Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a jury found petitioner Larry Bailey guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and leaving the scene of an accident and found true various enhancements. Petitioner was sentenced to 28 years in prison. In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. It also authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of early parole consideration. In 2017 and 2018, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) considered petitioner for Proposition 57 parole. In each of the parole consideration proceedings, the Board allowed petitioner to submit a written statement explaining why he should be granted parole. The Board, through written decisions by a deputy commissioner, both times denied petitioner parole. Petitioner requested administrative review of each of the parole decisions; both decisions were upheld. Petitioner thereafter filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus; the trial court denied petitioner’s claims challenging the evidentiary sufficiency of the parole denials, but granted petitioner habeas relief after finding he was entitled to “a live parole hearing at which [he] could attend.” The trial court interpreted Penal Code section 3041.5 “ ‘as providing for a hearing for all inmates eligible for parole consideration, at the very least to comply with federal and state due process concerns as well as equal protection.’ ” The trial court further ordered the Department to, within 60 days of the finality of the decision, promulgate new parole regulations to reflect the right to an in-person hearing under Proposition 57. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Proposition 57 neither required nor impliedly incorporated an in-person hearing requirement, and the Department acted within its delegated authority under Penal Code section 32(b) when it adopted the parole regulations at issue in this appeal. The Court further concluded the absence of an in-person hearing did not violate equal protection principles, nor did it violate a prisoner’s right to procedural due process. View "In re Bailey" on Justia Law

In 1984, Friend robbed an Oakland bar and fatally stabbed Pierucci. Convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a special circumstance, Friend was sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and denied Friend’s state habeas corpus petition.Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, requires that capital habeas corpus petitions generally be presented to the sentencing court and that a successive habeas corpus petition be dismissed unless the court finds that the petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty. A petitioner may appeal the denial of a successive petition only if the sentencing court or the court of appeal grants a certificate of appealability (COA). The sentencing court denied Friend’s second habeas petition and his request for a COA. The court of appeal denied a COA. The California Supreme Court remanded with directions to analyze whether Friend made a substantial showing that the claims in his second habeas corpus petition are not successive.On remand, the court of appeal again denied relief. Friend essentially acknowledged that all the claims in his second petition were either known or could and should have been discovered earlier and he failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of some claims from the initial petition reflects incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Friend failed to show a substantial claim that he is either actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence. View "In re Friend" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted petitioner Jason Harper of felony murder, and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance allegation for his participation in the robbery of a store, which resulted in the murder of the store’s manager. Although he was 16 years old at the time of the robbery, the trial court sentenced petitioner to state prison for life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on direct appeal in 2004 but, more than a decade later, the trial court resentenced petitioner to 25 years to life after a federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner sought habeas relief again from the resulting sentence from the federal court's grant of relief, arguing the jury’s special circumstance finding was no longer viable after the California Supreme Court's decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016),because the evidence did not establish he was a major participant in the robbery and that he acted with reckless disregard for human life. After review, the Court of Appeal denied the petition, finding the evidence in the record of conviction showed petitioner was a major participant in the robbery, and he acted with reckless indifference to human life, "so the jury’s special circumstance finding must stand." View "In re Harper" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Yolanda Harden of murdering 85-year-old Alfred P. during a residential burglary and robbery. The Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances in a partially published opinion. Among other things, the previous case rejected a claim of instructional error because there was no evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Harden was an aider and abettor. "Harden I" concluded, “a rational jury could not reasonably infer that . . . any person other than Harden[] was Alfred’s actual killer.” Twenty years later, Harden claims she did not kill anyone, but merely “crept in and stole” property, Harden filed a petition to vacate her conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court, which did not have the benefit of the California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in California v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021), denied the petition on the grounds that her claim was “completely inconsistent” with the facts recited in Harden I. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on slightly different reasoning. In reviewing the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, a trial court was not permitted to engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” The relevant inquiry at this stage was not whether factual findings recited in the prior appellate opinion were inconsistent with the petitioner’s claims. "Rather, the key question is whether legal determinations in the prior opinion refute those claims as a matter of law." The Court found Harden I conclusively established as law of the case that Harden’s first degree murder conviction was based on a theory that she was the actual killer. Because, as the actual killer, she would still be convicted of first degree murder even under recent amendments to the murder statutes that narrowed liability for the crime, the trial court correctly denied her 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause. View "California v. Harden" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Hector Pacheco and other gang members "jumped" two people: one victim died, the other survived. A jury found Pacheco guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, attempted murder, and gang participation. The jury also found true a gang special circumstance sentencing enhancement. In 2019, Pacheco filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. On appeal, the Attorney General argued the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance instruction made Pacheco ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court found the trial court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences theory, which was no longer a valid theory of murder liability. "While the gang special circumstance instruction told the jurors they needed to find Pacheco had the requisite intent to kill (the mens rea), the instruction did not require the jurors to find that Pacheco directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder (the actus reus). Therefore, without weighing the evidence, the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance does not conclusively establish Pacheco could be found guilty of murder under current law (that he had the intent to kill, and he directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder)." The Court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Pacheco’s section 1170.95 petition. On remand, the court was directed to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the murder charge. View "California v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a pause in a criminal jury trial due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic violated an accused’s due process right to a fair trial. Here, the prosecution nearly completed its case-in-chief against Defendant-appellant John Breceda when the trial court paused proceedings on March 16, 2020, because three of the 14 jurors were ill. Breceda refused to waive time and refused to proceed with 11 jurors. The trial court denied his motion for a mistrial and continued the case. Beginning that day, and for months after, the COVID-19 pandemic caused California officials to issue a series of orders to continue to provide essential government services, safeguard constitutional rights, and protect people from a "mysterious, contagious, and deadly virus." The effect of some of those orders was jury trials could not proceed. Seventy-two days after the trial court paused proceedings, the court denied Breceda’s second motion for a mistrial. Trial resumed the following day. The prosecution completed its case-in-chief, and Breceda testified. The jury acquitted Breceda of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder and arson of another’s property. Breceda argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his mistrial motions because the pause in his jury trial due to the COVID-19 pandemic violated his due process right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Although the pause in the trial was lengthy, 10 weeks, Breceda’s constitutional rights were not set aside and forgotten. ... the record demonstrates the court remained appropriately focused on Breceda’s constitutional rights during the onset of an unprecedented global health crisis." Judgment was thus affirmed. View "California v. Breceda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Taylor Pixley appealed the denial of his petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, which allowed a person convicted of a felony who may have certain kinds of trauma as a result of his or her military service to petition for resentencing. The trial court ruled that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that provided for a stipulated sentence. Petitioner argued the language of section 1170.91(b), which allowed “[a] person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea” to petition meant that the existence of a plea agreement could never bar resentencing. He also argued that, if the petition were granted, the trial court could withdraw its approval of the plea agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points, and affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Pixley" on Justia Law

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, On March 16, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-in-place order. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency statewide order suspending jury trials and continuing them for 60 days, extending by 60 days the speedy trial time period provided for in Penal Code section 1382 for holding a criminal trial. The order was later extended an additional 30 days. In December, in response to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order. After trials resumed, there were backlogs and trials were continued beyond the statutory deadlines. Defendants alleged violations of their speedy trial rightsThe court of appeal declined to order dismissal of their cases. The continuances were supported by good cause. In making a determination of good cause based on reasons of court congestion or backlog, the critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances. The District Attorney adequately showed exceptional circumstances connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, not chronic conditions in the court. View "Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After a police officer found him asleep in his car with a bag of methamphetamine and a loaded gun at his feet, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Daniel Gonzalez of possession of a controlled substance while armed, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. On appeal, Gonzalez challenged the constitutionality of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, arguing the provision violated the Second Amendment by restricting a nonviolent offender’s right to possess firearms. The Court of Appeal concluded the argument lacked merit and affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law