Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Twin brothers, Roman and Ruslan Glukhoy, led police on two high speed chases, the second of which was in a stolen truck and culminated in a fatal collision killing two people. Separate juries found them guilty of multiple offenses and allegations.1 Ruslan, who was convicted of first degree murder with felony-murder special-circumstances, was sentenced to two terms of life without the possibly of parole. Roman, who was convicted of two counts of second degree murder, was sentenced to 30 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the alternative-theory instructional error in Roman’s case brought about Senate Bill 1437 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence establishing the valid theory of direct aiding and abetting implied malice was overwhelming. In addition, the Court found that evidence was the same evidence the jury had to have credited to find defendant guilty based on the now invalid natural and probable consequences theory. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected the remainder of Roman's and all of Ruslan's contentions and affirmed the judgments. View "California v. Glukhoy" on Justia Law

When a person is arrested for driving under the influence, the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") holds a hearing to determine if the driver's license should be suspended. The DMV requires that the hearing officers act as both advocates for the DMV as well as triers of fact. The DMV also authorizes managers to change hearing officers’ decisions, or demand hearing officers change their decisions, without providing notice to the driver.Plaintiffs, a group of lawyers, challenged the DMV's administrative hearings process on three grounds. The district court resolved one of Plaintiffs' grounds in favor of the DMV in summary judgment, entering judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiffs on their two remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the hearing officers' dual roles as an advocate for the DMV and adjudicator violates drivers’ due process rights; and (2) granting the DMV’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.The Second Appellate District reversed on these issues, finding Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all their 1983 claim. The lack of neutral hearing officers violates drivers’ federal and state due process rights. The court also found that the trial court did not err in awarding attorneys fees to Plaintiffs. However, because Plaintiff's succeeded on appeal, the court remanded the case for a recalculation of the attorney's fee award. View "California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/" on Justia Law

Vacaville Officer Hill followed a car and noticed the license plate light and third brake light at the vehicle's back window appeared not to be working. Hill initiated a traffic stop. Pantoja was alone in the car. When Pantoja gave his name, Hill remembered Pantoja “had a history of violence and firearm possession, and he was at the time an investigative lead in a homicide.” There was no smell of marijuana and no contraband in plain view. Hill saw no signs that Pantoja was intoxicated. Hill ran a record check and learned Pantoja had a valid license and was not on probation or parole. Hill asked Pantoja if he could look in the vehicle for contraband. Pantoja declined. Hill then asked Pantoja to exit his car and put his hands behind his head because Hill was going to issue a citation for the lighting infractions. Pantoja did not make any furtive gestures or sudden movements. As Hill patted Pantoja’s waistband area, he found a revolver. Pantoja was arrested.The trial court granted Pantoja’s motion to suppress, explaining: “[T]he officer … didn’t have any specific or articulable facts to believe that this individual was presently armed or dangerous. The court of appeal affirmed. An officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s past arrests or convictions is inadequate to furnish reasonable suspicion as is the knowledge that a suspect is merely under investigation. View "People v. Pantoja" on Justia Law

Respondent, a consulting company, entered into a written contract whereby respondent agreed to provide services to a health care company on an hourly basis. Appellant, a licensed attorney, is the General Counsel of the health care company. When the health care company did not pay for services, the respondent filed a complaint alleging an ordinary breach of contract. Acting in his individual capacity, appellant filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”). His complaint consisted of six causes of action. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously determined that he had failed to satisfy the first step of the anti-SLAPP statute he also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.The Second Appellate District reasoned that the Legislature enacted anti-SLAPP statute to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights. Here, the court looked to only the first step under the statute because the trial court determined appellant had failed to carry its initial burden. He argued that respondent’s causes of action for intentional misrepresentation and concealment invaded his ability to advise his client and attacked his settlement efforts. The court held that while settlement discussions constitute protected activity, the fifth and sixth causes of action had nothing to do with settlement discussions nor did they arise from protected speech. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying appellant’s special motion and imposing sanctions. View "Clarity Co. Consulting v. Gabriel" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Charlie Hola guilty of second degree murder. Defendant’s conviction arises from a murder capping a three-hour crime spree. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 48 years to life. Defendant originally raised several contentions related to the natural and probable consequences theory underlying his second degree murder conviction, including that insufficient evidence supported his conviction based on that theory and he was entitled to relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). He also claimed his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to speculative gang testimony; that insufficient evidence supported a finding that he acted for the benefit of a criminal gang; that there was instructional error related to the natural and probable consequences doctrine relative to self-defense and mutual combat; and that certain conduct credits the trial court withheld for jail misconduct must be restored. After oral argument and supplemental briefing, the parties agreed defendant’s murder conviction could not stand in light of the Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill 775 amendments. The parties disagreed, however, as to whether the Court of Appeal should also remand the matter to the trial court to afford the prosecution the opportunity to advance a valid murder theory at a new trial. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed defendant’s murder conviction and vacated the associated enhancements. The Court held that the State was entitled to retry defendant on the murder charge based on a valid theory of liability if it could do so in good faith, along with the associated enhancements. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions or concluded that they were moot in light of the reversal of his second degree murder conviction. View "California v. Hola" on Justia Law

During Defendant’s murder trial, the prosecution used five of its eight peremptory challenges to remove Black women from the jury panel. Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge at trial. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court accepted the prosecution’s proffered reasons for the use of its peremptory challenges. Defendant was convicted and appealed.When the trial court requires the prosecution to place its reasons for exercising peremptory challenges on the record, an appellate court skips the first two steps of the Batson analysis and goes straight to considering the credibility of the prosecution’s stated reasons and whether the record as a whole reveals a discriminatory motive for removing even a single prospective juror.The court found that there was no valid basis to strike at least one of the Black women. Moreover, there were several reasons why the struck panel member should have been an “ideal juror” from the prosecution’s perspective. The prosecutor’s stated reason for striking the juror “didn’t hold up" and appeared to be based on impermissible discrimination. View "P. v. Salinas" on Justia Law

Defendant Woody McMurray appealed a trial court’s denial of a recommendation made by the Secretary (Secretary) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) under former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) that the trial court consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him in light of changes made to section 12022.53. Defendant contended the trial court’s denial of resentencing without notice or the appointment of counsel violated his constitutional rights and was reversible error. While defendant’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, sections 1-7) came into effect on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03. Assembly Bill 1540 also clarified the Legislature’s intent regarding procedural requirements and the provision’s application to “ameliorative laws . . . that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion, regardless of the date of the offense of conviction.” In addition, where requests for recall and resentencing are made, Assembly Bill 1540 added a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. To the change in the law, Defendant argued: (1) Assembly Bill 1540 constituted a clarification of existing law and applied to cases involving the interpretation of former section 1170(d)(1); and (2) Assembly Bill 1540 applies retroactively to his case. The State argued Assembly Bill 1540 was not retroactive, but acknowledged, however, that in the interest of judicial economy, that the Court of Appeal may reverse the trial court’s order and remand for new proceedings under section 1170.03. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that Assembly Bill 1540 applied to his case because it is a clarification of former section 1170(d)(1), so it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. McMurray" on Justia Law

The ex-girlfriend of defendant Johnathan Kiger testified that he got drunk and started an argument with her. During the argument, he slapped her, pushed her head against a car, dragged her by the leg, and finally strangled her into unconsciousness. There was evidence that defendant had committed three prior assaults: one on the same girlfriend and two on previous girlfriends. The assaults on the previous girlfriends had resulted in a conviction in 2009 for domestic battery and in 2016 for attempted domestic battery. At a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of domestic battery with a prior, and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, each with a domestic violence great bodily injury enhancement. One “strike” prior, and one prior serious felony conviction enhancement, were found true. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 16 years in prison, along with the fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence of domestic battery with a prior because his only sufficiently recent prior conviction was for an attempt, not for a completed crime. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by finding defendant guilty of domestic battery with a prior when his only relevant prior conviction was for attempted domestic battery. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. Accordingly, the judgment was modified and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Kiger" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Kelley, III and the victim, L.S., were dated and lived together for two years and had a child together. When the relationship ended, L.S. obtained a domestic violence restraining order against defendant. He violated the order repeatedly. In one of several consolidated cases, defendant was charged with felony stalking. He pled guilty and the charges in the other consolidated cases were dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years in state prison, imposed fines and fees, and issued a criminal protective order. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing certain fines and fees despite his inability to pay, and this violated his right to due process under California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019); and (2) the criminal protective order was unconstitutionally vague because its stay-away provision did not specify that he not do so “knowingly.” In a supplemental briefing, defendant argued (3) he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., Senate Bill 567). In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not have to modify the criminal protective order because the requirement that defendant not “knowingly” come within 400 yards of L.S. was implicit in the order. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court agreed with both parties that Senate Bill 567 applied retroactively to defendant’s case, and that the matter had to be remanded for resentencing in compliance with the Bill. Because the case was remanded for resentencing, defendant’s claims concerning the trial court’s imposition of fines and fees and Dueñas were deemed moot and were not addressed. View "California v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Holiman was found in possession of illegal drugs and a handgun during a traffic stop initiated after he made a right-hand turn at a stop sign, while the arresting officer’s patrol car was stopped directly behind him. Holiman did signal the turn, but the basis for the traffic stop was that he did not turn on his signal blinker early enough: for the 100 feet he drove before coming to a stop. The arresting officer cited him for violation of Vehicle Code section 22108. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, following which he pled guilty to two felony drug charges.The court of appeal reversed. The warrantless seizure of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked objectively reasonable suspicion. Holiman’s turn did not violate the Vehicle Code, and no reasonable police officer could think that it did. The statute refers to “the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” The prosecution presented no evidence that the turn could have affected any vehicle, including the officer’s patrol car. View "People v. Holiman" on Justia Law