Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court did not err in ruling that the Board is bound by the factual findings and credibility determinations that established the basis for the federal district court's grant of petitioner's habeas petition, but that the Board is not bound by the factual findings and credibility determinations from the district court's order allowing petitioner to pass through the Schlup gateway.The court concluded that a district court's Schlup gateway finding of "actual innocence" is not necessarily equivalent to a finding that the person is "factually innocent" under Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a), thus requiring the Board to recommend payment of that person's claim without a hearing. The court also concluded that the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the district court in determining that the habeas petitioner could pass through the Schlup gateway is not necessarily binding on the Board in a hearing on a section 4900 claim. The court explained that the language of sections 4309, subdivision (b) and 1485.5, subdivisions (c) and (d), make clear that only those factual findings and credibility determinations relied upon by the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus—as opposed to allowing the petitioner to pass through the Schlup gateway—are binding on the Board. View "Souliotes v. California Victim Compensation Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that LAUSD discriminated against her based on her "electromagnetic hypersensitivity," failed to accommodate her condition, and retaliated against her—in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq. The trial court sustained LAUSD's demurrer to plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff adequately pled her cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation for her disability. The court explained that the FEHA protections against torts based on disability are independent of those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The FAC alleges that plaintiff could not work because she experienced "the various symptoms of which LAUSD had been warned could occur, namely, chronic pain, headaches, nausea, itching, burning sensations on her skin, ear issues, shortness of breath, inflammation, heart palpitations, respiratory complications, foggy headedness, and fatigue, all symptoms of Microwave Sickness or EHS." In this case, plaintiff adequately pled physical disability within the four corners of the statute. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege adverse employment action taken against her with discriminatory or retaliatory motive; plaintiff adequately pled a cause of action for failure to prove reasonable accommodation for a physical disability; plaintiff failed to allege failure to engage in the interactive process; and the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Brown v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

Alexander Valliant petitioned to recall his sentence and be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91(b), a statute which authorized such relief for military veterans who suffered from military-related trauma and substance abuse, and who did not have those factors considered as mitigating factors when they were originally sentenced. The trial court denied his petition on the basis that section 1170.91(b)(1)(B) authorized resentencing relief only for persons who were sentenced before January 1, 2015. On its face, this provision did not apply to Valliant who was sentenced in March of 2015. Valliant argued to the Court of Appeal the trial court erred in its interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), contending the subdivision extended resentencing relief to all veterans whose military-related trauma was not considered at their initial sentencing, without regard to when that sentencing took place. Valliant suggested this broad construction was the only reasonable interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), while amicus claimed the language was “poorly drafted” and ambiguous, and urged the Appellate Court to resolve the purported ambiguity by examining the statute’s purpose and legislative history. The Court affirmed the order, finding (b)(1)(B) unambiguously specified its resentencing relief was limited to cases in which “[t]he person was sentenced prior to January 1, 2015.” It further specified that “[t]his subdivision shall apply retroactively, whether or not the case was final as of January 1, 2015.” View "California v. Valliant" on Justia Law

In 2007, Juan Rodriguez, a non-citizen, entered a plea agreement in San Diego County that avoided any adverse immigration consequences. After the plea was entered, but before sentencing, Rodriguez was arrested and jailed for another crime in Riverside County. As a result of that arrest, Rodriguez did not appear at the scheduled sentencing hearing. He later agreed to be sentenced in absentia, and the court imposed a sentence subjecting Rodriguez to deportation. Deportation proceedings were initiated after Rodriguez’s release from custody and remain ongoing. In 2019, after amendments to Penal Code section 1473.7, Rodriguez moved to vacate his conviction on the grounds that he had not been sufficiently advised of the immigration consequences he faced. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Rodriguez challenged that decision, asserting the court erred by finding he meaningfully understood he would become deportable as a result of the plea. The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence supported Rodriguez’s motion. The Court thus reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to grant Rodriguez’s motion to vacate the conviction. View "California v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In a prior opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeal determined the tiered water rate system used by the City of San Juan Capistrano (the City) violated the California Constitution. The City offered to refund its water ratepayers the difference between what they paid and what they should have paid for a 10-month period of time, in exchange for a release of other claims against the City related to the tiered water rate system. Plaintiffs Hootan Daneshmand, Brian Montgomery, and John Bottjer were ratepayers in the City. Bottjer signed the release and received a refund; Daneshmand and Montgomery did not. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of claim against the City, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of ratepayers, to recover the difference between what they paid and what they should have paid during the entire time the tiered water rate system was in place. The City denied the notice of claim, which was filed more than one year after the last bill under the tiered water rate system was due, as untimely under Government Code section 911.2. The Court of Appeal determined claims of Bottjer and the other ratepayers who obtained a refund from the City were barred by the release those ratepayers signed. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal, the release was valid and enforceable. Further, Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were properly dismissed by the trial court. Finally, the claims of Daneshmand, Montgomery, and the other ratepayers who did not accept the City’s refund offer were barred because the notice of claim was filed more than one year after the claims accrued. Plaintiffs failed to show that waiver or any other legal or equitable doctrine affected the application of Government Code section 911.2 in this case. View "Daneshmand v. City of San Juan Capistrano" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.C. (minor) appealed a court order sustaining the State's petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged minor carried a concealed dirk or dagger on his person in violation of Penal Code section 21310. Minor argued, and the State conceded, reversal was called for because the juvenile court erred when it found the human trafficking affirmative defense set forth in Penal Code section 236.23 did not apply in his case. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the juvenile court erred, but declined the parties’ invitation to find the requirements of the defense were met. The Court reversed and ordered a new hearing on the applicability of Penal Code section 236.23. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

Armando Marrero pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to another person, with sentencing enhancements for great bodily injury, multiple victims, and a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for five years and granted formal probation, on the condition (among others) that Marrero spend 180 days in local custody. At a subsequent hearing, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $358,047.79, covering $350,000 in attorney fees and approximately $8,000 in travel expenses. Marrero appealed, contending: (1) the attorney fees order was excessive; (2) the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting illegible handwritten attorney time records into evidence; and (3) the court violated due process by awarding travel expenses without adequate notice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Marrero’s first two contentions but agreed with the third. The Court therefore reversed the award of travel expenses with directions to rehear the matter on proper notice. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Marrero" on Justia Law

Months after a Pennsylvania court ordered Reginald Burgess be put on supervised probation, a jury in California convicted him of violating Penal Code section 29815, possession of a firearm in violation of an express condition of probation. The superior court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Burgess three years’ probation with various conditions, ordering that he could move to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor upon 18 months of successful probation. Burgess appealed, contending insufficient evidence supported his conviction. Specifically, pointing to a Judicial Council jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 2512, he argued an essential element of the section 29815 offense was not met: his violation of a court order that he not own or possess a firearm. Burgess contended that because the Pennsylvania probation department directly set the conditions of his probation, there was no court order for purposes of the offense. The California Court of Appeal rejected these contentions. "Interpretation of section 29815 is not guided by form jury instructions, which are not the law. ... the statutory language merely requires the probationer be bound by the condition." The Court found the State proved Burgess had agreed to a condition of probation specifically restricting his possession of firearms, and substantial evidence supported his possession of such firearms in California while subject to the probation condition. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Burgess" on Justia Law

At 21 years old, appellant Joshua Acosta, who was diagnosed with a form of high-functioning autism spectrum disorder, plotted with his codefendant, to kill their friend Katlynn’s parents, whom Acosta believed was physically and sexually abusing her. Acosta shot and killed Katlynn’s parents and a family friend who was at their house. A jury convicted Acosta of three counts of first degree murder and found true the multiple murder special circumstance and firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus an additional 75 years to life in prison. On appeal, Acosta claimed his LWOP sentences were unconstitutional and had to be modified to allow for future parole consideration. Much of his challenge related to California Penal Code section 3051, which granted the right to a youth offender parole hearing to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, and to juvenile and young adult offenders sentenced to indeterminate or life terms, no matter how lengthy. According to Acosta, section 3051 violated equal protection because it denied young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP the right to a youth offender parole hearing. Acosta further contended his LWOP sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Acosta" on Justia Law

In 1989, after appellant Jody Ann Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16-year-old brother, the two killed the brother by stabbing him and bludgeoning him with a rock and then buried his body in the desert. A jury convicted Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision to the Penal Code, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements petitioned for relief under SB 1437, arguing she could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeal's decision in Clements’ original appeal and made two alternative determinations: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition on each of these independent, adequate grounds. Clements argued the trial court erred (1) by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal; (2) by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute; and (3) by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the trial judge sat as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95 (d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The trial judge correctly denied Clements’ petition for resentencing for that reason. View "California v. Clements" on Justia Law