Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Carl Flores was convicted by jury of attempted premeditated murder with a 25-year-to-life gun enhancement. After trial, Flores admitted a prior serious felony, a prior prison term, and two prior strike offenses, which made him a third strike offender and exposed him to a life sentence under the “Three Strikes” law. At sentencing, the judge struck the prison prior and prior serious felony enhancements but nevertheless added them to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence, to reach a total indeterminate term of 69 years. On appeal, Flores challenged the sentence, and raised a new question about the role of enhancements in third strike sentencing. If a trial court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under Penal Code section 1385 “in furtherance of justice,” may the enhancement still be used to increase the minimum term of the defendant’s life sentence under what is commonly called “Option 3” of third strike sentencing? To this the Court of Appeal concluded no: once a court exercises its discretion to strike an enhancement under section 1385 for sentencing purposes, the enhancement may no longer be used to increase punishment, whether as a separate determinate term to be served before the life sentence or as a means of lengthening the minimum term of the life sentence. The Court also found the trial judge in this case made the additional error of adding the enhancements twice to the minimum term of Flores’s life sentence. The other arguments Flores raised on appeal lacked merit. Judgment was affirmed but the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted him on a charge of resisting an executive officer with force or violence, defendant-appellant Cory Braden, Jr. requested mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held he was ineligible for that section’s “pretrial diversion” because he did not request diversion before trial began. The Court disagreed with California v. Curry, 62 Cal.App.5th 314 (2021), which held that such a request could be made until entry of judgment. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court properly denied his request to be considered for diversion, and affirmed. View "California v. Braden" on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. In 2020, Murray unsuccessfully sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. The court cited section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.Meanwhile, Murray sought habeas corpus relief, asserting an equal protection violation, arguing that section 3051(h) violates his right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders (those under 18 at the time of their offense) a youth offender parole hearing while denying youthful LWOP offenders (those 18-25 years old at the time of their offense) a hearing. The court of appeal denied relief. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders; children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. The court joined “others in encouraging the Legislature to revisit where it has drawn the line.” View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

The California State Air Resources Board, pursuant to Health and Safety Code 39613, imposed fees on manufacturers who sold consumer products and architectural coatings that emitted volatile organic compounds (VOCs) of 250 tons or more per year. The Board implemented the statute by adopting regulations that impose a uniform fee per ton on all affected manufacturers. Appellant American Coatings Association, Inc. (the Association) sought a declaration that the statute and regulations were unlawful and unenforceable, and a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Board to vacate the regulations. The trial court denied the petition and complaint. On appeal, the Association contended the statute was a tax subject to Proposition 13, the fees imposed did not bear a reasonable relationship to the manufacturers’ regulatory burden, the statute unlawfully delegated revenue authority to the Board, and the statute’s regulations were arbitrary and capricious. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "American Coatings Association, Inc. v. State Air Resources Board" on Justia Law

A trial court denied Robbie Viehmeyer’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petition based on the contention that Viehmeyer was eligible for early parole consideration under subdivision (a) of section 32 to article I of the California Constitution. While being pursued on foot by two police officers, Viehmeyer fired a semiautomatic pistol four times directly at the head of one of the officers. Viehmeyer was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm, assault with a firearm on a peace officer with enhancements for personal use and personal discharge of a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court selected assault with a firearm on a peace officer as the primary offense. Viehmeyer served the full term for the primary offense, which section 32(a) defined as “the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement.” Viehmeyer remained incarcerated on the sentences imposed on the personal discharge of a firearm enhancement, the counts for possession of a firearm and unlawful taking of a vehicle, and for the sentencing enhancements for prior convictions. Viehmeyer argued that, pursuant to section 32(a), he was eligible for early parole consideration and relied on In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719 (2019), review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S259999 (Mohammad), to support that argument. The Attorney General contended Viehmeyer was not eligible for early parole consideration because of (1) the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, which is a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5(c) by virtue of the use of a firearm in its commission, and (2) the personal discharge of a firearm enhancement attendant to the assault conviction. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General and denied relief. View "In re Viehmeyer" on Justia Law

Defendants Gerquan Clark and Anthony Brown robbed three men at gunpoint. Defendants were tracked to a local retail store using a phone app on one of the cell phones they had stolen. At a showup, one of the victims identified both defendants, and another identified Clark. At trial, both victims identified Clark as the man who pointed the gun at them, and one victim identified Brown as the other man. Police never found the gun. At trial, defendants asserted the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the object used during the robbery was a real gun. Nonetheless, a jury found defendants guilty of three counts of robbery in the second degree with firearm enhancements. Additionally, the jury found each defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced Clark to an aggregate term of 21 years and Brown to an aggregate term of 12 years. On appeal, defendants claimed their felon in possession of a firearm convictions and the firearm enhancements had to be reversed because: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Clark’s prior uncharged act involving possession of a firearm pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101 (b); and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in urging the jurors to use that prior uncharged act as propensity evidence. Brown separately claimed: (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in vouching for the prosecution and disparaging defense counsel; and (4) that cumulative error required reversal. The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of felon in possession of a firearm as to both defendants and all firearm enhancements, finding the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Clark’s prior uncharged act pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101 (b), and the evidentiary error was prejudicial as to the felon in possession of a firearm count and the firearm enhancements. Because the possession conviction and firearms enhancements were reversed, the Court did not reach defendant’s allegations the prosecutor committed misconduct. As for Brown’s separate prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Court concluded the prosecutor committed misconduct in vouching for the prosecution and disparaging defense counsel, but these instances of misconduct did not prejudice Brown. Brown’s cumulative error contention was meritless. Finally, because of Senate Bill 136 (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, sec. 1), the Court struck Brown’s prior prison term enhancement and remanded for resentencing as requested by the parties. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the City and three police officers for arresting and strip searching her, a federal jury unanimously found that the police acted reasonably and the verdict defeated plaintiff's federal claims. The state law claims were also later dismissed by a United States District Judge. Plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit in state court against the City and the three officers, alleging negligence and other state law claims based on the strip search.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, which barred civil rights plaintiffs who lost in federal court from pursuing equivalent state law claims in a second suit in state court, is controlling in this case. The court explained that, although Hernandez involves a fatal shooting rather than a strip search, the difference between Hernandez and this case is nominal. Therefore, plaintiff cannot sue a second time because her first suit definitively settled her dispute: she lost and cannot now try to prove defendants acted unreasonably. View "Shuler v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Clapp plead no contest to concealing the true extent of his physical activities and abilities from his employer, the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). Consistent with a resolution negotiated by the parties, the trial court granted defendant three years’ probation, and as a condition of probation, ordered him to pay restitution. Following a hearing, defendant was ordered to pay $30,095.68 to SCIF for temporary disability benefits and $81,768.01 to CHP for benefits wrongfully obtained. He was also ordered to pay $1,350 and $70,159 to SCIF and CHP respectively for investigative costs. Defendant appealed the restitution award as to investigation costs contending that, as public investigative agencies, neither SCIF nor CHP was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of investigating his claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that as direct victims of defendant’s fraud, both CHP and SCIF were indeed entitled to restitution for investigative costs incurred in an effort to justify discontinuance of payments and recoup money defendant fraudulently obtained. View "California v. Clapp" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tyrone Douglas was convicted of two nonviolent felonies and a violent felony. The trial court chose one of the nonviolent felonies as the primary offense, imposed sentence for that offense, imposed but stayed sentence on the other nonviolent felony offense, and imposed a consecutive term for the violent felony. After Douglas’s sentencing, California voters passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, which added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution. Douglas petitioned or habeas relief, challenging a regulation adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that limited the parole-consideration benefit of section 32(a)(1) to inmates who were convicted only of nonviolent felonies, thus excluding from early parole consideration anyone convicted of one or more violent felonies plus one or more nonviolent felonies (“mixed- offense inmates”). In support of his challenge to the CDCR regulation, Douglas cited In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719, review granted February 19, 2020, S259999 (2019), which held that because the unambiguous text of section 32(a)(1) provided for early parole consideration for inmates convicted of nonviolent felony offenses, regardless of whether they were also convicted of a violent offense, a mixed-offense inmate is eligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). Although the Court of Appeal found the language of section 32(a)(1) supported an interpretation that mixed-offense inmates were entitled to early parole consideration, such an interpretation would lead to absurd results the voters did not intend. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a person convicted of a violent felony offense and sentenced to state prison was ineligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Douglas" on Justia Law

In two separate trials involving two different victims, juries found Defendant-appellant Michael Brugman guilty of three counts of corporal injury to someone with whom he had a dating relationship; three counts of violating a protective order; one count of assault with a deadly weapon; one count of making a criminal threat; one count of rape of an unconscious person; and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found that the corporal injury counts were committed within seven years of a previous conviction for aggravated assault, some of the counts were committed while Brugman was out on bail, and that Brugman incurred a serious felony prior and a prison prior. The trial court sentenced Brugman to a prison term of 25 years, 8 months. On appeal, Brugman contended: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his request for a pinpoint instruction with respect to the count of assault with a deadly weapon; (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and making a criminal threat; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by not striking Brugman’s prior strike, or the five-year enhancement for Brugman’s serious felony prior. Concluding that Brugman’s arguments lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Brugman" on Justia Law