Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In May 2020, the chairs of the California Assembly and Senate committees that consider election-related matters, prepared a formal letter to the Governor indicating they were working on legislation to ensure Californians could vote by mail in light of the emergency occasioned by COVID-19. The committee chairs encouraged the Governor to issue an executive order allowing all Californians to vote by mail. On June 3, 2020, the Governor signed the order at issue here, Executive Order No. N-67-20. The Executive Order identified statutory provisions that were displaced pursuant to its provisions. At the time the Governor issued the Executive Order, two bills pending in the Legislature addressed the substance of the Governor’s Executive Order: Assembly Bill No. 860 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which would ensure all California voters were provided ballots in advance of the election to vote by mail, and Senate Bill No. 423 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which would govern those remaining aspects of the election that were yet to occur. In June, real parties filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that the Executive Order “is null and void as it is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative powers reserved only to the Legislature, nor is it a permitted action” under the Emergency Services Act and an injunction against the Governor implementing the Executive Order. The complaint also sought an injunction. In Newsom v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.5th 1093 (2020), the Court of Appeal granted the Governor’s petition challenging a temporary restraining order suspending the Executive Order that the superior court issued in an expedited, “ex parte” proceeding. The Court held that there was no basis for the superior court to grant real parties’ ex parte application at a hearing conducted one day after the action was filed, without proper notice to the Governor or his appearance, and without the substantive showing required for an ex parte proceeding. Following the earlier Newsom decision, the case was reassigned to a different judge who conducted a trial and entered a judgment granting declaratory relief that the Executive Order was void as unconstitutional, and that the California Emergency Services Act did not authorize the Governor to issue the Executive Order. In this case, the Court of Appeal granted the Governor’s petition and directed the superior court to dismiss as moot real parties’ claim for declaratory relief: the Executive Order was superseded by legislation and was directed only at the November 3, 2020 general election, which had occurred before the judgment was entered. However, the Court found the declaratory relief and accompanying permanent injunction regarding executive orders issued under the Emergency Services Act raised matters of great public concern regarding the Governor’s orders in the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic emergency. The Court ruled the superior court erred in interpreting the Emergency Services Act to prohibit the Governor from issuing quasi-legislative orders in an emergency. The Court concluded the issuance of such orders did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. View "Newsom v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Troy Steward was charged with battery on a correctional officer, and he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. Following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 103 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 103), defendant filed a petition for a reduction of his commitment under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.127, a statute which paralleled Three Strikes relief for those found guilty of a crime. The superior court denied defendant’s petition, concluding that Assembly Bill 103 was an unconstitutional amendment of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The Court of Appeal found Assembly Bill 103 did "not amend Proposition 36 to prohibit what Proposition 36 authorized or authorize what it prohibited: [w]hile Proposition 36 addresses the length of prison sentences for criminal defendants, Assembly Bill 103 addresses the length of commitment terms for NGI committees." The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Steward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults claiming that they were molested by a priest when they were children, filed suit against the Archdiocese, alleging that it was vicariously liable for ratifying the molestation and directly liable for its own negligence in failing to supervise the priest. The Archdiocese moved to strike the operative complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the Archdiocese's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the gravamen of the suit against the Archdiocese is not speech – it is the molestation and failure to supervise. The court concluded that the Archdiocese mischaracterizes the complaint by arguing that it has established that the child sexual abuse cause of action arises from protected activity because it is based on the Archdiocese's conduct in the Roe litigation and sheriff’s investigation. The court explained that, because the Archdiocese chooses to ignore the bulk of the allegations of the complaint against it, it makes no attempt to argue that these actual allegations are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law. The court further explained that the focus must be on the alleged acts of sexual abuse and battery that form the basis of the tort cause of action, not the acts of the Archdiocese by which it is alleged to be vicariously liable for those acts. The court concluded that those underlying tortious acts are not protected activity. The court also concluded that a similar analysis defeats the Archdiocese's argument that the negligence cause of action is based on protected speech. Finally, the court concluded that the ruling on demurrer is not before it, and the ruling on the demurrer did not affect, and could not have affected, the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the school district's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint for discrimination and retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from his removal from his school and placement on reassignment due to an unspecified allegation of misconduct. Plaintiff remained on paid suspension for more than three years, during which time he was told to stay home and not allowed to teach or pursue continuing education or professional development.As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff's appeal of the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) order is properly before the court. On the merits, the trial court erred by granting the school district's special motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint does not arise from the school district's protected activity. The court explained that the school district's decisions to place plaintiff on leave and terminate his employment are not protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), even if those decisions were made in conjunction with an official investigation. Furthermore, the school district's participation in, or preparation for, the statutorily defined procedures for dismissal or suspension, without more, does not constitute conduct in furtherance of the school district's own right to petition. View "Verceles v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review in this case was whether the jury should have been allowed to consider defendant’s physical limitations in determining whether his belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable. The case arose when defendant Jack Junior Horn shot Eugene Di Luigi following a dispute over Di Luigi’s dogs. Although defendant was charged with attempted murder, the jury acquitted him of that offense and found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal was that the prosecutor misstated the law in closing argument by telling the jury his physical infirmities were immaterial to whether his belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeal agreed and published its opinion to address the case law relied upon by the Attorney General, and also to illustrate how the mistake made by the prosecution here could be remedied. The Court concluded the trial court rectified the prosecutor’s misstatement by subsequently instructing the jury about the relevance of defendant’s physical infirmities on his claim of self-defense. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Horn" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of January 5, 2013, J.D., defendants Jeffery Powell and Christopher Langlois, and a fourth person, J.P., forcibly entered the victim’s home and found him sleeping on a couch. Powell and Langlois and possibly J.D. beat the victim and the group then fled within 15 to 90 seconds after their entry. The victim died soon after the attack from a stab wound to the heart. The prosecution contended that Powell inflicted that wound. A jury found Powell and Langlois guilty of second degree murder, and first degree residential burglary. The jury found true the allegation that, during the commission of the crimes, Powell personally used a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Powell to 16 years to life and Langlois to 15 years to life. Defendants raised a number of contentions alleging instructional and evidentiary error, and also asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a request to discharge a juror. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment. View "California v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angela Latten and two co-defendants drove to the California Department of Fish and Wildlife compound in Lewiston, California. They used a grinder to break the lock to the chain blocking the driveway, drove into the property, and entered five structures on the property: two evidence trailers, one housing marijuana and the other, oil-extraction tools; the warden’s garage housing an all-terrain vehicle and other tools; the fisheries shop housing metalworking tools and wading gear; and the fisheries mobile home housing offices. Defendant and one of her codefendants left shoe prints on top of a trailer, which they used to climb through a window to enter the fisheries mobile home. Defendant also left shoe prints in the warden’s garage. A witness, who lived on a property overlooking the compound, heard the grinder and saw a car with the silhouettes of three individuals inside drive into the compound. The witness later saw the car leave the compound and communicated that information to a 911 dispatcher when reporting the burglary. Around 30 minutes after the witness first reported the burglary, a Trinity County Sheriff’s deputy stopped a car matching the description provided by the witness which was several hundred yards from the compound with defendant and her codefendants inside. Defendant was ultimately convicted of five counts of burglary, one count for each of the five buildings. She appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her at trial and her resulting sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions. View "California v. Latten" on Justia Law

Defendant Rebecca Thomas lived with her boyfriend codefendant Taylor Montgomery-Gutzman and her 22-month-old twins K. and B. In 2016, while defendant was out trying to buy heroin, K. stopped breathing and ultimately died. An autopsy of K. revealed he was strangled to death. B. also exhibited signs of distress and, upon a physical examination, it was revealed B. suffered from extensive internal injuries. Most of B.’s injuries were recently inflicted but some were several weeks old. Defendant and Montgomery-Gutzman were tried together for the murder of K. and abuse of B. Defendant claimed Montgomery-Gutzman inflicted all the injuries and she was unaware of his treatment of the twins. Montgomery-Gutzman claimed defendant was responsible. In his effort to show defendant was responsible, Montgomery-Gutzman introduced evidence defendant had a propensity to commit child abuse. Over defendant’s objection, the court admitted propensity evidence and instructed the jury it could use the propensity evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to Montgomery-Gutzman’s guilt. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by admitting propensity evidence nor did it confusingly instruct the jury on how it could consider the evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected defendant’s remaining instructional error claims and her ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding her attorney’s performance at sentencing. View "California v. Thomas" on Justia Law

A jury found Trampas Orey to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Orey appealed the order of commitment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding: (1) any error in admitting into evidence two photographs of victims was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence prison records and Coalinga State Hospital records reflecting statements concerning or attributed to Orey; (3) substantial evidence supported the order of commitment; (4) the trial court did not err by denying Orey’s motions, made pursuant to California v. Marsden 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (5) the trial court did not err by denying Orey’s request to give a special instruction on the issues of “volitional impairment” and “serious difficulty controlling sexually violent behavior”; (6) the SVPA did not violate equal protection, due process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and double jeopardy under either the federal or state constitution; and (7) there was no cumulative error. View "California v. Orey" on Justia Law

Carl Flores was convicted by jury of attempted premeditated murder with a 25-year-to-life gun enhancement. After trial, Flores admitted a prior serious felony, a prior prison term, and two prior strike offenses, which made him a third strike offender and exposed him to a life sentence under the “Three Strikes” law. At sentencing, the judge struck the prison prior and prior serious felony enhancements but nevertheless added them to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence, to reach a total indeterminate term of 69 years. On appeal, Flores challenged the sentence, and raised a new question about the role of enhancements in third strike sentencing. If a trial court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under Penal Code section 1385 “in furtherance of justice,” may the enhancement still be used to increase the minimum term of the defendant’s life sentence under what is commonly called “Option 3” of third strike sentencing? To this the Court of Appeal concluded no: once a court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under section 1385 for sentencing purposes, the enhancement may no longer be used to increase punishment, whether as a separate determinate term to be served before the life sentence or as a means of lengthening the minimum term of the life sentence. The Court also found the trial judge in this case made the additional error of adding the enhancements twice to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence. The other arguments Flores raised on appeal lacked merit. Judgment was affirmed but the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law