Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Kejhonne Henderson shot and killed J.P. at a house party in the North Highlands neighborhood of Sacramento. Upset that music of a local rapper disparaging his neighborhood’s gang was being played, defendant exchanged heated words with the party’s host. When J.P. intervened, he and defendant agreed to step outside. On their way to the door, defendant pulled a handgun out of his waistband and when they got outside, shot J.P. multiple times in the head and chest. A.J., one of the party goers, tackled defendant and knocked the gun out of his hand. Defendant regained possession and shot A.J. multiple times before fleeing. J.P. died before emergency services arrived at the scene, but A.J. survived. A jury found defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder, and found true enhancement allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death as to each count. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve an aggregate determinate term of seven years plus an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 65 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded a trial court could not excuse for cause African-American prospective jurors solely because of their belief that the criminal justice system treats African-Americans unfairly, but rejected defendant’s assertion that the two African-American prospective jurors here were excused for that reason. "They were excused because the trial court concluded that, based on the voir dire evidence, they could not be impartial because of their bias and sympathy for defendant." On this record, the Court did not find the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion; nor was defendant’s constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community violated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in excusing a seated juror, because the record did not demonstrate the juror could not perform his duties. However, applying the harmless error standard in Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956), the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s other claims of error, and affirmed his convictions and sentence. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Alicia Haro was convicted by jury of multiple drug related offenses after she crossed into the United States from Mexico on three occasions while transporting large amounts of methamphetamine hidden in her vehicle. She was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On appeal, Haro argued the trial court erred: (1) in allowing a drug trafficking expert to testify that he did not believe that a drug organization would entrust large quantities of valuable drugs to an individual who had no knowledge of what they were transporting; (2) when it declined to disclose private juror information after defense counsel asserted that an alternate juror approached her following the reading of the verdict and told her that some of the jurors had discussed the case before deliberations began; and (3) when it aggregated two 10-kilogram enhancements that had been pled and proven with respect to separate charged counts of conspiracy and instead imposed the sentence for a single 20-kilogram weight enhancement, given that the court dismissed one of the conspiracy counts after the jury determined that the two charged conspiracies were in fact part of a single conspiracy. Finally, Haro contended the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that she was ineligible for a split sentence because of her immigration status. The Court of Appeal concluded Haro’s first two contentions were without merit. However, the Court agreed with Haro that the trial court erred in imposing a 20-kilogram weight enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 (a)(4), because the accusatory pleading failed to provide Haro with notice that she could be subject to such an enhancement with respect to any charged count. The Court ruled this enhancement had to be stricken, the sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing. Given the Court's vacatur of Haro’s sentence and limited remand for resentencing, the Court did not consider Haro’s final argument. View "California v. Haro" on Justia Law

Big Sugar filed suit alleging libel, slander, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law after defendant aired his dissatisfaction with the bakery to his 1.5 million social media followers and later discussed the experience on his podcast. Defendant responded with a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP), which the trial court denied.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that defendant's statements at issue did not involve the public interest. The court applied the Rand test and concluded that defendant's statements were not about a topic of public interest; defendant and Big Sugar's supposed proximities to fame do not turn this into a case of public interest; and the court rejected defendant's contention that his statements provide consumer protection information. In this case, the consumer protection cases defendant cites do not support his case. Furthermore, defendant's statements relate only to one transaction with Big Sugar; he published them on his social media accounts to air his dissatisfaction with a particular cake; and his statements were not part of a larger discussion. View "Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants for wrongful arrest after plaintiffs were arrested for public intoxication under Carson Municipal Code section 4201. Plaintiffs spent a night and the better part of the next day in jail, but they were never charged.Because Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f) has preempted section 4201, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a violation of the Carson ordinance, if proved, would establish reasonable cause to arrest. The court also concluded that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial where the instruction and special verdict form afforded no other basis to find the deputy had reasonable cause to arrest plaintiffs without a warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment rendered on the jury's special verdict findings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carcamo v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Two years after she pled guilty to felony animal cruelty Danae Rodriguez requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court denied her request as untimely because it was not presented until after her conviction by guilty plea. Section 1001.36(c), defined pretrial diversion as postponement of prosecution “at any point in the judicial process . . . until adjudication” and the trial court interpreted the term “adjudication” to mean an adjudication of guilt, whether by jury conviction or a plea of guilty. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s interpretation and affirmed its judgment. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. His conviction was affirmed In 2010, In 2020, Murray sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.3 The trial court denied his motion because under the terms of section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.The court of appeal then rejected Murray’s argument that section 3051 violates his constitutional right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders a youth offender parole hearing but denying such a hearing to youthful LWOP offenders. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context. View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended the mens rea requirements for the crime of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Senate Bill No. 1437 eradicated the narrowing function traditionally performed by the felony-murder special circumstance statute, Penal Code section 190.2. The trial court found it did, thus rendering the felony-murder special circumstance statute inoperable in practice. Based on this finding, the court found Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended a voter-approved initiative pertaining to special circumstances. After this ruling, the court struck a petition filed by defendant Virgil Wilkins to have his first degree murder conviction vacated under section 1170.95 (the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437). The Court of Appeal concluded Senate Bill No. 1437 neither repealed the felony-murder special circumstance statute in practice nor amended any voter-approved initiative. Given this conclusion, the Court reversed the trial court order striking the defendant’s resentencing petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings pursuant to section 1170.95 (c). View "California v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old Jessica F.-H. was brutally murdered in a Sacramento County park. Her murder went unsolved until defendant Ryan Roberts' DNA was linked to her belt buckle and cigarette butts found at the scene. Defendant’s DNA had been collected after an unrelated felony arrest more than a year after Jessica’s murder. Although that arrest was supported by probable cause, he was not formally charged in that matter. Based primarily on the DNA evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury also found true an enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 26 years to life. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether using a DNA sample taken from a defendant who was validly arrested for a felony on probable cause but never formally charged, violated the defendant’s federal or state constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure or his state constitutional right to privacy. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant’s federal right protecting him against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated. Further, the Court held defendant’s state constitutional rights were not violated, but even if they were, the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 prohibited suppression of the DNA evidence in a criminal trial. In addition to defendant’s search and seizure and privacy claims concerning the DNA evidence, defendant also asserted: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in restricting the scope of his gang expert’s testimony; (2 the trial court prejudicially erred in precluding the defense from presenting certain demonstrative evidence; (3 the trial court denied defendant due process by refusing to give his proposed pinpoint jury instruction on third party culpability; (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors warrants reversal; (5) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial premised on newly discovered evidence; and (6) the trial court erred in concluding a juror did not commit prejudicial misconduct related to statements made on Twitter during the trial. As to the last claim, defendant requested that the Court perform an independent in camera review of the juror’s Twitter account records. After review, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed judgment. View "California v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Ahmed Mumin was convicted by jury of first degree murder, burglary, and robbery. The jury also convicted Mumin on two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer, two counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. The jury found true various firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Mumin to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive indeterminate term of 55 years to life imprisonment and a consecutive determinate term of 41 years four months. Mumin appealed, contending: (1) the evidence did not support a jury instruction on the kill zone theory of attempted murder liability; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial misconduct by questioning Mumin’s counsel about her closing argument in the presence of the jury; and (3) his convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm should be vacated because they were lesser included offenses of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm. The Attorney General conceded the two assault convictions should have been vacated or reversed, and the Court of Appeal accepted this concession. The Court held Mumin’s two remaining contentions were without merit. Therefore, judgment was modified to vacate the two assault convictions (and the stayed sentences thereon) and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Mumin" on Justia Law

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (MCWE) appealed an order denying its special motion to strike, made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), which was directed to three affirmative defenses for setoff pleaded by Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (NHOM) in its answer to MCWE’s cross-complaint. The appeal presented two issues: (1) could a special motion to strike under section 425.16 (b) be directed to an affirmative defense pleaded in an answer; and (2) did an affirmative defense for setoff constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.The Court of Appeal answered the questions presented: (1) no - an anti-SLAPP motion could not be directed to an affirmative defense; and (2) also no - an affirmative defense for setoff cannot constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Only a “cause of action” asserted by a plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner could be the subject of an anti-SLAPP motion. "A cause of action seeks relief. An affirmative defense cannot seek relief and is not asserted by a plaintiff, a cross-complainant, or a petitioner." Further, the Court held setoff, as an affirmative defense, could not give rise to affirmative relief. "California Supreme Court authority holds that the affirmative defense of setoff may only be used defensively and does not permit recovery of the damages sought to be set off against the opposing party’s recovery." View "Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices etc." on Justia Law