Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants Raymond and Michelle Plata were property owners in the City of San Jose and customers of Muni Water. Muni Water’s annual budget was reflected each year in a document called a source and use of funds statement, which was part of the City’s annual operating budget. In 2013, the Platas filed with the City a claim pursuant to Government Code sections 910 and 910.2, accusing Muni Water of violating Proposition 218 ab initio by collecting money from customers and illegally transferring it to the City’s own general fund. The City rejected the claim, so in early 2014, the Platas brought a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City under Proposition 218, as well as recovery of the amounts overpaid. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision finding: (1) the late fees charged by Muni Water were not a fee or charge covered by Proposition 218; (2) any claims accruing prior to November 4, 2012 were time-barred because of the statute of limitations provided under Government Code section 911.2, and there was no basis for applying any equitable tolling doctrine; (3) as for tiered water rates, the discussion of high rates in the Platas’ government claims adequate to gave notice to the City that its rate structure was being questioned; and (4) “[a] more significant complication” raised by the City in its class decertification motion. The tiered rate structure would impact different class members differently from month to month, thus making it potentially “impossible” to draw a “line between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on monthly water consumption[.]” The court granted the City’s motion to decertify the class, and refused to grant the Platas any relief as to their tiered rate argument. The Platas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed judgment only as to the trial court’s findings on the tiered rate structure. In all other respects, it was affirmed. View "Plata v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Richard Speck guilty of felony vehicle theft and receiving stolen property with special allegations that the Honda was valued at over $950. Defendant testified; he denied stealing the Honda and knowing it was stolen or had been reported stolen. He claimed he had permission to drive the car and did not think it was stolen because it had an ignition that required particular keys and he had been given those keys; there were no red flags such as a “ripped ignition” or evidence of hot-wiring. Defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3406 regarding mistake of fact, as to both counts, based on defendant’s testimony that he mistakenly but actually believed he had permission from the owner--Jason, whom defendant thought was the owner--to drive the car, which he mistakenly but actually believed was not stolen. Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Speck" on Justia Law

Hayden Gerson attacked two police officers attempting to detain him after he refused to comply with their orders. This attack led to a SWAT standoff and gun battle between Gerson and two SWAT officers. After Gerson choked and bit a police K-9, multiple officers were able to subdue and arrest him. A jury found Gerson guilty of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of attempted murder (charged in counts 1 and 2); two counts of assaulting a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3-4); shooting at an inhabited house (count 5); assault on a peace officer with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 6); making a criminal threat (count 7); exhibiting a firearm to a peace officer to resist arrest (count 8); two counts of resisting an executive officer (counts 9-10); and harming or interfering with a police animal (count 11). The jury also found true various enhancements to these offenses. The jury found Gerson to be sane during commission of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Gerson to a total term of 33 years eight months in prison. Gerson appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Gerson did not meet his burden of showing he suffered from bipolar disorder, a mental disorder that qualifies for pretrial diversion. Accordingly, its ruling denying Gerson’s motion for pretrial diversion did not amount to an abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded an individual, such as Gerson, who was out on bail and subject to electronic monitoring on home detention was similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic monitoring program pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.018, and that a rational basis did not exist for treating these categories of individuals differently. Accordingly, Gerson was entitled to preconviction custody credit and preconviction conduct credit under the state and federal equal protection clauses. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Gerson’s remaining arguments. View "California v. Gerson" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on when a lawyer's settlement demand crosses the line and becomes professional misconduct. Falcon Brands, Inc. and Coastal Harvest II, LLC (collectively Falcon) appealed an order granting respondent’s special motion to strike both causes of action in Falcon’s cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law). The cross-complaint alleges extortion and intentional interference with a contract against attorney Amy Mousavi and her law firm, Mousavi & Lee, LLP (collectively Mousavi). Falcon argued Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, which were the focus of Falcon’s cross-complaint, were not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP law because they constituted illegal attempts to force Falcon into settling the underlying matter. The trial court rejected this argument and granted Mousavi’s anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal reversed as to the first cause of action for extortion because it concluded Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, when considered in context, were not protected speech in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006). "Mousavi’s escalating series of threats ultimately transformed what had been legitimate demands into something else: extortion." The Court affirmed as to the second cause of action, intentional interference with a contract. That cause of action arose from Mousavi’s actual revelation of damaging information about Falcon to Falcon’s merger partner. Falcon did not contend the revelations were illegal as a matter of law. The revelations were made in furtherance of Mousavi’s contemplated litigation. The Court found the trial court correctly concluded the revelations were protected by the litigation privilege. Consequently, they were also protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP" on Justia Law

On the night of March 29, 2018, defendant Ashneel Mani broke into the house where his mother and his brother lived. At the time, defendant’s brother had a restraining order in place against defendant. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree residential burglary and willfully disobeying a court order. The jury found true the allegation that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the burglary. At a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had a previous strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code sections 1109 to prove propensity to commit residential burglary grounded on a theory of intent to steal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101(b), and 352; (3) the trial court committed instructional error in instructing the jury with a modified version of the Evidence Code section 1109 instruction, CALCRIM No. 852A, because burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not a crime involving domestic violence; and (4) he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, and the modified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction was not erroneous. The appellate court rejected defendant’s contention that residential burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not an act of domestic violence for which the prior acts of domestic violence were admissible under section 1109, and rejected the related contention that the trial court erred in instructing that the prior acts in this case could be used as evidence of propensity to commit the residential burglary charge grounded on a theft theory. The Court of Appeal concluded that breaking into the victims’ home with the intent to steal was "an act that surely disturbed the peace of the victims. Consequently, given the expanded definition of domestic violence in the Family Code applicable in section 1109, which includes disturbing the peace as a form of abuse, we hold that such a burglary is a crime of domestic violence for purposes of section 1109." Having rejected defendant’s claims of error, the Court necessarily rejected his cumulative error contention. View "California v. Mani" on Justia Law

Orellana was charged with two counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code 422(a)) and one misdemeanor count of exhibiting a deadly weapon (417(a)(1)), with a prior prison term enhancement. The trial court found a doubt as to Orellana’s competency and suspended criminal proceedings. Orellana was treated and regained competence. The parties entered into a plea agreement. Orellana agreed to serve a prison term of two years. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence consistent with that agreement.On appeal, Orellana argued the trial court’s failure at sentencing to award him conduct credit for the period of time in which he was receiving treatment for restoration to competence in the state hospital violated Senate Bill 317, which was enacted while his appeal was pending and provides for such credits. The court of appeal affirmed. While Orellana’s appellate waiver is invalid and did not bar his appeal, Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively and the denial of conduct credit for the time Orellana was committed to the state hospital did not violate equal protection principles. The trial court invited Orellana to ask questions or state any concerns but Orellana’s failure to do so does not affirmatively demonstrate a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of his appellate rights. View "People v. Orellana" on Justia Law

When executing a search warrant at defendant Donald Rorabaugh’s home, police learned that one of his cars was a short distance away, at a ranch. Police went to the ranch and towed the car away to be stored until they could obtain a warrant to search it. Later, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the car. In closing argument to the jury, the prosecution argued DNA evidence found in the car corroborated its theory of defendant’s culpability for murder. After the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erroneously denied: (1) his suppression motion; and (2) his motion for acquittal. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first claim, but disagreed with his second. The Court found police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of defendant’s unattended car on private property. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained after a search of the car was prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Rorabaugh" on Justia Law

Israel Gutierrez Zamora was convicted on multiple charges, including attempted kidnapping and assault with a semiautomatic weapon. He petitioned for disclosure of juror identifying information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237. After denying the disclosure petition as untimely, the trial court sentenced Zamora to a total term of 98 years to life. Zamora then filed an appeal challenging the denial of his petition for disclosure; he also argued there were errors in his sentence and the abstract of judgment. As a result of that first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition, as well as the challenged aspects of the sentence and abstract, and remanded the case with directions. On remand, the court denied Zamora’s disclosure petition on the merits, and corrected the sentence and abstract as directed. Zamora appealed that second order which denied his disclosure petition, arguing that the court was statutorily required to release the identifying information for jurors who did not object to disclosure. Zamora also challenged additional aspects of his sentence that were imposed when the court resentenced him following remand, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of recent changes in the law that rendered certain sentence enhancements. The Court of Appeal found that section 237 obligated the trial court to release the information only if none of the jurors protested the disclosure. "If any juror does object, the court must sustain the objection if it concludes the motion fails to show good cause for the release. That is what occurred in this case. Six of the twelve jurors objected to disclosure, which triggered the court’s obligation to determine whether there was good cause for disclosure. After concluding there was not, the court properly denied the petition." The Attorney General agreed that the challenged enhancements had to be stricken, rather than stayed. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to strike those sentence enhancements. View "California v. Zamora" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a confrontation between petitioner’s gang and a rival gang in which an innocent bystander was shot. Petitioner, the driver of the vehicle from which his fellow gang members fired several shots, was convicted of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, criminal street gang participation with gang and firearm enhancements, for which he was sentenced to 32 years to life. The prosecution's primary theory was that petitioner aided and abetted these offenses, which were the natural and probable consequence of disturbing the peace or simple assault. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, finding in the published part of its opinion that a person convicted as an aider and abettor was a “principal” for the purposes of Penal Code section 12022.53(e). In 2014, petitioner petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to the superior court, which was denied. In 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal, which also was denied. The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the matter in light of California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). On remand, the appellate court vacated the superior court's denial, and remanded to that court for additional proceedings. The superior court again denied relief in March 2020. Petitioner again petitioned for habeas relief to the Court of Appeal in January 2021, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to give a kill zone instruction, a prejudicial error requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction; (2) allowing him to be liable for the section 12022.53 enhancement as a principal violated his due process right to adequate notice; (3) the failure to instruct the jury on attempted involuntary manslaughter violated his due process rights; (4) cumulative error warrants reversal; and (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise issues raised in the habeas petition. The Court of Appeal determined the kill zone instruction given in petitioner's case differed from that in Canizales. "The instruction in this case, when combined with the prosecutor’s arguments concerning it, presented the same problem that led to reversing the conviction in Canizales. The instruction allowed the jury to use circumstantial evidence to infer an intent to kill the victim when that same circumstantial evidence can support a reasonable inference of no intent to kill." Finding the error was prejudicial, the Court vacated petitioner's murder conviction, reversed the sentence, and remanded for additional proceedings. View "In re Lisea" on Justia Law

The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over minor A.V. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removed her from the custody of her mother, S.V. (mother). Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction as well as the resulting disposition order. She argued in the alternative that the court denied her due process right to be heard at the jurisdictional hearing when it made the challenged findings in her absence. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother’s latter contention and reversed without reaching her sufficiency of the evidence challenge. View "In re A.V." on Justia Law