Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two American Indian tribes, business entities affiliated with the tribes, and individual tribe members, sued a number of non-tribal cardrooms alleging they were offering banked card games on non-tribal land, in violation of the exclusive right of Indian tribes to offer such games. Based on those allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims for public nuisance, unfair competition, declaratory and injunctive relief, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship and prospective economic advantage. The defendants demurred and, after two rounds of amendments to the complaint, the trial court sustained the third and final demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. The court ruled that, as governmental entities, the Indian tribes and their affiliated business entities were not “persons” with standing to sue under the unfair competition law (UCL), and were not “private person[s]” with standing under the public nuisance statutes. The court further ruled the business entities and the individual tribe members failed to plead sufficient injury to themselves to establish standing to sue under the UCL or the public nuisance statutes. Although plaintiffs broadly framed the issue on appeal as whether they, as American Indians, had standing to redress their grievances in California state courts, the Court of Appeal determined it was much narrower: whether the complaint in this case adequately plead the asserted claims and contained allegations sufficient to establish the threshold issue of whether any of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring those claims. The Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint did not do so and, therefore, affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Shropshire was convicted of of manufacturing concentrated cannabis. Defendant Bryan Roberts was convicted on multiple counts, including two counts of receiving stolen property, unlawful possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of ammunition, two counts of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a deadly weapon, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with Shropshire that he was entitled to additional custody credits: Shropshire was serving a two-year sentence in a separate case from Placer County while he awaited trial in this case, and the sentence in the Placer County case was reduced to a misdemeanor before Shropshire was sentenced here. Because he had accrued more custody credits than was necessary to serve the sentence in the Placer County case, defendant was entitled to apply those excess credits to his sentence to the cannabis conviction. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Roberts’ and Shropshire’s challenges to a search warrant authorizing a search for stolen property. Further, the Court disagreed with Roberts’ remaining contentions except that one of his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and rejected Shropshire’s remaining claims except that a one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) should have been stricken. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgments as to both defendants and affirmed the judgments as modified. View "California v. Shropshire" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Sherwood Jenkins of the second degree murder and kidnapping of Phillip Reeves. In 2019, Jenkins filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, and the trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. Jenkins argued the court erred because it engaged in improper factfinding at the prima facie review stage, and the record of conviction did not refute the allegations of his petition. The State conceded the court erred by failing to issue an order to show cause, and to this, the Court of Appeal agreed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the petition, and the trial court was directed to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95(c). View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In a companion case, where an employee claimed she was forced to sign an arbitration agreement after litigation had commenced and without the benefit of her counsel, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause why relief should not have been granted. Although this case generally did not present the same factual scenario, the Court issued an order to show cause following motions to compel arbitration because this case was ordered related to the other and involves the same defendants. Here, the trial court granted the motions for eight employees, each of whom signed one of two versions of arbitration agreements. Because the first version did not clearly and unmistakably delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the Court granted the writ petition as to the employees who signed that version. As to two of these employees, the trial court had to decide whether this first version was unconscionable, guided by the Court's analysis in this opinion. As to the other two employees who signed this version, the Court of Appeal found that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for the separate reason of fraud in the execution. Furthermore, the Court found that fraud in the execution voided the agreement for two of the employees who signed the other, second version of the arbitration agreement. The petition was denied as to the remaining two employees who signed the second version. View "Najarro v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

In 2013, Crane was studying in a GED class at the High Desert State Prison. Inmate Dolihite approached Crane from behind and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Crane was taken to the prison’s emergency clinic. Crane alleges that after he was released from administrative segregation, he was assaulted by other prisoners and prison guards. He sued the correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Crane contends the assaults were retaliation against him for previously suing the warden and two captains for denying outdoor exercise and staging assaults on inmates.Crane, self-represented, sued Dolihite. The suit was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 583.210(a). Dolihite had been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison; for a time, Crane was unable to identify his location. The superior court advised Crane to use the sheriff’s office to effect service but the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office refused to serve the summons and complaint. The litigation coordinator at Salinas Valley refused to accept service on behalf of Dolihite.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The litigation coordinator’s refusal contradicts Penal Code 4013(a) and Code of Civil Procedure 416.90, which have been interpreted as authorizing state prison litigation coordinators to accept service on behalf of inmates. Crane’s statutory right to initiate and prosecute a civil action was infringed. View "Crane v. Dolihite" on Justia Law

John was a student at the University of California, Davis when fellow student Jane reported that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her in violation of University policy. John agreed they had sex but said Jane consented. Following an investigation, UC Davis found that on the night the two had sex, Jane was incapacitated due to alcohol such that she was unable to consent and that, given her condition, a reasonable person should have known she was unable to consent. John was suspended from all UC campuses for two years.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the suspension. The court rejected John’s claim that he was denied a fair process in UC Davis’s investigation and adjudication because he was denied a live hearing and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses before a fact-finder who was not also the investigator. In university disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct, when the sanction is severe and credibility is central to the adjudication, the university must provide cross-examination at a live hearing before a neutral adjudicator who was not also the investigator. In this case, however, credibility was not central. John’s own account provided substantial evidence of the policy violation. The investigation was thorough, there is no evidence of investigator bias, and John was provided many opportunities to state his version of events and to review and respond to the evidence. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant-appellant Marty Dominguez was convicted by jury of second degree murder, and an allegation was found true he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Dominguez was sentenced to prison for 21 years to life. He appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In January 2019, Dominguez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which permitted a defendant convicted of murder under a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for the conviction to be vacated and resentenced. The superior court found that Dominguez did not make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition. Dominguez appealed, contending the court erred in determining his petition did not establish a prima facie case for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the superior court properly considered the record of conviction to determine as a matter of law that Dominguez was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. View "California v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

During the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Linde Smith guilty of second-degree murder, and found true a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. Smith’s mother, Anne Smith (Anne), was the victim. During the sanity phase of the trial, the jury found that Smith was legally sane at the time she committed the offense. The trial court sentenced Smith to a term of 16 years to life in prison, consisting of a 15 years to life term for the murder and a one-year consecutive term for the deadly weapon enhancement. On appeal, with respect to the guilt phase, Smith claimed the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence pertaining to the severity of her depression at the time of the incident giving rise to the charged offense. In addition, Smith contended the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as an uncharged lesser included offense to murder. With respect to the sanity phase, Smith claimed the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and its progeny by admitting evidence that she claims amounted to a comment on her exercise of her right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She also contended the trial court erred in refusing to preclude an expert retained by the prosecution from testifying due to the State’s alleged failure to timely provide the defense with the expert’s report and related data. Finally, Smith argued cumulative error required reversal of the sanity verdict. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not commit Doyle error. The Court rejected the remainder of Smith’s claims in unpublished portions of its opinion. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Tevita Kaihea was convicted by jury of first degree murder and other offenses involving a crime spree preceding the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregated prison term of 111 years and court months to life. On appeal defendant challenged: (1) the admission of certain gang evidence as cumulative and highly prejudicial; (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact and transferred intent; and (3) the court’s instruction that the jury could consider gang evidence in deciding whether defendant acted in self-defense and heat of passion. Defendant contended those errors were cumulatively prejudicial. He also (4) challenged the imposition of a gang enhancement sentence to his murder conviction; (5) contended the trial court improperly calculated custody credits; and (6) contended the court improperly deducted actual days served credit for his jail behavior. Both defendant and the State separately noted (7) the trial court erroneously awarded conduct credit. In the published portion of its opinion,the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s third contention and concluded the standard instruction, CALCRIM No. 1403, was legally correct as it related to the use of gang evidence for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant actually believed in the need to defend himself or acted in the heat of passion. Furthermore, the Court concluded defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel grounded on the failure to request the modification because the failure did not prejudice defendant. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court conclude d that some of defendant’s other contentions had merit. The Court struck the 10-year gang enhancement, directed the trial court to award an additional 213 days of credit, and struck the award of conduct credits. The Court also directed the trial court to correct several errors in the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Kaihea" on Justia Law