Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. The City asked the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, but the trial court concluded that an appeal to the HR Commission was unnecessary. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found for plaintiff and awarded him about $4 million, including $2 million in past noneconomic damages and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages. The trial court subsequently denied the City's motion for a new trial.The Court of Appeal concluded that the involvement of plaintiff's direct superior in the underlying dispute, on one hand, and his expected role in deciding plaintiff's appeal, on the other, violated the requirements of due process and therefore excused plaintiff from proceeding with his administrative appeal. The court also found no reversible evidentiary error by the trial court. However, the court agreed with the City that the $3.5 million noneconomic damages award -- comprising $2 million in past and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages -- was so excessive as to suggest it resulted from passion or prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the awards for past and future noneconomic damages and remanded for a new trial on these issues, unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the awards to $1 million and $100,000, respectively. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Briley v. City of West Covina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Medina was placed in custody in November 2016 on charges of second degree robbery and misdemeanor sexual battery. In June 2017, the respondent court found that Medina was mentally incompetent to stand trial and had a developmental disability under Penal Code section 1370.1. Since the time Medina was adjudicated to be mentally incompetent, he has received neither treatment nor a trial. The regional center and the California Department of Developmental Services (DDS), which have the responsibility for providing services for people with developmental disabilities, disagreed with the court’s adjudication and concluded that Medina did not have a developmental disability. Although the incompetency order was legal and binding on the regional center and the DDS, they declined to offer Medina services or recommend placement. At issue was that the version of Penal Code 1369 and 1370.1 in effect in 2017 did not require the regional center’s determination that a defendant have a developmental disability. In 2017, a trial court’s findings of mental incompetence and developmental disability were sufficient, without concurrence by the regional center, to cause the suspension of criminal proceedings. In July 2020, the respondent court attempted to end the standoff by vacating the 2017 order adjudicating Medina to be incompetent. The court ordered new examinations and another competency hearing to be held. Medina challenged the respondent court’s actions by this petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. The Court of Appeal granted the petition in part and ordered the issuance of a writ directing the respondent court to vacate its order, reinstate the orders adjudicating Medina to be incompetent to stand trial and to have a developmental disability, and determine whether the maximum period of confinement has elapsed. View "Medina v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a reality show's production and media companies for various causes of action after discovering she was filmed while changing clothes in a dressing area designated for models, and that her "nearly fully nude body had been exposed on national television" during the airing of the show. Defendant production and media companies filed a special motion to strike the model's complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff's claims arise from the production and broadcast of an episode of "Shahs of Sunset," which is protected activity. In this case, the court agreed with defendants' assertion that the footage at issue is relevant to the storyline of the episode and that the experience of being a model is an issue of public interest. However, the court concluded that plaintiff has shown a probability of success on her causes of action for invasion of privacy; tortious misappropriation of name or likeness; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying defendants' special motion to strike the complaint, as modified: the separate cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is stricken from the complaint, as it is part and parcel of the negligence cause of action. View "Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Gabriel Presley challenged his commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), arguing his commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) was erroneous because expert testimony at trial was based on case-specific inadmissible hearsay, in violation of California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016). The trial court heard from four experts, all substantially agreeing defendant had a diagnosed mental disorder. The trial court observed that, though it was “required to consider the opinions of experts,” “as the trier of fact, [it] [didn’t] have to . . . agree with them.” The Court found the conclusion of one of the experts "to be a bit of an outlier," compelling the court to conclude ". . . that not only does [defendant] have a diagnosed mental disorder, . . . he is a danger to the health and safety of others, because I find that it is likely that he will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.” The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as nothing in the record "dispels the presumption the trial court ignored material it knew was inadmissible under Sanchez." View "California v. Presley" on Justia Law

A superior court judge summarily denied petitioner Nancy Michelle Mendoza's petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein she claimed she received ineffective assistance of counsel at her sentencing hearing. The California Supreme Court later issued an order to show cause (OSC) returnable to the superior court on the same claim. The case was then assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Mendoza’s petition. More than 40 days later, Mendoza filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. A different judge denied the challenge as untimely. Mendoza sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to direct the superior court to vacate its order denying her peremptory challenge, and to disqualify the original judge. The Court found her petition presented an issue of first impression as to whether her peremptory challenge was subject to section 170.6(a)(2)’s 60-day deadline following a “reversal on appeal” and assignment to the original judge for “a new trial” (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was timely); or section 170.6(a)(2)’s 10-day deadline for criminal cases assigned to a judge for all purposes (in which case Mendoza’s challenge was untimely). The Court determined the 60-day deadline did not apply. The Court found the proceedings on Mendoza's petition would not constitute a new trial; thus the 10-day all purpose assignment deadline applied. Applying this deadline, the superior court properly denied Mendoza’s challenge as untimely. View "Mendoza v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In prior proceedings, defendant Phong Thanh Huynh's conviction on murder and firearms charges was reversed. Defendant was retried on the same charges in 2019. The jury found him guilty of the same charges, and he was sentenced to a term of 25-years-to life in prison for the murder, and a consecutive term of 25-years-to-life for the enhancement of discharging a firearm. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that he was a member and the leader of, or had authority in, a gang called Thien Dang. He claimed the gang evidence was not relevant because Thien Dang was not a criminal street gang. Further, he contended there was no evidence that criminal activity was a primary activity of Thien Dang or any member of Thien Dang had ever committed any crime; and that Thien Dang was merely a group of Vietnamese men who gathered to drink, eat, and socialize. Defendant’s principal position was that identifying Thien Dang as a street gang was highly inflammatory and the error was compounded by a hypothetical question posed to the State's gang expert. To this latter point, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant. Judgment was reversed: "On remand, instead of an 'all' (i.e., the instant case) or 'nothing' (i.e., Huynh I) approach to the admission of such evidence, the trial court as the gatekeeper of the evidence may appropriately limit the admission of gang evidence as relevant to the issues raised by the parties and in accordance with the dictates of this decision." View "California v. Huynh" on Justia Law

Defendant Yamin Amahli Bongani El was convicted by jury of misdemeanor driving on a suspended license. On appeal, he argued the trial court: (1) failed to exercise its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term in jail, as it believed such a term was mandatory when he declined probation; and (2) failed to articulate the fines and fees imposed. The State conceded these points. The Court thus vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "California v. El" on Justia Law

In 2017, Israel Ontiveros was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to state prison in two criminal cases. In the first case, a jury convicted Ontiveros on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with gang enhancements. Ontiveros admitted suffering a prior serious felony conviction, a “strike” prior, and a prison prior. The trial court sentenced Ontiveros to an effective prison term of 19 years 8 months. In the second case, Ontiveros pleaded guilty to one count of robbery, and again he admitted a prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced Ontiveros to a term of seven years in prison, to run consecutively with Ontiveros’s sentence in the first case. Two years later, Ontiveros requested early parole consideration under Proposition 57, the California Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) denied his request. The trial court likewise denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court reasoned that, because one of Ontiveros’s convictions was for a violent felony (robbery), he was ineligible for early parole consideration under Proposition 57. Ontiveros petitioned the Court of Appeal for habeas relief, relying primarily on In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (2019). In response, the Attorney General argued that Mohammad’s interpretation of Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the intent of the voters and lead to an absurd result. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General: "A policy that rewards inmates for additional convictions is plainly unreasonable. Under established principles of statutory construction, we are not bound to follow the literal interpretation of the text if it would lead to such an absurd and unreasonable result that could not have been intended. We therefore conclude Ontiveros is not entitled to early parole consideration under Proposition 57 and deny his petition." View "In re Ontiveros" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Coleman appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91. That section allowed a current or former servicemember who might be suffering from sexual trauma or substance abuse (among other conditions) as a result of his or her military service to obtain a new sentencing hearing. Defendant contended he pleaded and proved a qualifying condition, and that the trial court erred by ruling otherwise. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court. View "California v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2013, a jury found defendant-respondent James Ambrosia Williams guilty of child abuse and that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the child, who was under the age of five. The trial court found defendant had a prior strike conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, and two prior prison terms. It imposed an aggregate term of 22 years in state prison, including a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, and judgment was affirmed. At the time defendant was sentenced, Penal Code section 1385 generally authorized judges and magistrates to order an action dismissed in the interests of justice on their own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney but specifically barred them from striking any prior serious felony conviction in connection with imposition of a five- year enhancement. Four years after defendant was sentenced, Senate Bill No. 1393 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018) amended the statute to delete the prohibition. In an unreported minute order dated September 30, 2019, and without the parties present, the sentencing judge recalled defendant’s sentence and struck the five-year punishment for the section 667 serious felony enhancement. The rest of defendant’s sentence remained unchanged. The State appealed. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence: the trial court set forth the authority it relied upon for its decision but did not articulate a factual basis for exercising its discretion to strike the punishment for the prior serious felony enhancement. The matter was remanded for the sentencing court to articulate its basis for exercising discretion to strike the punishment. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law