Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Scott Pettigrew challenged his conviction for the first degree murder of Mimie Cowen, contending substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the murder was premeditated, and the trial court erred prejudicially by instructing the jury with a standard “flight” instruction that it could consider defendant’s postarrest suicide attempts as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. In addition, defendant argued there was no evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that he had the ability to pay a $514.58 “booking fee,” and the court erred when calculating presentence credits to be applied to his state prison sentence of 25 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was supported by substantial evidence of premeditation. In addition, because there was no evidence defendant fled to avoid arrest or tried to escape from custody, the Court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the trial court’s order imposing a “booking fee” without finding defendant had the ability to pay, if error, was harmless. And the Court accepted the State’s concession that defendant was entitled to an additional 21 days of presentence credit. Because the Court found no reversible error, judgment was affirmed as modified to accurately reflect defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "California v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Curry was convicted by jury of robbery. Before the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 40 years to life and imposed various costs, defendant sought to file a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court ruled the motion was untimely and did not consider it. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erred by denying as untimely his request for mental health diversion; (2) if the diversion request was untimely, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court violated due process principles by imposing costs without determining defendant’s ability to pay. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention and conditionally reversed the judgment with instructions for the trial court in considering defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion. The Court's holding mooted defendant’s second contention. The Court disagreed with defendant’s due process challenge to costs imposed. View "California v. Curry" on Justia Law

After a political action committee and two political candidates successfully campaigned for a ballot measure in a Redondo Beach municipal election, two citizens filed suit against the committee and the candidates, claiming the candidates had controlled the committee, which had used an improper title for itself. The trial court ruled in favor of the committee and candidates, awarding them attorney fees.In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal concluded that the nonparties have standing to appeal the judgment; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Rescue was a general purpose committee and that neither candidate controlled it; and the trial court acted beyond its authority by issuing a judgment against nonparties to the action. The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants, who were unquestionably the prevailing party. Finally, the court denied the request for sanctions because the appeal of the attorney fees was not frivolous. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Andahl appealed a July 2019 judgment revoking his probation and executing a prison sentence of seven years eight months imposed in 2018 when he was first placed on probation. The sentence included two prior prison term enhancements of one year under Penal Code section 667.5 (b). Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 (b) to limit qualifying prior prison terms to those served for sexually violent offenses, which defendant’s prior offenses were not. The parties did not contest that Senate Bill 136 was retroactive under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965). On appeal, defendant claimed he was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 136 under the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. McKenzie, 9 Cal.5th 40 (2020). The Attorney General responded that McKenzie did not govern because the 2018 order at issue here suspended the sentence’s execution, as opposed to its imposition, and was therefore a final judgment for retroactivity purposes. The Court of Appeal concluded that by virtue of the retroactive change in the law, defendant’s one-year enhancements were unauthorized and must be stricken. View "California v. Andahl" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Miranda was convicted on 13 counts charging sex crimes against two minor girls, including oral copulation of an unconscious person, rape of an unconscious person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person. He was sentenced under the One Strike law. On appeal, he contended in part that the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses, and that his ineligibility for youth offender parole hearings violated equal protection. The Court of Appeal agreed that battery was a lesser included offense of oral copulation of an unconscious person, rape of an unconscious person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person. Given that battery required only an offensive touching, it was impossible to commit any of these crimes without also committing battery against that person. Because of the evidence presented, the Court concluded the trial court was required to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense as to one of Miranda’s crimes, oral copulation of an unconscious person. Therefore, that conviction was reversed and the sentence vacated, as there was a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the jury would have convicted him of only battery if instructed as to that option. As to Miranda’s other two crimes, the Court found the notion that Miranda committed battery but not the greater crimes lacked a grounding in the evidence, so the trial court had no duty to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense. In addition, the Court rejected Miranda’s other challenges to his convictions, including his equal protection challenge. View "California v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that prison officials retaliated against him because he disclosed information to the Office of Internal Affairs of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) about prison officials covering up a murder and he filed administrative grievances addressing misconduct by officials at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of replevin directing prison officials to return his personal property or pay its value. The trial court dismissed the action based on failure to exhaust.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On a question of properly pleading the excuse of unavailability, the court concluded that plaintiff must allege specific facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the machinations, misrepresentations or intimidations were accomplished. In this case, the papers plaintiff filed in the trial court and in this appeal demonstrate he could amend his petition to allege specific facts showing the administrative process is unavailable to him because prison officials have thwarted his use of the inmate grievance procedure through misrepresentations and machinations. View "Foster v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Gonzalo Paredes was found guilty by jury of 35 counts of offering or delivering compensation for workers’ compensation patient referrals and 16 counts of concealing an event affecting an insurance claim. The trial court sentenced Paredes to an aggregate term of five years in prison. On appeal, Paredes claimed the prosecutor committed misconduct during his examination of one of the witnesses and during closing argument by suggesting the existence of facts not in evidence. He also contended the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay, an unavailable witness' testimony from a prior federal trial. Further, Paredes contended the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Paredes' convictions and sentences. View "California v. Paredes" on Justia Law

Defendant Munir Mtanews Hawara owned a liquor store. He hired Willis Simmons to burn down a rival liquor store, but Simmons failed. Simmons then subcontracted the job to Randy Ramirez. Ramirez tried to burn down the rival store three times, but he, too, failed. The scheme was exposed when Simmons’s sister contacted police. A jury found defendant guilty on four counts of arson of a structure. On all four counts, state of emergency enhancements were found true. On two counts, accelerant device enhancements were found true. Defendant was sentenced to 11 years 8 months in prison, along with fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, Defendant contended, among other things, that the prosecutor improperly cross- examined his character witnesses by asking them if it would change their opinion if they “knew” or “learned” about his commission of the crimes; he maintained that the only correct form for this type of cross-examination was to ask if it would have changed their opinion if they “heard” about his commission of the crimes. He also contended his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper cross-examination. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held a defense character witness who testifies based on his or her own opinion — rather than based solely on the defendant’s reputation — can be asked on cross-examination if he or she knows about the defendant’s bad acts. Alternatively, the Court held any error was harmless, because defendant’s commission of the crimes was amply shown by other evidence. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that defendant did not show any other error. View "California v. Hawara" on Justia Law

A trial court denied defendant-appellant Anthony Williams’s motion to substitute retained counsel for his appointed counsel. After the jury found Williams guilty of first degree murder, and found true a special allegation, the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Williams claimed the trial court violated his constitutional right to counsel by denying his request to be represented by counsel of his choice and that this error requires reversal without regard to prejudice. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law