Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While serving as an inmate at West Valley Detention Center, defendant Chelsea Giddens threw a milk carton filled with urine at a deputy, hitting her in the face. The incident was recorded by one of the jail’s security cameras. Based on the video, the prosecution charged Giddens with one count of “gassing” a peace officer, an aggravated form of battery that occurs when an inmate intentionally causes “any mixture containing human excrement or other bodily fluids” to make contact with the officer’s “skin or membranes.” At trial, the prosecution played the security footage for the jury, and the deputy testified she was certain the “salty, warm” liquid that splashed into her eyes and mouth was urine. Giddens testified in her own defense and denied throwing anything at the deputy, but her attorney presented a different theory during closing statements, arguing the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the liquid was urine as it was just as likely Giddens had made a concoction of warm water and rotting food from her cell. The jury found Giddens guilty as charged. On appeal, she argued: (1) the jail violated Penal Code section 243.9’s mandatory duty to collect a sample of the suspected gassing substance and test it to determine whether it in fact contained a bodily fluid; (2) the failure to test the contents of the liquid also violated her due process rights to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial judge erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the gassing charge for insufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Giddens' conviction. View "California v. Giddens" on Justia Law

Appellants John Tos et al. (Tos parties) appealed a trial court's a judgment that section 2704.78 of the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Train Bond Act for the 21st Century (Bond Act) (Sts. & Hy. Code, section 2704 et seq.) did not violate the state debt provision of the California Constitution set forth in article XVI, section 1. Subdivision (d) of section 2704.08 of the Bond Act, approved by the voters in 2008 as Proposition 1A, required an independent financial report indicating, among other things, that each corridor or segment of a corridor of the high-speed train system, if completed according to a “detailed funding plan,” would be “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation.” The Tos parties contended the meaning of “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation” set forth in section 2704.78 (a), constituted an implied partial repeal of the Bond Act in violation of section 1 of article XVI of the California Constitution. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "The 'single object or work' of the Bond Act was (1) the initial planning and construction of a high-speed train system under (2) a 'mandatory multistep process to ensure the financial viability of the project,' which we described in California High- Speed Rail Authority v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 676 (Rail Authority). ... The multistep planning and review process in section 2704.08, subdivision (d), remained intact." The judgment was thus, affirmed. View "Tos, et al. v. California" on Justia Law

Jesus Valderas, facing several felony charges, did not appear at a status conference/trial call on October 20, 2020. It was the second consecutive court appearance that Valderas missed. The trial court issued a bench warrant for Valderas but ordered the warrant to be held until December 8, 2020, the date on which the court had set a readiness conference. The court sent notice to Valderas by mail to his last known address. When Valderas did not appear at the December 8 hearing, the court lifted its hold on the bench warrant. Valderas sought a writ of mandamus to recall the December 8 bench warrant., arguing there was no evidence before the court, at the time it lifted its hold on the bench warrant, that Valderas had actual notice that he was required to appear. Put differently, Valderas argues that a court may only issue a bench warrant if it can show that the subject defendant had actual notice of the hearing date he or she missed. The wrinkle here was that the COVID-19 pandemic caused the San Diego Superior Court to close for all criminal proceedings and continue all hearing and trial dates, thus requiring new dates be set for Valderas’s upcoming hearings and trial. Valderas did not dispute that the notices were mailed. His counsel represented to the court that Valderas was “couch surfing” with no set living address and infrequent access to a cell phone. Based on these representations, Valderas insisted there was no evidence that he had actual notice of the hearings, and, without actual notice, the court could not issue a bench warrant. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: "Here, we believe the burden appropriately falls on Valderas. ... Even if Valderas were changing residences or having difficulty obtaining the use of a cell phone, it is not too burdensome to require him to check in with the court or his attorney in the eight months that followed the continuation of his trial date. He did not do so. ... We decline to require a court in this situation to track down Valderas’s actual whereabouts, provide him with notice of a hearing, and, only then, if he does not appear, issue a bench warrant. ... "The court correctly exercised its discretion in issuing the bench warrant for Valderas. View "Valderas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Harris is charged with a violent rape that occurred in 1989. DNA from the crime scene and a vaginal swab matched Harris’s. A “pretrial services court report” indicated that Harris appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. Harris asked for release on his own recognizance with nonfinancial conditions, e.g., a no-contact order, limitation of his use of dating websites, and GPS tracking. Harris argued that he is indigent, there is no indication he is a flight or safety risk, the alleged crimes occurred 32 years ago, he has not tried to contact the victim, he had a limited criminal history in the interim years, and he had community ties. The prosecution offered testimony by the victim that she feared for her safety, the doctor who treated the victim, and several women who reported that Harris liked to tie women up during sex and enact rape fantasies.Ultimately, the trial court denied Harris bail. finding that the charged felony offenses involved acts of violence on another person and that there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that Harris’s release would result in great bodily harm to others. The court of appeal remanded. The court erred in failing to set out reasons on the record why less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The district attorney charged Appellant Joseph Codinha with four offenses which occurred on two different dates. The counts alleged, respectively: (1) felony indecent exposure; (2) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics; (3) felony possession of a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine; and (4) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. In addition, the amended information alleged: a prison prior for violating Penal Code section 667.5(b); five probation denial priors; the commission of one count while out on bail; and the requirement for registration as a sex offender. Appellant raised a number of issues as a result of rulings in four separate proceedings in the trial court: (1) the denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia; (3) the determination, based on Appellant’s Pitchess motion that the San Diego Police Department had no records responsive to Appellant’s discovery request; and (4) the sentence, which included a stay of a one-year enhancement on one of the counts. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in staying Appellant's section 667.5(b) one-year enhancement: due to a change in the law after Appellant’s guilty plea and before Appellant’s sentencing, at the time of sentencing Appellant was no longer subject to the one-year sentence enhancement based on a prior prison term. Accordingly, the Court struck the enhancement and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "California v. Codinha" on Justia Law

Appellant Javier Murillo was convicted by jury of forcibly resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties, as well as delaying a peace officer in the performance of his duties and possessing drug paraphernalia. After he served his prison sentence, Murillo moved to vacate his resisting conviction based on newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.6. Based on its own assessment of the underlying facts of the case and the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion for failure to establish a prima facie case for relief. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that such factfinding at the initial stage of the motion process was improper. Therefore, the trial court’s denial order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Murillo" on Justia Law

Fisher was stopped for reckless driving and officers found, in his car's trunk, three pipe bombs that could cause serious injury to anyone holding them when lit. Fisher was released on bail. The friend who facilitated his release found chemicals in Fisher's garage and called the police, who found chemical powders and an AR-15 rifle, with no serial number, capable of accepting a magazine. Fisher was convicted of five destructive device felonies. Three offenses were subject to sentences served in county jail (Penal Code section 1170(h)) but Fisher was also convicted of two felony counts of simple possession of a destructive device, a “wobbler” offense that is not county jail eligible under section 1170(h). The court ordered that Fisher’s entire sentence be served in state prison.Fisher argued the disparate punishment of offenders convicted of the simple possession crime violates constitutional equal protection principles by treating similarly situated classes of offenders differently with no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The court of appeal found that persons charged with the various destructive device offenses are similarly situated and that there is no realistically conceivable legislative purpose to require a state prison sentence for those convicted of possession while affording the benefits of county jail incarceration for the 1170(h)-eligible offenses. The court concluded that the proper remedy is to reform section 18710 by making its violation punishable under section 1170(h). View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Schuller shot his long-time friend, W.T., nine times in the head and set the body on fire. Defendant testified, claiming self-defense, but his trial testimony about what happened leading up to and during the shooting suggested he was delusional and hallucinating. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was ultimately found legally sane and sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He contended substantial evidence demonstrated he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self- defense that was not entirely delusional. The Court of Appeal agreed, but find the error harmless. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Schuller" on Justia Law

A wardship petition charged Y.C., then 17 years old, with assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Y.C. allegedly shot a suspected rival gang member in the leg. Arrested, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile Assessment Center, where he met with a probation officer and invoked his Miranda rights. Y.C. agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s detention hearings.The court of appeal dismissed Y.C.’s writ petition as moot to the extent that it sought relief relating to his detention During the pendency of the proceeding, Y.C. entered a change of plea and was released from detention. The court otherwise denied the petition, rejecting arguments that the disclosure of the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court, and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as HIPAA and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. View "Y.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Donte Revels appealed his convictions for child abuse resulting in death, and child abuse. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after a testifying expert doctor rendered assistance to an unconscious juror. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no abuse of discretion, but found an error in the minute order and abstract of judgment that required correction. The Court ordered the error corrected and affirm the judgment. View "California v. Revels" on Justia Law