Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Gregory Wilson guilty of second degree murder. He was sentenced to 17 years to life. On appeal he contended the trial court erred in failing to: (1) instruct the jury sua sponte on defenses arising from the use of deadly force to protect against common law felonies; (2) instruct sua sponte on the Home Protection Bill of Rights presumption; and (3) provide the jury with verdict forms for voluntary manslaughter. He also contended: (4) the errors cumulatively required reversal; (5) his prior prison term enhancement should have been struck in light of Senate Bill No. 136; and (6) the imposition of certain fines and fees were unlawful in light of California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court of Appeal concurred defendant was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill 136 and struck the one-year prior prison term; the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karen Sims, a former attorney with long standing history of mental illness, was convicted of murdering her husband Henry Sims in 2006 and was sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life. After her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court in 2011, on the ground her conviction was invalid because she was incompetent to stand trial. An order to show cause (OSC) was issued by the Supreme Court, returnable to the Riverside County Superior Court, but was denied. In 2016, petitioner again sought habeas relief, petitioning the Supreme Court, but with additional information about her postconviction mental health problems as they related to timeliness. The California Supreme Court again issued an OSC, this time returnable to the Court of Appeal. The appellate granted the petition and remanded the matter again to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing, where it specified that counsel should present the testimony of Michael DeFrank, as well as any expert witnesses or mental health professionals who were aware of defendant’s mental health condition during the period between August and December 2006, or such other evidence as may constitute substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence to stand trial. On remand, the court heard the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel, which it found lacking in credibility, and that of petitioner, and denied the petition once again. This petition followed. The State argued that the court properly found the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel lacked credibility and argued the Court of Appeal's previous remand order did not require the superior court to readdress petitioner’s claim that she was incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and reversed the judgment of conviction. Defendant could be retried on the charges for which she was convicted if she was competent to stand trial. View "In re Sims" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathan Henderson pleaded no contest to possession of a nunchaku, and admitted a prior prison term. In August 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four years, consisting of: three years for the nunchaku possession plus a consecutive year for the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5 (b). The trial court suspended execution of the final 1,096 days of the sentence and ordered them to be served as a period of mandatory supervision with various terms and conditions. Defendant subsequently admitted violating his mandatory supervision on four occasions. In May 2020, the trial court terminated defendant’s mandatory supervision, reaffirmed his sentence, but declined to strike the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), effective January 1, 2020, concluding that defendant’s sentence had become a final judgment 60 days after his sentence was pronounced on August 8, 2018, and thus defendant was not entitled to retroactive relief. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in declining to strike the prior prison term enhancement. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed. However, in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Stamps, 9 Cal.5th 685 (2020), the Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether striking the prior prison term enhancement while maintaining the remainder of the plea agreement would deprive the State of the benefit of their bargain, such that the State should be afforded an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. Defendant argued the Court could strike the enhancement and keep the plea deal intact, whereas the State argued the Court had to must remand to permit it to withdraw from the plea agreement. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded Stamps was not on point because in this case the parties entered into an open plea agreement rather than agreeing to a stipulated sentence. The Court thus modified the judgment to strike defendant’s prior prison term enhancement and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of Labor Code claims pursued by former employees, who contend that their lawsuit is limited to recovering civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).The Court of Appeal again interpreted the California Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, to mean "that PAGA representative claims for civil penalties are not subject to arbitration" under a predispute arbitration agreement. In this case, the PAGA claims alleged in the former employees' complaint are owned by the state and are being pursued by the former employees as the state's agent or proxy. The court explained that the arbitration agreements at issue are not enforceable as to the PAGA claims because the state was not a party to, and did not ratify, any of those agreements. Furthermore, after the former employees became representatives of the state, they did not agree to arbitrate the PAGA claims. Consequently, under the rule of California law recognized in Esparza v KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1234, and many other decisions of the Court of Appeal, the court concluded that the PAGA claims cannot be forced into arbitration based on agreements made by the former employees before they became authorized representatives of the state. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied this rule of law.The court also concluded that defendant's argument that arbitration is compelled by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal preemption fails for similar reasons. The court concluded that the FAA does not reach the PAGA claims alleged in this case and, therefore, federal law does not preempt the rule of California law stating PAGA claims are subject to arbitration only if the state, or the state’s authorized representative, consents to arbitration. View "Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, David Shawver, Brooke Paz, Ryan Hoskins, and Amanda McGuire brought two petitions for writ of mandate challenging the constitutionality of legislative amendments made to the procedures governing the recall of state officers. Petitioners began a recall proceeding in April 2017 with the aim of obtaining certification in August 2017 for the November 2017 election. The Legislature changed the law in June 2017 by passing Senate Bill No. 96 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085176, challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 96 on single-subject grounds. The Court of Appeal issued an order temporarily staying the enforcement of the amendments to the Elections Code effected by Senate Bill No. 96. On August 24, 2017, the Legislature enacted similar revisions to the recall procedures by adopting Senate Bill No. 117 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), a bill providing for appropriations related to the budget bill. Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085381, challenging the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 117’s Elections Code amendments, arguing the amendments impaired their right to a speedy recall, denied them due process, and were not a valid budget-related bill that could be passed by a majority vote and take effect immediately. The Court of Appeal consolidated both cases and issued an order directing the parties to address the following question: “Does the Legislature of the State of California have the authority to (1) amend the budget bill by a majority vote, and (2) adopt ‘other bills providing for appropriations related to the budget bill’ to become effective immediately by a majority vote.” The parties complied. After review, the Court of Appeal found no grounds upon which it could grant relief, and denied both petitions. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus to petitioner who was convicted of murdering her three young children by setting a house fire that killed them. Petitioner argues that the current scientific understanding of burn patterns and how fire behaves under certain conditions fatally undermines expert testimony offered by the prosecution at trial regarding the cause and origin of the fire at petitioner's home, as well as the fire scene investigation on which the experts based those opinions.The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b). Although petitioner has identified real advances in fire investigation science, the court explained that section 1473, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) condition the availability of habeas relief on the effect such advancements likely would have had on the particular expert testimony at issue in the particular proceedings at issue. In this case, given the extent to which the same criticisms of the prosecution's expert testimony were litigated at the original trial, the continuing expert debate on these topics reflected at the evidentiary hearing, the lack of any authority rejecting some aspect of the original investigation as improper or incorrect by current standards, and the other evidence of guilt offered against petitioner at trial, petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief.The court also concluded, for largely the same reasons, that petitioner failed to establish that the state of fire investigation science at the time of trial rendered her trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process. The court stated that, although additional scientific support for the defense's expert testimony at trial would have been helpful to the defense in rebutting the prosecution expert's opinions, the absence of such additional support did not necessarily prevent a fair trial. View "In re Parks" on Justia Law

California has two statutory mechanisms for detaining, evaluating, and treating persons who have been declared incompetent to stand trial for a felony that entailed a threat of bodily harm, and who continue to pose a danger to others. When the reason is a "developmental disability," the applicable mechanism is civil commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500; when the reason is a "mental disease, defect, or disorder," the applicable mechanism is a so-called Murphy conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (section 5000 et seq.), section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B). Under section 6500, the one-year recommitment period ends on the anniversary of the date of the recommitment order; for a Murphy conservatorship, the one-year period ends on the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order. Because, as is common, recommitment orders under section 6500 are not fully litigated (and hence not issued) until after the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order, the end dates for section 6500 recommitments typically get pushed out further and further with each recommitment.The Court of Appeal held that this "creep" of the end date under section 6500 does not violate equal protection in regard to Murphy conservatorships. The court explained that individuals civilly committed under section 6500 and Murphy conservatorships are not similarly situated for purposes of fixing the end date for a recommitment. Even assuming that persons civilly committed under section 6500 and in a Murphy conservatorship are similarly situated for purposes of the timetable for terminating a one-year period for a recommitment, the court concluded that there is a sufficient justification for that differential treatment that withstands rational basis scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed the end date for the section 6500 recommitment in this case. View "People v. Nolasco" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnny Lapenias committed multiple sex offenses against his stepdaughter. However, the stepdaughter did not disclose Lapenias’ sexual abuse to the police until years later, when she was 14 years old. At a jury trial, the trial court admitted expert testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), a theory that identified typical behaviors of sexually abused children, including delayed disclosures. During the CSAAS expert’s testimony, a juror asked: “Is it common for children to make up a story that abuse occurred, when, in fact it did not?” Over Lapenias’ objection, the CSAAS expert testified: “No, that’s rare.” The jury later found Lapenias guilty of the charged sex offenses and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, Lapenias challenged the admission of the CSAAS evidence, the related jury instruction, the CSAAS expert’s testimony, and statutory fines and fees. The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by allowing the CSAAS expert to testify that it is “rare” for children to make up stories about sexual abuse, but the Court did not find the error to be prejudicial. Finding no other errors, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Lapenias" on Justia Law

A mother of four young children was found guilty by jury of first degree murder and assault on a child resulting in death, after she killed her youngest child and only daughter. There was no dispute defendant Ka Yang, while alone with her baby Mirabelle, placed the baby in a microwave oven and turned it on. These actions killed the baby. Defendant told her family and first responders that she did not know how the baby was injured, but she consistently spoke of having suffered a seizure, and guessed that the baby had been injured when dropped on a nearby heater while defendant was incapacitated. Defendant's defense at trial, supported in part by expert testimony, was that she killed her daughter while unconscious due to an epileptic seizure. The prosecution countered defendant’s claim of unconsciousness with expert testimony of its own (and medical records), after an inadvertent disclosure by the trial court allowed the prosecutor to discern these records’ contents midtrial and secure their admission on that basis. Although defendant had not been diagnosed with any postpartum mental disorder, and Mirabelle’s pediatrician testified defendant had screened negative for any such disorder, the prosecution relied on this evidence to theorize that defendant was motivated to kill her daughter by hallucinations related to undiagnosed postpartum psychosis. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony regarding postpartum mental disorders without sufficient factual basis and by subsequently admitting into evidence defendant’s psychological records not directly related to any mental condition she had put at issue. The Court could not conclude these errors were harmless when considered together, thus it reversed the judgment in its entirety. View "California v. Yang" on Justia Law

Sergio Rojas Arias appealed the summary denial of his petition to vacate his first degree murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court found Arias was not entitled to relief, as a matter of law, because the jury that found him guilty of murder returned a true finding on a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation associated with the conviction. Because Arias was not the actual killer, the special-circumstance finding meant the jury necessarily found Arias aided and abetted in the commission of the murder with an intent to kill, or aided and abetted in the commission of the robbery while acting as a major participant and with reckless indifference to human life. The California Courts of Appeal were divided on the question of whether a jury’s true finding on a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation categorically precludes resentencing under section 1170.95 where, as here, the true finding was made prior to California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016). The Court here found persuasive the logic of those courts that determined a pre- Banks and Clark felony-murder special-circumstance finding did not necessarily preclude resentencing under section 1170.95. Thus, the Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Arias’s petition based solely on the existence of the true robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. "Further, given the limited record of conviction before us, we are unable to conclude the special- circumstance finding satisfied the standards set forth in Banks and Clark." The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings on whether Arias made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. View "California v. Arias" on Justia Law