Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After entering a plea of no contest to attempted driving with a blood alcohol-level of 0.08 percent or more within 10 years of a felony conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and admitting two prior DUI convictions, defendant Tanya Cummings was granted five years of formal probation. She appealed, contending that : (1) attempted DUI, even with two prior felony DUI convictions, was a misdemeanor under the plain terms of Penal Code section 23550.5; and (2) the trial court erred by ordering her to pay for the cost of her court appointed counsel without a finding of ability to pay or a showing of the actual costs incurred. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Cummings" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order enjoining the County from enforcing its orders to the extent they prohibit outdoor dining due to the COVID-19 pandemic until after conducting an appropriate risk-benefit analysis. During the pendency of the petition, the County lifted its prohibition based on infection rates declining and ICU availability increasing. However, the court concluded that these cases are not moot because conditions may change and the County may re-impose its outdoor restaurant dining ban.The court held that courts should be extremely deferential to public health authorities, particularly during a pandemic, and particularly where, as here, the public health authorities have demonstrated a rational basis for their actions. In this case, the County's order banning outdoor dining is not a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law and is rationally related to limiting the spread of COVID-19.Even assuming that Mark's, a restaurant, has a First Amendment right to freedom of assembly, or that Mark's has standing to bring a First Amendment challenge on behalf of its patrons or employees, the court held that the order does not violate Mark's purported First Amendment right to freedom of assembly or that of its patrons. The court explained that the County's order does not regulate assembly based on the expressive conduct of the assembly; it is undisputed that limiting the spread of COVID-19 is a legitimate and substantial government interest; and the order leaves open alternative channels for assembling. Accordingly, the court entered a new order denying the Restauranteurs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "County of Los Angeles Department of Health v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Ashford San Francisco owns the 2nd Street property. In 2013, a majority ownership interest in Ashford San Francisco was acquired by Ashford Hospitality. The transfer resulted in a change in ownership of the property, which the city determined triggered the imposition of the transfer tax. Ashford paid $3,348,025 in transfer taxes based upon the $133,920,700 self-reported value of the property, then filed an administrative claim for a refund. The transfer tax has five tiered (graduated) tax rates.When the city did not timely act, Ashford filed suit. seeking a refund, alleging that the transfer tax “imposes different tax rates on taxpayers for performing the same exact function” and arbitrarily classifies property transfer instruments for the imposition of a varying rate of taxation, solely by reference to the amount of the consideration in the transactions in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The court of appeal affirmed a judgment in favor of the city. The city rationally chose to treat the sale or transfer of a higher-valued property differently from the sale of a lower-valued property; the transfer tax “taxes all transfers of the same consideration or value equally.” The court noted the city’s justifications: the owner’s ability to pay and that time and costs associated with the city’s audits for the self-reported transfer tax may increase depending on the value of the property. View "Ashford Hospitality v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

San Rafael voters approved by a two-thirds vote a Paramedic Services Special Tax, imposing an annual special tax up to a maximum of 14 cents per square foot on all nonresidential structures in the city to fund paramedic services. In 2015-2016, the city determined that the Assessor had been inadvertently omitted certain properties from the Paramedic Tax assessment. City officials rectified this oversight prospectively and sought to collect a portion of the Tax that had gone unpaid. One property owner that received notice of the levy was Valley Baptist, a nonprofit religious organization that operates a church on property within city boundaries. The city requested payment of $13,644.Valley Baptist filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the Tax as applied to a place of worship. Valley Baptist argued that it is exempted from payment of all property taxes under article XIII, section 3(f) of the California Constitution, including the Paramedic Tax. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeal held that the religious exemption does not extend to non-ad valorem special property taxes like the Paramedic Tax. The constitutional articles added by Propositions 13 and 218 do not evince an intent by the electorate to extend the scope of article XIII exemptions to special property taxes. View "Valley Baptist Church v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016,” which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. Petitioners Alexei Kavanaugh, Alberto Moreno, and Larry Smith were denied parole release under the procedures established by the parole regulations. In separate habeas corpus proceedings challenging the parole denials, the trial courts invalidated the parole regulations and ordered new parole consideration proceedings for the petitioners. The courts found the parole regulations were unconstitutional because they did not guarantee the assistance of legal counsel for potential parolees, they did not require in-person parole hearings, and they permitted individual hearing officers to make parole release decisions. According to the courts, the parole regulations conflict with section 32’s guarantee of parole consideration and violate prisoners’ procedural due process rights. The Court of Appeal concluded the parole regulations did not conflict with the constitutional guarantee of parole consideration or violate due process. "Section 32... vests CDCR with authority to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of parole consideration. CDCR acted within its mandate by enacting the parole regulations." Further, the Court concluded parole regulations required annual parole eligibility reviews, set forth sufficiently definite criteria governing parole release decisions, mandated a written statement of reasons for each parole release decision, and granted prisoners notice of the parole proceeding, an opportunity to submit a written statement to the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board), and the right to seek review of an adverse decision. "These features adequately safeguard against arbitrary and capricious parole release decisions." Orders granting the petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions were reversed. View "In re Kavanaugh" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jonathon Blanco was found guilty by jury of: (1) bringing a controlled substance into a penal institution; and (2) bringing a deadly weapon into a penal institution. The trial court found defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction and sentenced him to prison for a term of six years. On appeal, defendant raised two issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the useable quantity element of the controlled substance offense; and (2) the trial court erred by denying his request for the jury to be instructed on the allegedly lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. The Court of Appeal found merit to defendant's first contention: because there was evidence suggesting defendant possessed less than a usable quantity of methamphetamine, the Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict if it had been properly instructed. Accordingly, the trial court’s error was prejudicial, and that portion of the judgment was reversed and remanded. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Blanco" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Lyon was found guilty by jury of six counts of eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications, and two counts of disorderly conduct. These counts arose from defendant's secret videotaping of prostitutes at his residence. Defendant argued on appeal that prostitutes, as a matter of law, have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications during sexual encounters at a client’s residence, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on those grounds. He further contended reversal was required due to instructional error, unlawful prosecution under the "Williamson" rule, and an unlawful probation search. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's convictions. View "California v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under California Penal Code section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly “is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who are convicted of first degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal, defendant reasserted section 3051’s exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The Court of Appeal independently concluded the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not an equal protection violation. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Foster Farms for its allegedly misleading labels and against American Humane for its allegedly negligent certification. The Court of Appeal concluded that it need not decide whether there are triable issues of fact that would defeat summary judgment. Rather, the court concluded that plaintiff has not pleaded a viable cause of action against either defendant. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Foster Farms are barred by federal preemption. In this case, plaintiff's direct causes of action against Foster Farms is based on the premise that its labels' inclusion of the American Humane Certified logo was itself misleading, because the chicken was not treated in a manner that an objectively reasonable consumer would consider humane. The court concluded that these causes of action are barred by the doctrine of federal preemption, based on the express preemption clause of the Poultry and Poultry Products Inspection Act. The court also concluded that the negligent certification claim against American Humane is not viable in the absence of physical injury. View "Leining v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Luis Figueras appealed the denial of his postjudgment petition to vacate his murder conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal; Counsel filed a "Wende" brief, advising defendant of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and the Court of Appeal received no communication from defendant. The appeal was then dismissed as abandoned. Counsel filed a petition for rehearing, which was granted. After supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeal again concluded the appeal was abandoned, and accordingly again dismissed the appeal. On rehearing, defendant contended the Wende procedure applied or should have applied to an appeal from an order denying a postconviction petition seeking relief pursuant to section 1170.95. Quoting California v. Cole, 52 Cal.App.5th 1023 (2020), the Court explained“Wende set forth the procedures to be followed during the defendant’s ‘first appeal of right’—that is, during the direct appeal of his judgment of conviction and sentence. At this stage in criminal proceedings, a criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. ... [W]e reject the notion that the Constitution compels the adoption or extension of Wende procedures (or any subset of them) for appeals other than a criminal defendant’s first appeal of right because, beyond that appeal, there is no right to the effective assistance of counsel." The Court advised that once appointed counsel reviewed a defendant's record and finds no arguable issues to raise on appeal, counsel confirms defendant he has a right to file a supplemental brief, and the Court has the duty to address any issue defendant raises, but the Court may dismiss the appeal without conducting an independent review of the record. With no supplemental brief filed in this case, the Court dismissed the appeal as abandoned. View "California v. Figueras" on Justia Law