Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with attempted carjacking. He requested and was denied, mental health diversion several times. After the last hearing and denial, Defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court erred by requiring the consent of the prosecution before granting diversion. Defendant also contended that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to allow live testimony in the last diversion hearing by a psychiatrist that had examined Defendant.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant that it was an error for the trial court to conclude that diversion required consent by the People. But found that the error was harmless because the trial court independently found that Defendant did not meet the criteria for diversion. And, the court acted within its discretion in considering the expert’s report, but not live testimony, in the pre-trial diversion hearing. View "P. v. Watts" on Justia Law

In a previous opinion in this matter involving defendant James Bunas, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and the underlying convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under Penal Code section 1001.36 and to determine whether to place Bunas in mental health diversion. (Bunas I.) The Court further directed that, if the trial court determined Bunas was ineligible for diversion or exercised its discretion not to place Bunas on diversion, then the court was to reinstate Bunas’s convictions and resentence him. On remand, the trial court denied Bunas’s request for mental health diversion, but did not resentence. On appeal, Bunas argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mental health diversion; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to resentence him in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s prior decision. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Bunas mental health diversion, but it did err in failing to issue a new sentence. Judgment was affirmed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Bunas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Zuniga pled no contest to felony hit and run resulting in death or serious bodily injury. In late 2018, the court placed him on formal probation for three years. The terms and conditions of probation included that Zuniga “pay restitution [to the victim] through the Probation Department in an amount and manner to be determined by the probation officer at a later date.” Effective January 1, 2021, two years into Zuniga’s probation term, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) which amended Penal Code section 1203.1(a) by reducing the maximum felony probation term to two years, with certain exceptions not applicable here. In November 2021, the parties agreed that Zuniga was entitled to have his term of probation shortened to two years under Assembly Bill No. 1950. Accordingly, the court terminated Zuniga’s probation nunc pro tunc to December 31, 2020. When the court terminated Zuniga’s probation, the probation officer still had not determined the amount of victim restitution, as contemplated in the original probation order. Zuniga then argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set the amount of victim restitution because his probation had terminated. After soliciting briefing on the issue, the trial court disagreed with Zuniga and ordered direct restitution to the victim in the amount of $313,518.74. Zuniga appealed the restitution order. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction and affirmed the order. View "California v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Cristina Qualkinbush threw a pair of scissors at her 75-year-old mother and then spat on a police officer who detained her following the incident. After the trial court denied Qualkinbush’s motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, she pled guilty to elder abuse and misdemeanor battery on a peace officer. The trial court placed her on formal probation for three years, subject to certain conditions, including residential mental health treatment. Qualkinbush appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mental health diversion. She also contended, and the State conceded that the Court of Appeal: (1) order an amendment of the probation order to vacate certain fees or costs pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1869); and (2) order a correction of the probation search condition to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. After briefing, the parties agreed that the offense of conviction fell under an exception to Penal Code section 1203.1 and required a three-year minimum probation term. The Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion, and remanded for the court to consider the primary purposes of the mental health diversion statute. “If after conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court again denies mental health diversion, the order granting formal probation shall be reinstated, as modified, to vacate the unpaid portion of the challenged fees and costs, and to correct the probation search conditions to delete authorization of searches of computers and recordable media.” View "California v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jesse Sambrano sought to reverse his attempted murder convictions because his jury was given a kill zone instruction that was erroneous under California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). The State conceded the error but argued it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded after a review of the trial court record: (1) the jury should not have been instructed on the kill zone theory at all; (2) the instruction’s description of the kill zone theory was erroneous; (3) the prosecutor relied almost exclusively on the kill zone theory in arguing that Sambrano had the necessary mental state for attempted murder; and (4) the prosecutor’s argument concerning the kill zone theory was likewise erroneous. From this, the Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would not have reached a verdict more favorable to Sambrano. "Accordingly, the convictions on the attempted murder counts must be reversed." the petition was granted and the attempted murder convictions were vacated. View "In re Sambrano" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in September 2009, police searched defendant Manual Soto and found 29.9 grams of methamphetamine in his breast pocket. According to the officer who arrested him, defendant stated he was to receive $200 for delivering the drugs on behalf of another person. A probation report noted defendant had never attended school, was illiterate in English and spoke it poorly, and was subject to an immigration hold as a noncitizen. Defendant was charged with drug possession and transportation charges, in addition to driving without a license. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, defendant initialed and signed a waiver of rights and plea form, in which he indicated his understanding that, as a noncitizen, his plea “may cause my deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States and denial of citizenship or naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” He also initialed the following line on the form: “I read and understand the English language.” Defendant’s attorney signed an acknowledgement on the form stating, among other things, he had “explained the consequences of this plea” to his client. A Spanish interpreter signed an acknowledgement on the form stating she was duly sworn, had translated the form to defendant, and that defendant indicated he understood its contents. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2020 motion to vacate his 2010 drug trafficking conviction, claiming he would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Defendant contended his conviction was invalid due to prejudicial error. Applying its independent judgment, the Court of Appeal concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonably probable defendant would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Therefore, defendant established prejudice. The trial court's order denying the section 1473.7 motion was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. View "California v. Soto" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this coordinated proceeding appealed postdismissal orders denying their motions for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In 2017, plaintiffs filed petitions against defendant Department of Water Resources (DWR) challenging the California WaterFix (WaterFix), a proposal to improve the State’s water supply infrastructure by constructing two 35-mile-long tunnels that would convey fresh water from the Sacramento River to pumping stations in the southern Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (Delta). The lawsuits sought to compel DWR to rescind the WaterFix approvals, decertify the environmental impact report (EIR), and suspend activities related to the project until DWR complied with applicable laws. In 2019, while the coordination proceeding was pending, California’s newly elected Governor announced that he did not support WaterFix’s dual tunnel proposal and directed DWR to instead pursue a single tunnel conveyance. Shortly thereafter, DWR decertified the EIR and rescinded the project approvals. Consequently, all pending actions, including the validation suit, were dismissed. After the cases were dismissed, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, asserting that they were “successful” parties under the catalyst theory because the litigation motivated DWR to voluntarily provide the relief sought in their petitions and answers. On appeal, plaintiffs argued: (1) the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining there was no causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained; and (2) the trial court’s finding of no causation is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard and therefore failed to consider all relevant evidence in the record. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for redetermination of the issue. View "Dept. of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases" on Justia Law

On appeal, the district attorney argued that The Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County (“ADDA”) lacks standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of its members and that he does not have a ministerial duty to comply with the legal duties ADDA alleges he violated, that the trial court’s preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that the balance of the harms does not support preliminary injunctive relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order. The court concluded that ADDA has associational standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. The court concluded the voters and the Legislature created a duty, enforceable in mandamus, that requires prosecutors to plead prior serious or violent felony convictions to ensure the alternative sentencing scheme created by the three strikes law applies to repeat offenders. This duty does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by materially infringing on a prosecutor’s charging discretion; to the contrary, the duty affirms the voters’ and the Legislature’s authority to prescribe more severe punishment for certain recidivists. Further, neither the voters nor the Legislature can create a duty enforceable in mandamus to require a prosecutor to prove allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions, an inherently discretionary act. Nor is mandamus available to compel a prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss allegations of prior strikes or sentence enhancements under section 1385. View "The Association of Deputy District Attorneys etc. v. Gascon" on Justia Law

United Water Conservation District (“District”) manages the groundwater resources in Ventura County. City of San Buenaventura (“City)” pumps groundwater from the District’s territory and sells it to residential and commercial customers.   The District collects a fee from the city by applying a fixed ratio of rates for nonagricultural users, such as the City, who pump groundwater for municipal and industrial (M&I) uses. The District charged such users three times more than agricultural (also known as “Ag”) users in accordance with Water Code section 75594.   The City filed its complaint for determination of invalidity and declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. The City alleged section 75594 is facially unconstitutional because the groundwater extraction rates charged for the water year 2019-2020 were not allocated to the City and other M&I users in a manner that bears a reasonable relationship to the City’s burdens on or benefits from the District’s activities.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the groundwater extraction charge is invalid as to nonagricultural users and must be set aside and section 75594 violates the California Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. The threshold issue concerned the applicable standard of review. The court held that District’s rates for the 2019-2020 Water Year do not comply with proposition 26. The court reasoned that the constitutional requirement of a ‘fair or reasonable relationship’ is not resolved by application of a rigid judicial standard nor by application of a deferential standard of substantial evidence. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Three men ("Defendants") were involved in a fistfight. During the fracas, one of the Defendants ("the Shooter") retrieved a gun. The Shooter missed his intended target, but several passing vehicles, including a young child. All three Defendants were charged with attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. All charges contained a gang enhancement under Sec. 186.22. The jury convicted all Defendants of two counts of attempted murder and several counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found the gang enhancements to be true.In a May 2, 2022 opinion, the Second Appellate District reversed all Defendants' gang enhancements, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that Senate Bill 333 provides a new framework for determining the applicability of the enhancement. The court affirmed the Shooter's convictions for attempted premeditated murder but reversed the other Defendant's convictions for the same. The court held that the evolving standard of aiding and abetting liability requires a retrial on these charges. The court also affirmed the non-shooting Defendant's convictions for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.The Second Appellate District released a modified opinion replacing the court's May 22, 2022 opinion. In its modified opinion, court removed certain directives to the trial court regarding the restructuring of Defendants' sentences. View "P. v. Perez" on Justia Law