Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition after taking six-year-old A.H. and her younger half-siblings into emergency protective custody and placing them in foster care. The petition alleged that the children’s mother had allowed A.H. to have unsupervised contact with an older relative suspected of having sexually molested the child. A.H.’s alleged father, J.H., had failed to provide care, support, or supervision for more than a year and it was indicated that his whereabouts were unknown, although the Department did have an address.The court of appeal reversed an order terminating J.H.'s parental rights. From the outset of the dependency proceedings through the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the Department’s efforts to locate J.H. and provide him notice requirements fell far short of the statutory requirements and left him in the dark about his parental status, how to assert his parental rights and how to participate in the proceedings. While its efforts may have improved later in the case, the Department never rectified its earlier failures by advising J.H. of his right to request counsel and his need to elevate his status to "presumed parent" to assert his parental rights. The Department violated his right to due process. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

In 2001, Gerardo Vizcarra was convicted of the second degree murder of Richard Holcomb. Vizcarra and three confederates beat, kicked, and stabbed Holcomb to death after he bumped a mutual companion’s young child into a wall while playing with him. In 2019, Vizcarra filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on changes to California’s murder laws effectuated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Vizcarra was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Holcomb’s murder under a still-valid theory of liability: he directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. Vizcarra appealed the order denying his petition for resentencing, arguing direct aiding and abetting of implied malice murder was not a legally-valid theory of murder liability. Further, he argued he was entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the order denying Vizcarra’s petition for resentencing. View "California v. Vizcarra" on Justia Law

The State of California appealed after a juvenile court declared defendant-respondent T.O. a ward of the court and placed him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The State contended the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section 290.008, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re T.O." on Justia Law

Victor Tellez asked the Court of Appeal to vacate his conviction based on a plea of guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years. He contended his appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him before the plea that he could be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually violent predator after service of the prison term. Finding that Tellez did not state a prima facie case for habeas relief, the Court denied his petition. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 1990 of special-circumstance felony murder for a crime committed when he was 25 years old. Current law entitles anyone who commits a special-circumstance murder at age 16 or 17 is entitled to both a Youth Offender Parole Hearing and a Franking Hearing. However, those who commit a special-circumstance murder at 18 or older are ineligible for both.Defendant challenged California law on Equal Protection grounds. The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant, finding there is no rational basis to support the Legislature’s distinction between young adult offenders who committed a special-circumstance murder and were sentenced to life without parole and other young adult offenders who committed different serious or violent crimes and received parole-eligible indeterminate life terms, including those that could be the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence. Thus, the court determined that Defendant was eligible for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing as well as a Franklin Hearing. View "P. v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Long before the passage of California Senate Bill No. 620 in 2002, defendant Frederick Johnson pleaded no contest in two cases to various counts in connection with multiple armed robberies and, as relevant here, admitted seven Penal Code section 12022.53(b) enhancements. He was sentenced to 46 years four months in prison, and resentenced approximately 15 years later to 46 years in prison. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal to decide related to the extent to which fairly recent legislation, when considered together with the available caselaw interpreting that legislation, conferred new discretion on trial courts at sentencing. The discretion at issue here was a trial court’s choice to impose an uncharged lesser included firearm enhancement in lieu of the greater enhancement of conviction, after the greater enhancement was stricken by the trial court in its exercise of discretion. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court had broad discretion to impose a lesser uncharged firearm enhancement provided for by section 12022.5(a) when it exercises its discretion to strike a Penal Code section 12022.53(b) firearm enhancement of conviction. The Court remanded the case for a full resentencing hearing, where the trial court could consider exercise of its discretion and any other new laws related to sentencing that might apply to defendant. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

California law requires notification to “a local law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction in which the theft or loss occurred” when a gun is lost or stolen. (Penal Code 25250(a)), within five days of the time when the owner or possessor knew or reasonably should have known that the firearm had been stolen or lost. Morgan Hill adopted its own missing firearm reporting requirement, requiring notification to the Police Department within 48 hours of discovering a gun is missing if the gun owner lives in Morgan Hill, or the loss occurs there.A Morgan Hill resident and the California Rifle & Pistol Association sued, asserting the ordinance is preempted by the state law's five-day reporting requirement. The trial court found no preemption and granted the city summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. Local governments are free to impose stricter gun regulations than state law. If it is possible to violate the ordinance without violating state law, as it is here, there is no duplication. The ordinance does not contradict state law. Given the significant local safety interests at stake, cities are allowed to impose more stringent firearm regulations than state law prescribes. View "Kirk v. City of Morgan Hill" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Noy Estul Boukes guilty of the first degree murder of victim 1, threatening victim 2, and falsely imprisoning victim 2. The jury also found true allegations that defendant intentionally murdered victim 1 while he was an active member of a criminal street gang, and that he personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder, proximately causing great bodily injury or death. In a separate proceeding thereafter, defendant admitted he had suffered three prior prison terms and two prior strike convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for life without the possibility of parole plus 78 years to life. On appeal of the judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court then struck the prior prison term enhancements and imposed, but struck punishment on the gang enhancements attached to counts 2 and 3. Appealing again, defendant contended that pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021- 2022 Reg. Sess.), the judgments of conviction on counts 1 through 3, and the true findings on all the gang-related allegations, including the special circumstance finding, had to be reversed: “the prosecution did not present evidence that the predicate offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang in a manner that was more than reputational” and that “the prosecution relied, in part, on the reputational benefit of the shooting in this case to” defendant’s gang. To this point, Court of Appeal concurred and reversed the gang enhancements and special circumstance finding; the Court remanded the matter to give the State the opportunity to retry the issue relating to gang activity. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Boukes" on Justia Law

Respondents are a group of college students, all of which face criminal charges for marching though San Luis Obispo in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Respondents sought recusal of the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office on the basis that the District Attorney had a well-publicized association with critics of the Black Lives Matter movement. The trial court granted respondents' motion, appointing the Attorney General to the case, and the District Attorney and Attorney General appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. Based on social media posts, public statements and targeted fundraising appeal to undermine the Black Lives Matter movement, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office was not likely to treat respondents fairly. View "P. v. Lastra" on Justia Law