M did not restrict short-term rentals in nonresidential districts or otherwise modify existing rules.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of a suit by licensees. The Plaintiffs’ economic interest in renting their homes for transient visitors was not an entitlement subject to state or federal constitutional protection. The curtailment of short-term rental licenses is related to legitimate state interests. View "Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove" on Justia Law

Eight years after defendant-appellant Raymond Griffin was convicted on two murder counts, he petitioned the trial court for resentencing pursuant to California Penal Code section 1172.6. The court summarily denied his petition, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal found defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief that did not raise any issues. Counsel acknowledged this was not defendant’s first appeal of right so the Court of Appeal was not required to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if it contained any arguable issues, but he requested the Court exercise its discretion to do so. The Court granted that request and found no issue. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition was affirmed. View "California v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Officers separately arrested the defendants for DUI and released each with a Notice to Appear. Each signed their respective Notice, agreeing to appear in court on a specified date more than 25 days later. Each Notice included the issuing officer’s declaration alleging the facts of the misdemeanor violation. The specified court dates passed without the filing of charges. The District Attorney filed charges against each defendant just as the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanor DUIs was about to expire. Both were arraigned about 90 days later, nearly 15 months after arrest. The defendants asserted violations of their speedy trial rights.The trial court determined that the defendants were and remained “accused” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee from the day officers arrested and released them on Notices; the lapse of more than one year from the issuance of the Notices was presumptively prejudicial; and although the delay between arrest and the filing of the complaints was justified by a commensurate delay in analyzing blood specimens, the further delay between the filing of the complaint and arraignment was unjustified. The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. Although the citation was an accusation otherwise sufficient to initiate Sixth Amendment protection against delay, the District Attorney’s election not to file formal charges by the appearance date ceased any legal restraint upon the defendants and had the same effect, for constitutional speedy trial purposes, as a dismissal of charges. View "People v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

In 1997, two 14-year-old girls were walking near their school when Foster, age 21, approached them, drew a knife, and told them to get on the ground and not try to run or he would kill or stab them. He sexually assaulted the girls and assaulted them with the knife. Foster pled guilty to two counts of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object and was sentenced to 15 years to life on one count, with special allegations including serious-felony status and use of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to a consecutive upper term of eight years on the second count--a total of 23 years to life.After the Board of Parole Hearings found him suitable for parole in 2019, the Governor requested en banc reconsideration under Penal Code section 3041.1. The Board ordered a rescission hearing. Foster requested the presence of evidentiary witnesses at that hearing, including the author of the Comprehensive Risk Assessment that the Governor quoted. The Board denied Foster’s request. The panel rescinded the grant of parole. The court of appeal vacated the denial of Foster’s petition for habeas corpus relief. The Board’s denial of Foster’s request to present witnesses violated the Board’s own procedural rules as well as Foster’s due process rights. View "In re Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in 1984 for a gang-related stabbing petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced statements Defendant made to a psychologist in 2013 during a parole risk assessment interview. Defendant argued that admitting his prior statements was an error because those statements are (1) inadmissible under a judicially crafted “use immunity” doctrine, and (2) involuntary under the due process clause.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. The court held Defendant’s statement to the psychologist was not involuntary under due process. A finding that Defendant’s statement was involuntary means it would have been inadmissible at the parole hearing itself because involuntary statements are, by definition, coerced and utterly unreliable. Yet Defendant is not asserting that his 2013 interview statement should not have been considered at the parole hearing. At the bottom, Defendant seems to be urging us to construe the due process clause as a sort of “super use immunity” that would preclude the use of his prior statement even to impeach. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "P. v. Duran" on Justia Law

G.I. Industries, doing business as Waste Management (WM), provided solid waste management for the City of Thousand Oaks (City). The City was considering entering into a new exclusive solid waste franchise agreement with Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. doing business as Athens Services (Athens). A supplemental item was posted giving notice of the staff’s recommendation that the City find the agreement to be exempt from CEQA. Prior to the commencement of litigation under the Brown Act, WM sent the City a “cure and correct” letter. WM petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate directing the City to vacate both its approval of the franchise agreement and its finding that the project is exempt from CEQA. Athens was joined as the real party in interest. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court agreed with WM that the CEQA exemption is an item of business separate from the approval of the franchise agreement. The court also concluded that the Brown Act does not apply.   The Second Appellate District reversed the finding that the trial court erred when it entered judgment. Section 54954.2 of the Brown Act, requires this CEQA finding of exemption to be listed on the agency’s agenda for its public meeting. The purpose of section 54960.1, subdivision (b) is to give the local agency notice of an alleged violation of the Brown Act so that it can avoid litigation by curing the violation. Here, the City council voted that the project is exempt, without the public notice required by the Brown Act. WM’s cure and correct letter adequately stated that point. View "G.I. Industries v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

In 2005, fifteen-year-old Davion Keel and eighteen-year-old Ariel Bolton held Barry Knight at gunpoint and robbed him of twenty dollars on the streets of San Bernardino. One of them shot and killed Knight when he resisted the robbery and tried to flee. Keel and Bolton were both prosecuted in adult criminal court and convicted of first degree murder in connection with Knight’s death. More than a decade later, Keel petitioned to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on legislative changes to California's murder laws. The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Keel was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Knight’s murder because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery and he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Keel appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In the alternative, he contended the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated his petition for resentencing. The Court of Appeal agreed with Keel’s first argument, which rendered it unnecessary to reach his second argument. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination, the Court reversed the order denying Keel’s resentencing petition and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant Keel’s resentencing petition and vacate his murder conviction. Further, the Court concluded Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, and Senate Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) would apply retroactively to Keel once his petition for resentencing was granted and his murder conviction was vacated. Therefore, on remand, the Court instructed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court for resentencing in accordance with those measures. View "California v. Keel" on Justia Law

Defendant joined in an “eight against one” gang assault resulting in the victim’s death. While his cohorts used a baseball bat, a shovel, and a knife, Defendant pummeled the victim with his fists and feet. The trial court found that this participation in the gang assault resulting in death is an implied malice murder.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing on his 2001 second-degree murder conviction. The court explained that it suffices that Defendant knew was aiding in a violent attack, knew dangerous weapons were being used against the victim and intended to stop the victim from escaping or defending himself by helping the perpetrators to surround and hit him. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that second-degree implied malice murder cannot be shown unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was a substantial factor in aiding and abetting the actual perpetrators of the murder. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that SB 775 invalidated the theory of aiding and abetting a second-degree implied malice murder. View "P. v. Schell" on Justia Law

In September 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition after taking six-year-old A.H. and her younger half-siblings into emergency protective custody and placing them in foster care. The petition alleged that the children’s mother had allowed A.H. to have unsupervised contact with an older relative suspected of having sexually molested the child. A.H.’s alleged father, J.H., had failed to provide care, support, or supervision for more than a year and it was indicated that his whereabouts were unknown, although the Department did have an address.The court of appeal reversed an order terminating J.H.'s parental rights. From the outset of the dependency proceedings through the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the Department’s efforts to locate J.H. and provide him notice requirements fell far short of the statutory requirements and left him in the dark about his parental status, how to assert his parental rights and how to participate in the proceedings. While its efforts may have improved later in the case, the Department never rectified its earlier failures by advising J.H. of his right to request counsel and his need to elevate his status to "presumed parent" to assert his parental rights. The Department violated his right to due process. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

In 2001, Gerardo Vizcarra was convicted of the second degree murder of Richard Holcomb. Vizcarra and three confederates beat, kicked, and stabbed Holcomb to death after he bumped a mutual companion’s young child into a wall while playing with him. In 2019, Vizcarra filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on changes to California’s murder laws effectuated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Vizcarra was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Holcomb’s murder under a still-valid theory of liability: he directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. Vizcarra appealed the order denying his petition for resentencing, arguing direct aiding and abetting of implied malice murder was not a legally-valid theory of murder liability. Further, he argued he was entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the order denying Vizcarra’s petition for resentencing. View "California v. Vizcarra" on Justia Law