Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Christopher Parra Martinez appealed a Superior Court’s decision not to strike two personal firearm use enhancements imposed pursuant to California Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. The firearm enhancement provisions set forth in sections 12022.5 and 12055.53 were amended effective January 1, 2018 upon the passage of Senate Bill No. 620. (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2017, ch. 682.) The Court of Appeal found the trial court record demonstrated that the trial court considered the appropriate circumstances and exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner when it declined to strike the firearm enhancements imposed at the time of defendant’s sentencing. Therefore, it found no reversible error in the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancement. View "California v. Parra Martinez" on Justia Law

Three men ("Defendants") were involved in a fistfight. During the fracas, one of the Defendants ("the Shooter") retrieved a gun. The Shooter missed his intended target, but several passing vehicles, including a young child. All three Defendants were charged with attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. All charges contained a gang enhancement under Sec. 186.22. The jury convicted all Defendants of two counts of attempted murder and several counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found the gang enhancements to be true.The Second Appellate District reversed all Defendants' gang enhancements, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that Senate Bill 333 provides a new framework for determining the applicability of the enhancement. The court affirmed the Shooter's convictions for attempted premeditated murder but reversed the other Defendant's convictions for the same. The court held that the evolving standard of aiding and abetting liability requires a retrial on these charges. The court also affirmed the non-shooting Defendant's convictions for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. View "P. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Whitmore was convicted by jury of rape, false imprisonment, and other crimes. After trial, Whitmore made a motion under California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970) to replace his appointed counsel; he also moved for a new trial. Because of circumstances related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Whitmore was not physically present in the courtroom when the trial court heard those motions in late December 2020; instead, Whitmore reluctantly appeared via video for the hearing and at sentencing. The court denied Whitmore’s motions and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. On appeal, Whitmore contended the trial court erred in overruling his demand to be personally present in the courtroom for the hearing on his posttrial motions and at sentencing. He also contended the court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion, and that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for false imprisonment. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Whitmore" on Justia Law

Yang was charged after he struck his father in the head with a flashlight and kicked a juvenile down the stairs. On April 9, 2018, the trial court suspended proceedings, finding Yang incompetent to stand trial, and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. On August 7, 2019, the state hospital’s medical director certified that Yang was competent to stand trial; he was returned to the county jail. The court reinstated criminal proceedings. Yang pled no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The court imposed a four-year sentence, suspended its execution, and placed Yang on probation.After six petitions for revocation of probation, the court executed the previously-imposed sentence. The probation department recommended he receive only actual time credit and no conduct credit for the time he spent receiving competency treatment in Napa State Hospital. Yang argued, on equal protection grounds, that because Penal Code section 4019(a)(8) had been amended to permit conduct credit for defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial who received competency treatment in county jail treatment facilities, he should receive conduct credit for the time he spent at Napa. The trial court rejected the argument. The court of appeal remanded for resentencing. Yang must be afforded the same opportunity for presentence conduct credit received by defendants receiving competency treatment at a county facility. View "People v. Yang" on Justia Law

The issue presented by this appeal was whether youthful offenders who are statutorily ineligible for early parole consideration were nevertheless entitled to a "Franklin" proceeding to preserve evidence for their eventual parole hearing. During his early 20’s, appellant was involved in three separate criminal incidents. s a result of those incidents, appellant was convicted of kidnapping for robbery and multiple counts of robbery, burglary, false imprisonment and illegal gun possession. He was also found to have personally used a firearm during the offenses and suffered a prior strike conviction. The trial court sentenced him to 59 years to life in prison under the “Three Strikes” law. In 2020, appellant requested a Franklin proceeding to present mitigation evidence in anticipation of his youth offender parole hearing (YOPH). However, the trial court correctly determined appellant was not eligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Therefore, it denied his request for a Franklin proceeding. Appellant admitted he was statutorily ineligible for a YOPH because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. However, he contended he is entitled to a YOPH – and a concomitant Franklin proceeding – as a matter of equal protection. Although the Court of Appeal rejected appellant’s equal protection argument, both parties concluded he was entitled to a Franklin proceeding under the standard rules applicable to all parole hearings. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for such a proceeding. View "California v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jaime Lopez was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of Reginold Harry. The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed a trial court order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, contending he made a prima facie case for relief by showing it was possible the jury had convicted him of felony murder and found the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation to be true without finding he was the victim’s actual killer. The Court of Appeal found the term “actual killer” as used in the revised felony-murder rule of Penal Code section 189 (e)(1) referred to someone who personally killed the victim and was not necessarily the same as a person who “caused” the victim’s death. Under this meaning of actual killer, it was possible for the jury to have found defendant guilty of felony murder, and found to be true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, without finding defendant was the actual killer. Defendant therefore met his burden of making a prima facie case for relief under section 1170.95. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing and remanded with directions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant Frankie Weisner pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and grand theft, and admitted he personally used a firearm in the robbery. After his initial appeal was denied as untimely, defendant sought to reduce his conviction on the grand theft count to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing. Once the Court of Appeal determines an appeal of the denial of postconviction relief is not subject to "Wende" review, then the case becomes a "standard" appeal of an order denying postconviction relief in which defendant, through counsel, stated there were no issues that properly could be raised on appeal. Under these circumstances, the appeal was abandoned and the Court of Appeal dismissed it. View "California v. Weisner" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the following counts: 1.) dissuasion of a victim by threat of force, 2.) criminal threats, 3.) assault with a deadly weapon, and 4.) infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a victim. The jury found Defendant guilty of counts 1, 2 and 4. Additionally, the jury found Defendant guilty of simple assault, as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed his convictions for counts 1 and 3.The Fifth Appellate District affirmed Defendant's conviction for dissuasion of a victim by threat of force, determining that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the single count of dissuasion of a victim by threat of force by leaving out the malice requirement. However, the court's error was harmless.The Fifth Appellate District reversed Defendant's conviction for simple assault, finding that simple assault is a lesser included offense of dissuasion of a victim by threat of force. In so doing, the court rejected the government's argument that Defendant's convictions for misdemeanor assault and infliction of corporal injury were based on different acts. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

Defendant Weldon McDavid, Jr. appealed his resentencing after the Court of Appeal remanded this matter following his original appeal in California v. Lovejoy et al. (July 28, 2020, D073477), a nonpublished opinion (Lovejoy). In Lovejoy, the appellate court affirmed McDavid’s criminal convictions, but vacated his sentence and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under recently amended Penal Code section 12022.53 to either impose or strike the section 12022.53 (d) enhancements that the court had originally imposed under the former version of the statute. On remand, the trial court declined to strike the section 12022.53 enhancements and reimposed its original sentence, except for a reduction of the restitution fines from $10,000 to $1,800. After consideration of McDavid's arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated McDavid’s sentence and any balance of the criminal justice administration fee imposed under former Government Code section 29550.1 that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021, and remanded the matter for resentencing to: (1) allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to impose lesser, uncharged section 12022.53, section 12022.5 (a), or other lesser included enhancements in lieu of imposing section 12022.53 (d) enhancements; (2) amend its abstract of judgment to reflect the Court's vacatur of any criminal justice administration fee imposed under former Government Code section 29550.1 that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021; and (3) correct its April 30, 2021 minute order and amend its abstract of judgment to reflect an award to McDavid of presentence credit for all custody time served through the time of his April 30, 2021 resentencing. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. McDavid" on Justia Law

Defendants Victor Wilkins and Aaron Vaughn were found guilty of human trafficking and multiple counts of pimping and pandering; some counts involved a minor victim. They appealed their resultant sentences. After careful review, the Court of Appeal concluded the sentences violated Penal Code section 654, and modified them accordingly. Finding no other reversible error, the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Vaughn" on Justia Law