Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a defamation case against defendant, alleging that defendant falsely told independent insurance agents that plaintiff is dishonest and unethical in her business practices and falsifies insurance documents. Defendant and Auchel World filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure 426.16, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect defendant's statements because they squarely fall within the commercial speech exemption set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c). Courts are admonished to examine section 425.17 as a threshold issue before proceeding to an analysis under section 425.16. Section 425.17 expressly provides that speech or conduct satisfying its criteria is entirely exempt from anti-SLAPP protection even if "the conduct or statement concerns an important public issue." In this case, the trial court also erred in finding that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). The court explained that defendant's alleged slander of a competitor in a private setting to solicit business is neither speech in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition nor the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue. View "Xu v. Huang" on Justia Law

Before 2018, a person who aided and abetted only an intended assault could be found guilty of second degree murder if a resulting death was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. The aider and abettor did not have to intend to aid the perpetrator in committing the life endangering act, nor be subjectively aware of the risk to human life. Murder charges that might have been brought before 2018 using the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine had to be pursued, if at all, on a direct aiding and abetting theory. And that required, among other things, the aider and abettor acted with malice aforethought. The question this case posed for the Court of Appeal's review was what evidence sufficed, for purposes of a preliminary hearing, to bind over a defendant on a direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder. What started as a fist fight ended in a senseless killing: real party in interest, Daniel Valenzuela, did not stab the victim. But he instigated the fight, was armed with a screwdriver, and he brought Cesar Diaz Vasquez (Diaz), a known gang member armed with a knife, to fight on his side. Diaz stabbed 19-year-old Orlando M. a few inches above the heart. Valenzuela was charged with murder, but the magistrate dismissed that charge at the preliminary hearing. Exercising independent review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to bind over Valenzuela on an implied malice murder theory. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Valenzuela)" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Brown order granting Defendant Brown's motion in part. The court held that statements in an annual 10-K report filed with the SEC constitute statements "made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by [an] official proceeding" under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). View "Sugarman v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that statements Banc made in its Forms 8-K and 10-Q filed with the SEC, as well as related investor presentations and conversations, are protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as matters under review and consideration by the SEC. Furthermore, statements related to financial projections were also protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), as matters of public interest. View "Sugarman v. Benett" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Clark appealed his conviction for second degree murder and true findings on the associated firearm enhancements. He argued the trial court erred by inquiring into the identity of a holdout juror and subsequently dismissing that juror, as well as by failing to grant his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. He also argued the trial court was biased against him, thus violating his right to due process and a fair trial. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed defendant's conviction. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant Harry Howard filed a motion for a Franklin proceeding three decades after committing the underlying offense. By that time, he had already introduced youth-related evidence at a prior parole hearing, but he had never requested a Franklin proceeding. The court denied his motion on its face because it failed to show what additional evidence merited preservation. The Court of Appeal found the trial court prematurely denied Howard’s request. "His motion met the legal requirements to initiate the Franklin process. As such, the court should have provided Howard an opportunity to explain the evidence he sought to introduce before determining whether a Franklin proceeding was warranted." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Howard" on Justia Law

Lange drove past California Highway Patrol Officer Weikert, who noticed Lange was blaring music and honking unnecessarily. Weikert followed Lange, activating his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over. Seconds later, Lange arrived at the driveway of his home and drove into his attached garage. Weikert followed Lange into the garage and began questioning him. Lange appeared intoxicated. Weikert conducted field sobriety tests, which Lange failed. Lange’s blood-alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. Lange, charged with DUI and operating a vehicle’s sound system at excessive levels, unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence collected after Weikert entered Lange’s garage.In 2019, the court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that an officer’s hot pursuit into the house to prevent the suspect from frustrating the arrest is always permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home”; an “officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency,” and vacated for reconsideration.The court of appeal again affirmed the denial of the motion. Weikert followed binding state appellate law when he entered the garage in pursuit of Lange. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of the evidence seized in Lange’s home, even though under the Supreme Court’s new pronouncement. View "People v. Lange" on Justia Law

Joanne R., a conservatee subject to a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, contends that the trial court provided her an inadequate jury trial waiver advisement and improperly induced her to waive her right to a jury trial by stating she could either have a court trial that day or a jury trial nine months later.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although it is concerned by the delay in providing conservatees jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no violation of Joanne's statutory right to a jury trial. However, the court cautioned the superior court that a nine-month delay for a conservatee to have a jury trial where the conservatorship would otherwise end in a year, absent a health emergency, raises serious constitutional concerns in light of the significant liberty interests at stake. The court urged the superior court to dedicate the necessary additional resources to LPS jury trials so that conservatees may exercise their right to a jury trial in a timely manner. The court noted that failure to do so likely violates a conservatee's constitutional right to due process. View "Stusser v. Joanne R." on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Blakes sought review of the denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of his car following a traffic stop. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the warrantless search supported by probable cause and was a valid impound search. The Court of Appeal found the facts adduced by the officers before the warrantless entry of the car were: illegally tinted windows, defendant taking one-tenth of a mile to pull over and stop, the smell of marijuana emanating from the car, his having a suspended license, and his having a prior arrest for felon in possession of a firearm. The Court concluded these facts did not provide probable cause that contraband or evidence of illegal activity was in the car. The Court determined the evidence showed the impound decision was based on an investigative pretext rather than serving a community caretaking function. The Court thus granted petitioner's request for mandamus relief, and remanded this case to the trial court with directions to grant the suppression motion. View "Blakes v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law