Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Danny Beasley, who had a lengthy criminal history, was on parole from a 25-to-life sentence when he committed this first degree robbery. He used a knife in the commission of the offense, which exposed him to a maximum sentence of at least 35 years to life. The trial court dismissed all three of Beasley’s prior strike convictions, his three prior serious felony convictions and the weapon-use enhancement, and sentenced him to the low term of two years in prison. The district attorney objected and filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s order dismissing the prior strike convictions plainly “fell outside the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts.” Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Beasley an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. View "California v. Beasley" on Justia Law

After defendant-appellant M.H. was convicted of a criminal offense, she was committed to the California Department of State Hospitals at Patton as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) under Penal Code section 2962. While committed, M.H. petitioned under section 2966 (c) challenging her commitment and requesting appointment of counsel and a hearing. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, and defendant requested a bench trial. Toward the beginning of the bench trial, the trial court advised defendant of her right to a jury trial under section 2966 (b), but did not advise her of her right to call, confront, or subpoena witnesses. Defendant did not object, waived her right to a jury trial, and stipulated to the trial court’s ruling on her petition based on the parties’ papers. The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant qualified as a MDO and denied her petition. On appeal, defendant contended section 2966 (b) required the trial court to advise her of her right to call and confront witnesses and subpoena them if necessary, that the trial court erred in failing to do so, and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her of her rights. To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the district court. View "California v. M.H." on Justia Law

Defendant Pravindar Prem Singh, a noncitizen legal resident, was found guilty of various illegal substance charges. After serving his sentence for these convictions he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He filed a motion under California Penal Code section 1473.7,1 seeking to vacate his conviction. He argued that, had he known of the immigration consequences of those convictions, he would have attempted to negotiate a plea to an offense or offenses that did not carry those consequences. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding he was ineligible because his conviction was the result of a trial, not a plea. Assembly Bill No. 1259 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) became effective while defendant’s appeal was pending and modified section 1473.7. The Court of Appeal concluded Assembly Bill 1259 made clear defendants whose convictions derived from a trial were eligible for relief under section 1473.7, so the trial court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Singh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Mazur concocted a fraudulent investment scheme that resulted in his conviction on 35 felony charges and various sentencing enhancements. After an appeal that resulted in resentencing, and several subsequent unsuccessful petitions for writs of habeas corpus, Mazur filed this petition for habeas relief, challenging the imposition of an on-bail enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.1. Mazur argued his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the enhancement because the statute, by its terms, did not apply. The Court of Appeal found the statute unambiguously required an arrest for a secondary offense, which did not occur in this case. Therefore, the Court agreed the on-bail enhancement was improperly imposed and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge its imposition. View "In re Mazur" on Justia Law

Defendant Laura Shelly pled no contest to one count of embezzlement by an employee. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court imposed a five-year term of felony probation. The court also ordered defendant to pay $72,972.47 in restitution. Shelly argued on appeal the length of her probation had to be reduced in light of Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) which reduced the maximum length of felony probation to two or three years. She also argued the amount of restitution had to be reduced by $5,816.25. The Court of Appeal agreed, and the State conceded, that Assembly Bill 1950 applied retroactively and entitled defendant to have the length of her probation reduced. The question remaining was whether the State was then entitled to withdraw from the plea agreement. To this, the Court held it was not. The Court also reduced the restitution order by $1,000. View "California v. Shelly" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kejuan Clark was convicted by jury of rape, forced oral copulation, false imprisonment, first degree burglary, and robbery in concert inside an inhabited dwelling. The jury found true the allegations that (1) the rape and forced oral copulation were committed during the burglary; (2) during the burglary, a person other than an accomplice was present in the residence; and (3) the false imprisonment, burglary, and robbery were committed in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to assist criminal conduct by gang members. Defendant admitted a prior strike conviction and committing the charged “felony offenses while released from custody prior to the judgment becoming final on the primary offense.” The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a determinate term of 20 years plus an indeterminate term of 90 years to life. The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to amend the indeterminate abstract of judgment to reflect the statute in Count 5 was Penal Code section 288a(c)(2)(A), and send the amended abstract of judgment to the appropriate agency/agencies. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law

Golden Gate, which operates a Berkeley horse racing track, sued Action, an animal rights organization, and individuals who allegedly climbed over a fence surrounding the race track, lit incendiary devices that produced smoke, then lay down on the track with their arms connected using PVC to make removing them difficult. The trespassers prevented scheduled races. The complaint alleged trespass and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. The complaint alleged that “each of the defendants" was "the agent, co-conspirator, aider and abettor, employee, representative, co-venturer, and/or alter ego of each and every other defendant,” but did not specify the circumstances upon which Action’s alleged vicarious liability was based. Action responded by filing an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16) motion, claiming it “had no involvement in the civil disobedience.”The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that Action failed to show that the complaint challenged protected activity. The court of appeal affirmed. Claims alleging that an advocacy organization is vicariously liable for a third party’s illegal conduct may be subject to a demurrer or other summary challenge, but they cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute unless the organization’s alleged liability is premised on constitutionally protected activity. The only fair reading of the complaint is that the wrong on which the claims against Action are based was the organization’s alleged involvement in the illegal trespass, not its speech or petitioning activity. View "Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere" on Justia Law

Invoking California Penal Code section 1170.95, defendant Yolanda Harden sought to vacate her conviction of first degree murder. She claimed some 20 years later (and after recent amendments to the statute) that she was not the actual killer. The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions and verdicts conclusively established, with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations, that in 2001 Harden was convicted as the actual killer. That made her ineligible for relief as a matter of law, despite her contrary factual claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order summarily denying her section 1170.95 petition. View "California v. Harden" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Anthony Zabelle guilty of second degree robbery. It also found true the allegation he inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction and resulting sentence for two reasons: (1) the trial court wrongly admitted a confession he made to officers following an allegedly coercive interrogation; and (2) based on a recent amendment to Penal Code section 1170 that became effective January 1, 2022, defendant argued the Court of Appeal should remand the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the current statutory text. The Court found defendant’s second argument, not his first, persuasive. The Court agreed that premised on section 1170’s new language, remand for resentencing was appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with section 1170’s then-current text and otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Zabelle" on Justia Law

A jury found Hayden Gerson guilty of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter a lesser included offense of attempted murder; two counts of assaulting a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm; shooting at an inhabited house; assault on a peace officer with force likely to produce great bodily injury; making a criminal threat; exhibiting a firearm to a peace officer to resist arrest; two counts of resisting an executive officer; and harming or interfering with a police animal. The jury also found true various enhancements to these offenses. The jury found Gerson to be sane during commission of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Gerson to a total term of 33 years eight months in prison. Gerson attacked two police officers attempting to detain him after he refused to comply with their orders. This attack led to a SWAT standoff and gun battle between Gerson and two SWAT officers. After Gerson choked and bit a police K-9, multiple officers were able to subdue and arrest him. Gerson appealed his convictions, arguing that the judgment had to be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion for pretrial diversion based on a mental order. Further, he made arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, and errors in instructing the jury. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Gerson did not meet his burden of showing he suffered from bipolar disorder, a mental disorder that qualified for pretrial diversion. Accordingly, its ruling denying Gerson’s motion for pretrial diversion did not amount to an abuse of discretion. In the unpublished parts of the opinion, the Court rejected Gerson’s remaining arguments. View "California v. Gerson" on Justia Law