Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case arose from the violent sexual assault and killing of an 84-year-old woman inside her home and during a burglary. After the first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, a second jury found defendant Alvin Larry Davis guilty of first degree murder, and forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object, a cane. The jury also found true the enhancement allegations, and a special circumstance allegation. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had two prior convictions that qualified as strikes under the three strikes law. The court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant contended the judgment had to be reversed due to prejudicial evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Defendant primarily argued the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony based upon the application of the STRmix(TM) methodology (a method of DNA analysis): this evidence should have been excluded under the test for the admission of new scientific evidence established by the California Supreme Court in California v. Kelly 17 Cal.3d 24 (1976), abrogated by statute on another point in California v. Wilkinson, 33 Cal.4th 821 (2004). Defendant made additional claims of error that he conceded may have been forfeited; thus he argued in the alternative that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and cumulative error. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in determining that the STRmix method of DNA analysis was generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community, such that expert testimony relying on the method satisfied the first requirement of the Kelly test. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected or declined to consider the remaining claims of error and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Elijah Hall was convicted by jury of six counts of robbery committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and one count of active gang participation (all committed when he was 15 years old), and he received a sentence of 65 years to life in state prison. Hall appealed, and while his appeal was pending, Proposition 57 raised the minimum age a minor could be tried as an adult in criminal court from 14 to 16. Following the procedure approved in California v. Superior Court (Lara) 4 Cal.5th 299 (2018), the trial judge recalled Hall’s sentence and transferred his case to juvenile court, where the judge “treat[ed the] convictions as juvenile adjudications” and held a hearing to impose an appropriate disposition. After Hall was transferred to the Department of Juvenile Justice, he informed the Court of Appeal he wished to proceed with his appeal, which was reinstated as an appeal of a judgment in a juvenile criminal proceeding. Hall raised two challenges to the criminal trial on which his juvenile adjudications were based: (1) the trial judge violated his due process rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, which covered eyewitness identification evidence and tells the jury to consider, among other factors, the witness’s level of certainty when making the identification; and (2) Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) required reversal of the true findings on the substantive gang offense and enhancements because the new law increased the proof requirements under the gang statute (Pen. Code 186.22). The Court of Appeal rejected Defendant's first argument under California v. Lemcke, 11 Cal.5th 644 (2021), in which the Supreme Court held that CALCRIM No. 315’s certainty factor did not violate due process. The Court agreed with Defendant's second argument, and remanded the case to give the State an opportunity to retry the substantive charge and enhancement allegations under Assembly Bill 333’s new requirements in a juvenile criminal proceeding, and impose a new disposition in Hall’s case - either at the conclusion of retrial or upon the State's election not to retry him. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Hall" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Jody Ann Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements filed a petition arguing she was convicted of second degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory and could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeals' decision in Clements’ original appeal and other portions of the record of conviction and made two alternative determinations that: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition. Clements argued the trial judge erred by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal, by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute, and by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court of Appeal held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. The Court also held the trial judge sits as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95(d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The Court again affirmed the trial court's order denying Clements' petition. View "California v. Clements" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Larry Jackson to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the California Sexually Violent Predator Act. The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Jackson argued the trial court prejudicially erred by granting the prosecution’s motion to exclude Jackson’s only SVP expert witness from testifying at trial. Based on its review of the record, and applying California Supreme Court authority, the Court of Appeal held that in the context of SVP cases, in determining whether to exclude defense expert witness testimony, the trial court must consider both applicable statutory law, including relevant portions of the SVPA and the Civil Discovery Act of 2004 and the defendant’s constitutional due process right to present such evidence. Here, the trial court’s exclusion of critical defense expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s two expert witnesses deprived Jackson of a fair trial. The Court therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new SVP trial. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Hampton was convicted by jury of first degree murder and on two counts of robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate terms of 33 years to life. The jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, and that allegation was dismissed on the State's motion for insufficient evidence. Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, and requested appointment of counsel. In ruling on the section 1170.95 petition, the court considered the murder-robbery jury instructions given and the State's motion to dismiss the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence. The court concluded “that the dismissal of that special circumstance for insufficient evidence is equivalent to a finding that the defendant did not act with reckless indifference. Consequently the People have failed to carry their burden of proving ineligibility.” The court then proceeded to resentencing, vacated the murder conviction, and lifted the stays on the robbery convictions, leaving a sentence of seven years. The State appealed, contending the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation was not an acquittal. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the petition for resentencing. There was no dispute defendant was not the actual killer and did not act with intent to kill, to now be convicted of murder the prosecution was required to prove defendant “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” If there was a prior finding by a court or jury that defendant did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony the court was required to vacate the conviction and resentence defendant. Because the original trial court dismissed the case for insufficient evidence, this dismissal acted as the equivalent of an acquittal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly granted the petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. View "California v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement approved by the trial court, defendant Anthony Scarano was granted five years of supervised probation after he pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. Among the conditions of probation were a search condition, drug treatment programming, and drug testing. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and that his term of probation should have been reduced from five years to two in accordance with the recent amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1, enacted while his appeal was pending in Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s suppression contention was not preserved because he did not renew his motion in the superior court. As to Assembly Bill 1950, the Court agreed with the parties that it applied retroactively, but disagreed with defendant that the appropriate remedy was to order his supervised probation term be reduced. The Court remanded this matter to allow the trial court and the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the original plea agreement. View "California v. Scarano" on Justia Law