Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. He contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction shows that jurors were instructed on now-invalid theories of murder and attempted murder at trial.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law if, for example, the jury instructions show that jurors were not instructed on any theory of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189. The court explained that the trial court here correctly concluded that Defenadnt was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. The court instructed jurors on two theories of liability at trial: direct aiding and abetting and conspiracy. If the jury adopted the former theory, Defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because jurors would have had to conclude that he harbored the intent to kill. Further, under current California law, “conspiracy to commit murder may be based on an agreement to kill ‘“a human being” ’ who is not specifically identified.” That Defendant and his coconspirators did not conspire to kill the victims specifically is not relevant. View "P. v. Allen" on Justia Law

The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed here. Defendant appealed the judgment after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the “errors” requires reversal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. First, the court found that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2). Further, the court explained here there is no substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the greater offense of trafficking of a minor. View "P. v. Banks" on Justia Law

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant-appellant Ryan Christianson as an inmate potentially eligible for relief under California Penal Code section 1172.75, but the trial court corrected the original sentence by administratively striking section 667.5(b) enhancements that had been stayed by the original sentencing court, and thus concluded resentencing was unnecessary. On appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to decide whether section 1172.75 applied in cases like this, where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate was currently serving time included one or more section 667.5(b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed. To this, the Court concluded that it did and that therefore resentencing was required. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Christianson’s request for resentencing. View "California v. Christianson" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to a charge of second-degree murder. Appellant admitted as true an enhancement allegation regarding the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Appellant to prison for 15 years to life. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court, claiming he could not be convicted of murder based on the 2019 changes to the law. After giving the parties a chance to brief this issue, the court denied the petition, concluding Appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his conviction had occurred after Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition. The court explained that Appellant is ineligible for resentencing for two reasons. First, in order to be resentenced, the charging document filed against Appellant must have allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid. This requirement is not met here. The prosecution filed the information against Appellant in 2020. Thus, when this criminal proceeding was initiated, the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice. This deficiency amply demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s petition for resentencing. Further, when Appellant entered his change of plea, the now invalid theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. Consequently, Appellant has already received the benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437. View "P. v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Senate Bill 567 amended Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) to provide that when a statute specifies three possible terms of imprisonment, the court cannot impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless it finds that a longer sentence is justified by “circumstances in aggravation of the crime” and “the facts underlying those circumstances” have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury at trial. Before SB 567, trial judges had discretion to impose the lower, middle, or upper term of imprisonment based on their own assessment of which term best served the interests of justice, without making any factual findings.The court of appeal upheld a trial court order allowing the prosecution to amend an information to allege aggravating factors against a criminal defendant. Section 1170(b)(2)'s phrase “circumstances in aggravation” refers to the factors listed in California Rules of Court, 4.421; the Legislature has not violated the separation of powers by that delegation. The use of qualitative terms and the requirement that an aggravating circumstance make the commission of the offense distinctively worse does not render rule 4.421's factors unconstitutionally vague. The factual allegations supporting the aggravating circumstances do not need to be supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing. View "Zepeda v. Superior Court City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Rhodius appealed the trial court’s denial of a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Defendant contended the trial court erred in denying him a full resentencing hearing on the basis that defendant’s prison priors were imposed and stayed, not imposed and executed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that "interpret the statute to include enhancements that were imposed and stayed would be contrary to the legislative intent and the plain language of the statute." Accordingly, judgment was affirmed the trial court's denial of a full sentencing rehearing. View "California v. Rhodius" on Justia Law

A defendant in a criminal proceeding (“Defendant”) was arrested based on a co-defendant’s statement. The petitioning Newspaper sought an interview with the then-unindicted co-defendant (“Co-defendant”). Subsequently, Defendant filed a subpoena seeking all material relevant to Newspaper’s interview with co-defendant.The trial court denied Newspaper’s request to quash the subpoena, finding that newsperson’s immunity must yield to a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court ultimately held Newspaper in contempt.The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Newspaper’s motion to quash a subpoena but vacated the trial court’s finding of contempt. View "Bakersfield Californian v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Juan Boitez moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his mother’s car. After the trial court denied his motion, Boitez petitioned for writ of mandate or prohibition The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether Boitez gave voluntary consent for the police to search his mother’s car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation. As a material part of obtaining Boitez's consent, the police officer falsely, but apparently with subjective belief that it was true, stated that he had the authority to tow the car, but would not do so if Boitez consented to the search. Specifically, the Court considered whether, but for the police officer’s false promise of leniency as to the towing of the mother’s car, the prosecution met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Boitez's consent was uncoerced. To this, the Court concluded the prosecution did not meet its burden: the false promise of leniency not to tow the car was a material and inextricable part of the agreement inducing defendant’s consent to the search, and thus, under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner's consent was not voluntarily given. As part of its analysis, the Court adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that the question of voluntary consent "cannot be based on the subjective good faith of a police officer in making the false statement that induced the defendant’s consent to search." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Boitez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Flores appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of provocative act murder. Flores contended the superior court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage. He argued the instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted co-defendant Anthony Paez’s provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the instructional argument he urged here. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

This case involved the complicated relationship between a mother, Teri A., and her son, Zachary H. During a tense period in their relationship, Zachary H. moved out of Teri A.’s home and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over Zachary H.’s repeated objections, Teri A. continued to reach out to him by mail, text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Zachary H. claimed that after he moved out, Teri A. nearly ran him over with her car as he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident, Teri A. sent Zachary H. a series of e-mails that caused him significant emotional distress. Immediately after receiving Teri A.’s e-mail referencing firearms, Zachary H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the DVRO hearing, the trial court found Zachary H.’s testimony to be credible, and evidence established Zachary H. was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms prohibition. Teri A. appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She also contended the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional. View "Zachary H. v. Teri A." on Justia Law